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1ABSTRACT 
 
 
e are no less directly acquainted with the temporal structure of the world 
than with its spatial structure. We hear one word succeeding another; feel 
two taps as simultaneous; or see the glow of a firework persisting, before it 
finally fizzles and fades. However, time is special, for we not only experience temporal 
properties; experience itself is structured in time.    W
 
Part One articulates a natural framework for thinking about experience in time. I claim (i) 
that experience in its experiential aspect has a realistically conceived temporal structure; 
(ii) that our judgements about that structure always go via judgements about the temporal 
structure of the apparent objects of perception; and (iii) that a subject undergoing 
perceptual experience of a given experiential kind is always in a position to know that 
they are undergoing experience of that kind simply in virtue of so undergoing. On this 
basis, I argue that the temporal structure of experience cannot systematically come apart 
from the temporal structure of its objects. 
 
Part Two treats four puzzles relating to our experience of time. The first is Dennett’s 
notorious discussion of masking and apparent motion phenomena. The second is the 
traditional debate regarding the very possibility of perceiving temporal properties. The 
third is Fara’s recent contention that standard explanations of our experience of slow 
changes preclude us from perceiving constant motion. A common reaction to these three 
puzzles is to reject some element of the naïve picture of temporal experience developed 
in Part One. I resolve them instead by showing how each arises from mistakenly thinking 
that experience is homoeomerous down to very short durations or instants. That is, thinking 
that we can analyse experience into a series of independent short slices, and explain the 
nature of the stream of consciousness in terms of those slices. The final chapter discusses 
a fourth puzzle about visual motion perception which I diagnose as driven by a rather 
different, but equally misguided way of thinking about vision. 
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PART I – EXPERIENCE IN TIME 
 
Chapter One: 
The Temporal Structure of Experience 
 
 
Time is the thing I am made of. Time is a river that sweeps me along, but I am the river; it is a 
tiger that tears me apart, but I am the tiger; it is a fire that consumes me, but I am the fire. The 
world, unfortunately, is real; I, unfortunately, am Borges.
1
  
 
1. The Datum 
 
yriad different temporal properties and relations can be made manifest in 
perceptual awareness. We experience objects enduring, and their doings 
and modifications as sequential, simultaneous, and persistent. We can hear 
one word succeeding another; feel two taps as simultaneous; or see the glow of a 
firework persisting, before it finally fizzles and fades.
2 Our experience is also replete with 
aspects which, whilst not strictly temporal, bear a logical connection to time. We can feel 
a raindrop run down our cheek; watch a ball trace its parabola into our cupped hands; or 
hear the crescendo of the horn section as the symphony reaches its climax. Since motion 
and change in general necessarily take place over time, I use the phrase ‘temporal 
properties’ so as to include these aspects of our experience in addition to the strictly 
temporal aspects already mentioned. 
M 
 
                                                 
 
1 Borges (1964) ‘A New Refutation of Time’ from Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings. 
2 Cf. Block and Zakay who note, “There are several qualitatively different kinds of temporal experiences: 
simultaneity, successiveness, temporal order, duration, and temporal perspective” (2001: 59). My primary 
interest is in the first three kinds of experience, and also our experience of relative duration – see §1.1. 
Some argue that we also experience ‘A-properties’ (presentness, pastness etc.) or even the ‘flow’ or 
‘passage’ of time itself. I do not discuss these possibilities. 
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Just as with properties such as shape, colour, and pitch, when it comes to describing 
what it is like for us experientially, we naturally appeal to temporal properties in order to 
give an adequate account of our conscious lives. Strawson famously pointed out that, 
when asked to describe their experience, naïve subjects do so in terms of ordinary, 
apparent objects of perception and their features. Thus, his imagined subject reports his 
visual experience by saying that he sees “the red light of the setting sun filtering through 
the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms … [and] the dappled deer grazing in 
groups on the vivid green grass…” (1979: 43). Such descriptions already refer to 
processes which essentially take place over time, in particular grazing. But in any case, 
Strawson’s naïve subject might equally have answered that he could see the deer 
gambolling in the dusk-lit grass. He might have noted how his attention was drawn to the 
branches of the elms swaying in the wind and casting a play of successive shadow 
patterns on the ground. From this perspective, we seem to be no less directly acquainted 
with the temporal structure of the world around us than with its spatial structure. As 
John Foster puts it, 
 
duration and change through time seem to be presented to us with the same phenomenal 
immediacy as homogeneity and variation of colour through space. (1982: 255)
3
 
Part Two of this thesis considers ways in which philosophers have struggled to account 
for these two aspects of our perceptual experience: both the strictly temporal aspects of 
experience (e.g., perceived succession, persistence and simultaneity) and those aspects, 
like perceived change and motion, which whilst not strictly temporal bear a logical 
connection to time. There I try to understand and respond to the difficulties that 
philosophers have had in accounting for temporal experience, difficulties felt to be so 
large that some have even denied that experience really does make manifest temporal 
properties. For now I take our experience of such aspects as a datum in order to explore 
issues to do with the temporal structure of our inner lives and the relation between our 
inner experience and its apparent objects. This may seem back-to-front. However, as will 
become evident in Part Two, one can only achieve clarity regarding the answers to 
questions concerning how our experience can present or represent the world as it 
unfolds in time, if one is first clear about how experience itself is structured in time. The 
                                                 
 
3 See also Dainton 2000: 114-5, Broad 1923: 287, 351, O’Shaughnessy 2000: Ch.1, §3 and many other 
places; though contrast Le Poidevin 2007: Ch.6. 
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fact that experience itself has temporal structure imposes constraints on the way 
experience can make manifest the temporal structure of the world; we must understand 
experience in time before we can understand experience of time. 
 
Throughout, my primary concern will be experience in the narrow sense of perceptual 
experience. Other kinds of mental episode (imagining, recollecting, thinking and so forth) 
have temporal shape and are no less a part of the stream of consciousness than 
perceptual experience. There is, for example, something it is like to undergo an 
imaginative episode and its temporal shape contributes to that being so. As such, many 
of my claims will in fact apply to such episodes.
4 Nonetheless, the problems of time and 
experience arise most forcefully in the perceptual case and that case will be my burden. 
 
1.1  Metrical Properties 
 
Amongst the temporal properties we should distinguish the metrical properties, in 
particular the metrical durations of events and processes, and also the metrical rates of 
change of events and processes. The examples of temporal perception above leave it 
open whether we can, for example, experience a movement from A to B as taking two 
seconds, or a thunder clap as lasting three; and likewise whether we can hear the period 
of a siren as being 500ms or see a sports car as accelerating at seven metres per second 
per second. Certainly we can perceive that such things are the case – we can be 
positioned to know these facts in virtue of undergoing perceptual experience. But should 
we think of such properties as being genuine aspects of the content of our experience? 
As being, strictly speaking, perceptual? There are good reasons to think not. 
 
Before motivating that claim, a caveat. Some theorists are inclined to think of vision as 
possessed of one kind of content which determines phenomenal character and a further 
content which is independent of phenomenology.
5 My focus here is purely on the 
phenomenological. Nothing I argue conflicts with the view that, in some non-
                                                 
 
4 Especially those in Chapter Three – though see discussion there also. The notion of transparency 
developed in Chapter Two highlights a clear contrast between perceptual experience and these other 
episode kinds. 
5 Some will want to think of this as the narrow/wide distinction but the distinction can be drawn 
independently of one’s view of externalism. For helpful discussion of the various views one might take, at 
least on a representationalist approach, see Chalmers 2004. 
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phenomenological sense, experience has content with metrical properties. I say more 
about the phenomenological in Chapter Three. In terms there elucidated, my claim is 
that metrical properties are not amongst the experiential properties of experience. 
 
Why deny that metrical temporal properties are amongst the experiential? Firstly, 
consider the spatial analogy. Can we experience objects as being a metre long? Or as 
growing by a centimetre a second? The cartoon below is evidence that the intuitive 
answer is, ‘No.’ 
 
 
© Rod McKie, 2004/5. 
 
If our cartoon-Crusoe’s vision actually presented his island as barely a few metres across, or 
the miniscule palm tree as only centimetres high, the pretence engaged in would be 
impossible to relate to – or at least not sufficiently plausible for us to find the joke 
amusing. One could hardly pretend to be a giant if you saw the things around you as only 
centimetres large. Rather, the pretence takes place against the tacit background 
understanding that vision is neutral as regards the metrical size of the island. 
 
Pretence would also make sense if vision presented the island illusorily. But the idea that 
our cartoon-Crusoe has been enjoying visual illusions of the island as many metres across, 
is not how we ordinarily react to the conceit. We regard visual illusions as robust in the 
face of countervailing beliefs. Yet we take the pretence to be extremely tenuous and 
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easily abandoned.
6 In other words, we take it that the man-as-giant pretence is not 
grounded in experience; rather, experience leaves the pretence open to Crusoe. As the 
novelty wears off, the island continues to look, as it always has done. How is that? My 
suggestion is that the island continues to look small relative to his [Crusoe’s] body-size. In 
this way, Crusoe’s visual experience is neutral as between giant-pretence and small island-
reality. 
 
Similarly, consider how Lewis Carroll relates the Wonderland story after Alice has begun 
to shrink again. “[Alice] looked down at her hands, and was surprised to see that she had 
put on one of the Rabbit’s little white kid gloves while she was talking. ‘How can I have 
done that?’ she thought. ‘I must be growing small again.’ She got up and went to the 
table to measure herself by it, and found that, as nearly as she could guess, she was now 
about two feet high” (2001: Ch.2). Again, it is crucial to the narrative here that Alice does 
not perceive metrical properties. If perception presented or apparently presented her 
with metrical size-properties, then Alice’s experience (whether or not veridical) would 
not be neutral as to her size, and so she would immediately see herself as small again. 
Instead, Alice seeks comparison with the table to establish that she is small again (as 
opposed to the glove having grown). The table is precisely used to gain metrical 
knowledge, since Alice (correctly) takes it that the table has remained constant in size. 
Alice’s behaviour seems quite rational to us and is best explained by the fact that she, like 
us, does not perceive metrical spatial properties. The table is not being used to rule on 
whether her experience is veridical or not. That could be its only role if her hand was 
apparently presented as only a few centimetres in size. 
 
I now spell out the argument against metrical spatial properties figuring in the content of 
visual experience more rigorously. The argument focuses on two cases. 
 
Case 1: Alice, who has led an entirely normal life until the current time, awakes 
from a dreamless sleep. Everything in her visible environment, except for her 
own body, is a quarter of its normal size.
7
 
                                                 
 
6 Likewise, we do not think that entertaining this kind of pretence (or indeed convincing ourselves of a 
false belief) can alter the nature of our visual experience, dramatically shifting its content. 
7 The shrinking must be limited to avoid metaphysical issues concerning absolute and relative space. 
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Case 2: Alice, who has led an entirely normal life until the current time, awakes 
from a dreamless sleep. She is four-times her normal size. Nothing else has 
changed in size. 
 
Clearly in both cases, the sizes of visible things relative to Alice’s own size have changed. 
However, the question is whether visually speaking it looks to Alice as if she is in one 
case or the other. Firstly, I claim that Alice cannot distinguish the cases on the basis of her 
sensory experience, specifically visual experience. They are visually indiscriminable from 
Alice’s point of view.
8 If we think that phenomenal aspects of experience make 
themselves manifest (a claim I defend in Chapter Three), the experiences cannot present 
different properties and yet be indiscriminable. Thus, we have two basic options. Either 
vision presents metrical properties to Alice veridically in at most one of the cases. Or 
vision is neutral and does not present metrical properties at all. 
 
If vision is not neutral, at most one case is veridical. The question is, which? Of course, 
the answer might be neither. But this simply raises the further question, what are the 
veridicality conditions of Alice’s experience in both cases? These questions raise a clear 
challenge to someone who thinks that we perceive metrical properties: provide some 
basis on which to prefer one metrical content as opposed to another. Conversely, the 
denial that we perceive metrical properties allows one to offer the following simple and 
attractive account of the situation. In both cases, Alice perceives the world as being 
much smaller than her own body size, she is aware of the relative change in size of 
things. However, her visual experience is quite neutral as to what has actually happened; 
vision does not speak to the issue of which situation she is in. 
 
We can put the point another way. One way of introducing veridicality conditions into 
experience is as follows.
9 At least with respect to those aspects of experience which are 
transparent (see Chapter Two), a request to describe our experience will be answered by 
describing the world apparently encountered in experience. This description of the world 
                                                 
 
8 At least in terms of size. I leave aside various distracting complications. For example, if Alice’s powers of 
discrimination remained the same, at least on one way of understanding discriminative powers, then she 
would be able to discriminate more detail on a larger hand and so there would be certain differences in 
how things looked to her. 
9 This way of putting things attempts to remain neutral as to whether we think of experience as having 
propositional content with veridicality conditions or alternatively we think of experience in relational, or 
naïve realist terms, but nonetheless wish to allow for veridicality conditions. For a challenge, at the very 
least to the propositional content approach here, see Travis 2004. 
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as apparently encountered provides a source of veridicality conditions for we can say that 
the experience is veridical to the extent that the description applies to the world actually 
encountered.
10 Now, if we consider Alice’s ability to make judgements about the world 
encountered on the basis of her experience, she is in no position to describe the metrical 
properties of the world. She cannot judge which case she is in. As a result, employing the 
above method of introducing veridicality conditions, these will at most include the 
condition that the visible world be a fourth of its usual size relative to her body. In other 
words, both experiences will be veridical.
11
 
One worry about this argument is that it is too powerful. We certainly allow that we can 
see things as being pea-sized or golf-ball-sized. Does this not amount to seeing things as 
having metrical properties, where the unit is a pea or football? If we deny this, what sizes 
can we see things as having? I suggest quite generally that we see things as having relative 
sizes, in particular that we see things as having sizes relative to our own bodies.
12 Seeing 
things as golf-ball-sized simply means that we see things as having the size-relative-to-us 
that a ‘normal’ pea or golf-ball does. Similarly, we can allow that things have the size-
relative-to-us that a ‘normal’ metre-rule has. Now consider the two cases above. In both 
we can say that things look smaller-relative-to-Alice. For her, golf-balls look pea-sized, 
where this means the size that peas normally have relative to her. And, likewise, there is a 
sense in which things look to be much smaller than a metre, viz., they look much smaller 
than a metre-long object normally does to her. But this is not to say that things look a 
metre long simpliciter. 
 
Clearly the aforementioned aspects of vision depend on the relative sizes things have 
during a ‘normal’ environmental upbringing. So one might argue that in a normal 
environment we can see things as a metre long after all. Now this certainly is a plausible 
line to take in certain cases. For example, imagine that I have grow up in a ‘normal’ 
environment often encountering oranges in the way we ordinarily do. Consider also the 
                                                 
 
10 Of course, I assume an ideally rational and attentive describer. 
11 Once again this argument assumes that we have access to the veridicality conditions of our experience; 
again see Chapter Three below. 
12 I take it that giving the precise details of the relativity here is an empirical question. I also assume that we 
only have a grip on the relative size of our own bodies. As Pickard puts it, “…what is hard to see is how 
[one’s] awareness of one’s body size [relative to other bodies] could be made available from the inside 
alone, and not in conjunction with one’s awareness, through the outer senses, of the sizes of these other 
things. Whatever awareness of one’s size amounts to, it seems to require an external measure” (2001: 27). 
Thus, in my view, all size perception is relative. 
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schmorange, a fruit that has precisely the look of a normal orange but, being the creation 
of a hare-brained geneticist, is in fact not of that natural kind. If I do have a chance 
encounter with a schmorange, it is not wholly outlandish to suggest that I enjoy a visual 
illusion of the schmorange as an orange. Given the context and my environmental 
upbringing, possession of an orange-look might be thought sufficient for appearing to 
me as an orange. The fruit may also have the look of a schmorange, but I have not been 
brought up around schmoranges. 
 
Such a story is not plausible in the metrical case. For it provides no answer to the initial 
challenge: what are the veridicality conditions of Alice’s experience? Which case, if either, 
is her experience veridical in? Moreover, whereas when I am presented with an 
schmorange, I naturally describe my experience in terms of oranges (hence the grounds for 
positing illusion), Alice does not naturally describe her experience in terms of things 
being metrically different sizes. It is not as if a table that she would have described on the 
basis of vision as being two metres long, she now describes as being half a metre long. 
Rather her description is neutral. In sum then, the most natural view to take of Alice’s 
predicament is that her visual experience is neutral across cases and does not involve 
illusions. More generally, the most natural view to take is that our experience presents us 
with the relative sizes of objects and not their metrical sizes. 
 
Turning to the temporal case, we can perform a similar thought experiment to probe 
whether the temporal features of our experience include metrical properties.
13 Take a 
subject, Rose, and record her neurological activity over an hour. Then replicate the same 
pattern of activity in her brain but speeded up so that it is all compressed into the space 
of a few seconds.
14 This will plausibly induce a massive hallucination whose apparent 
objects will, I presume, match the objects seen in the recorded hour at least in structural 
properties.
15 Now, if we genuinely perceive temporal metrical properties in experience, 
this kind of case generates a question: how long do the events in the hallucinatory 
experience appear to last to Rose? Do they seem to last an hour (or more precisely: to 
                                                 
 
13 Conversations with Geoff Lee inspired this discussion. In forthcoming work, Lee uses reflection on 
experience consequent on ingesting a drug which speeds up neurological metabolism to argue against 
transparency claims (such as those in Chapter Two below). My own view is that transparency claims are 
immune to such objections once we recognise that metrical temporal properties do not feature in the 
content of experience as I argue here. Again, see also Chapter Five, §1. 
14 Not that this is nomologically feasible but it is, I take it, metaphysically or conceptually possible. 
15 The use of hallucination is inessential to the example but helps simplify discussion. 
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have just those durations which were apparent in the original experience) or do they 
appear to unfold over merely a few seconds (or more precisely: to have vastly briefer 
durations than those apparent in the original experience)? 
 
There is a complication in thinking about how to answer this question. In trying to 
imagine Rose’s experience, we cannot ignore the temporal structure of Rose’s non-
perceptual inner life, her stream of thought in the broadest sense, in contrast to her 
stream of perceptual experience. In the story as told above, this too will, I presume, be 
speeded up. In other words, Rose will think very much faster than normal, her stream of 
imagery will go past very much faster and so forth. Given that this is so, it is hard to see 
how Rose could possibly discover ‘from the inside’ that she was not simply ‘reliving’ her 
prior experience. That is, it is extremely hard to see how Rose could, by reflection on her 
inner life alone, distinguish her new situation from one in which everything in the world 
apparently perceived went on at the same pace and over the same period of time as ever. 
To know that something was radically different would require some kind of ‘meta-time’ 
against which to measure her current experience and thought in order to determine 
whether it lasted the same amount of time as her past experience. I see no reason to 
believe in such a ‘meta-time’.
16 The default and by far the simplest hypothesis should be 
that no such time exists. 
 
To clarify the situation we should distinguish two possible kinds of metrical property: 
subjective and objective. Objective metrical properties include the objective amount of 
change per unit time. Thus, in the above scenario Rose’s inner life changes objectively 
much faster than normal. Rose, however, is quite blind to this. Subjective metrical 
properties include the rates of change that things seem to have. Insofar as these 
properties exist, I suggest that they do not change in Rose’s case: everything in the world 
appears to her to go on at the same rate as ever. Objective metrical change isn’t 
something that Rose notices (or can notice) in the envisaged scenario. But the question 
remains open whether we should think of her experience as involving subjective metrical 
properties. 
 
                                                 
 
16 Cf. Dainton (2001: 21-3) in his discussion of meta-time in the context of McTaggart’s argument. 
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If experiential content does include subjective temporal metrical properties, the fact that 
Rose will not be able to distinguish her new situation suggests – assuming the principle 
defended in Chapter Three that phenomenal aspects of experience are manifest – that 
these are the same in both cases; in both things seem to take, say, an hour. 
 
One reason to hesitate here is that Rose’s neural activity seems consistent with an entirely 
veridical experience in a creature with a very fast brain, living in a very fast part of the 
world. It seems deeply implausible to suggest that this creature would always be subject 
to illusions of temporal metrical properties. However, this consideration is not decisive 
because of the role that might plausibly be assigned to the ‘normal’ environment in 
determining content ascriptions. Nonetheless, there are reasons to think that an alterative 
account is more plausible, reasons which mirror the Alice cases above. 
 
Assuming that our stream of perceptual experience and our stream of thought can be 
manipulated separately, we can imagine that Rose’s internal mental activity – her 
thinking, imagining, deployment of attention and so forth – is dramatically slowed down 
whilst leaving her perceptual experience to flow along its normal time-course. How 
would things seem to Rose? From the inside it is hard to see how Rose could distinguish 
her situation from one in which the experienced world had suddenly speeded up, her 
thinking failing to keep pace. Again, to distinguish scenarios would seem to require a 
‘meta-time’ with respect to which the competing hypotheses could be adjudicated, and it 
is extremely difficult to believe that we have any grasp of such a meta-time. If that is 
right, then the most plausible thing to say is simply that Rose feels as if her thinking were 
immensely sluggish relative to the experienced world. In contrast, if subjective metrical 
properties were presented in experience, it would have to be the case that things did feel 
one way or the other to Rose (either that her thinking had become incredibly sluggish or 
that the world had speeded up). But again, there seems no reason to think that this 
should be so given the intuitive indiscriminability of the scenarios. 
 
If this is right the temporal content of experience is relative, on analogy with spatial 
content. Temporal content is relative to the flow of ‘internal’ conscious processes; slow 
down her ‘internal’ conscious processes without affecting her perceptual experience and 
Rose will have the impression that the surrounding world had speeded up in relation to 
that internal stream. 
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A view one sometimes encountered is that we do, in fact, have a sense of a more 
fundamental ‘personal’ time against which all inner processes can be measured.
17 On 
such a view it would make sense to think of our entire stream of consciousness slowing 
down or speeding up relative to this more fundamental flow. I am sceptical. Of course, 
the rate at which a certain kind of image or thought train recurs or proceeds may increase 
in speed or slow down relative to other mental goings on, just as with perceptual 
experience. But if we try to think through the idea that every aspect of our conscious life 
was slowed down in objective time, it is hard to gain any grip on how we could be aware 
of that change from the inside. If all such scenarios are mutually indiscriminable, that is 
powerful reason for thinking that phenomenologically they are all alike and that there is no 
further aspect to our mental life which involves a sense of this ‘absolute flow’. 
Consequently, it seems to me that the burden of proof is squarely on the shoulders of the 
proponent of a fundamental personal time to evidence its phenomenal reality. 
 
In a recent article, Dainton comments as follows. 
 
Since we lack clocks for directly measuring phenomenal durations, we have no option 
but to correlate them with objective processes whose durations can be measured using 
normal clocks. This is less than ideal, but it does give us a reasonably reliable handle on 
subjective durations: we all know roughly the quantity of auditory change which can 
occur during one second of objective time. There are of course complications, e.g. when 
in a hurry, a few (objective) minutes spent waiting in a queue can seem to take 
(subjective) eternity” (2008: 19, fn.9). 
 
The first claim here strikes me as quite correct and, I suggest, further highlights the 
difficulties with the notion of a fundamental personal time. On the other hand, I suggest 
that once metrical properties are excluded from the content of experience, the every day 
phenomena that we talk about as involving ‘time slowing down’ or ‘taking an eternity’ 
take on a quite different guise. I return to these complications at the start of Chapter Five 
(§1). For now I simply want to flag that our starting datum should be understood 
narrowly as the claim that we are aware of certain temporal properties in experience – 
                                                 
 
17 Barry Dainton suggested to me that we might think of Husserl’s notion of absolute time-consciousness 
(and correlatively, his notion of absolute flow) in these terms. Forthcoming work by Geoff Lee considers 
such a notion independently of Husserl’s view. 
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succession, simultaneity, and relative, non-metrical persistence – and need not involve 
the controversial idea that metrical properties are so presented. When I talk of 
(perceived) temporal properties in what follows I mean to exclude metrical properties. 
 
2. Only a Matter of Time 
 
In order to begin our investigation of the temporal structure of experience itself, 
consider the following passage from Carnap’s Aufbau. 
 
The psychological objects have in common with the physical ones that they can be 
temporally determined. In other respects, a sharp distinction must be drawn between the 
two types. A psychological object does not have colour or any other sensory quality and 
furthermore, no spatial determination. (1967: §18, 33) 
 
By ‘objects’ Carnap simply means “something about which a statement can be made”; 
psychological objects, we are told, “begin with, the acts of consciousness: perceptions, 
representations, feelings, thoughts, acts of will and so on” (ibid.: 32). Thus, Carnap puts 
forward two claims: (i) that temporal properties are common to psychological and 
physical objects (in Carnap’s thin sense); and (ii) that time is unique in this respect: no 
other interesting properties are common to psychological and physical objects. 
 
Carnap’s first claim here seems clearly true. As we have just seen temporal properties 
form an utterly pervasive aspect of our experience of the world; these temporal 
properties are properties of physical objects and events – the raindrop’s motion, the 
relative duration of the flash of light. Thus it is not just that physical objects have 
temporal properties; amongst the objects of perception are found temporally determined 
physical objects. The second conjunct of the claim, viz., that psychological objects also 
have temporal properties, seems equally unobjectionable. Our mental lives change and 
develop over time. We fall in and out of love. We hope to increase our store of 
knowledge even whilst we forget much that we once knew. Sharp, irregular stabbing 
pains abate, leaving dull throbbing ones in their stead. Last but not least, we can chart the 
course of our stream of consciousness over time and describe its flow. Experiences are 
not just of unfolding events and processes, they are in addition themselves dynamic in 
 
 
15 
character. More precisely, experience is itself composed of events and/or processes 
which persist through time and occur before and after one another. 
 
What though about Carnap’s second claim concerning the uniqueness of time in this 
respect?
18 At first blush the assertion seems far more tendentious. If certain identity 
theories are true, experience possesses whatever physical properties the neuro-chemical 
events or processes with which it is identified possess.
19 Thus if Carnap’s claim is read 
transparently, it follows by Leibniz’s law that psychological objects also have such 
properties. If identity theorists are right, is Carnap straightforwardly wrong? Is there 
nothing to be said for a Carnapian uniqueness claim? In the rest of this chapter I argue 
that much remains to be said in favour of uniqueness. In particular, I argue that temporal 
properties are experiential or phenomenal properties of experience. Thus, even if the 
identity theorist is right, temporal properties are plausibly the only interesting experiential 
properties of experience which are also properties of the objects of experience. Time is 
uniquely common to experience in its experiential aspect and the objects of experience. 
 
3. Temporal Properties as Experiential Properties 
 
Temporal properties contrast with other perceptible properties such as shape, colour and 
pitch in being both experiential and instantiated by experience itself. This is why time is 
distinctive. Insofar as the truth of identity theories is an open question, so is the 
attribution of spatial properties to experience itself. However, even according to such a 
theory, the locations of experiences are not experiential properties. In contrast, 
experiences are episodes in our stream of consciousness – our own subjective, 
experiential lives unfold as we perceive the world unfolding around us. That is to say, 
experience is not just composed of events and processes occurring in and persisting 
through time. It is composed of experiential events and processes occurring in and 
                                                 
 
18 A claim also made by Mellor who draws attention to “the striking fact … namely that perceptions of 
temporal order need temporally ordered perceptions. No other property or relation has to be thus 
embodied in perceptions of it: perceptions of shape and colour, for example, need not themselves be 
correspondingly shaped or coloured” (1981: 8). 
19 At the very least such events will have physical locations. What other properties the identity theorist will 
want to ascribe to neural events or processes is a nice question. There may also be reasons to think that 
experiences have locations independent of identity theories. See, for example, Russell (1927), Lockwood 
(1989) and Lee (2007), who draw on special relativity to argue that any event located in time must also be 
located in space. 
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persisting through time. The time in which experience is structured is experiential time; 
its temporal structure matters from the point of view of its counting as experience. 
 
3.1 Experiential Properties 
 
What exactly does it amount to when we claim that a property is an experiential property? 
Experiential or phenomenal properties (I use the terms interchangeably) are those 
properties of an episode in virtue of which there is something it is like to undergo that 
episode from the subject’s point of view. Thus, a property is experiential just if it is a 
property of an episode which contributes to what it is like, subjectively, for the subject of 
the episode to be undergoing that episode.
20 The phenomenal or experiential character of 
some course of experience is then the totality of that course of experience’s phenomenal 
properties.
21 A consequence of this is that experiential properties will figure essentially in 
providing a complete personal-level psychological description of a person’s conscious 
life.
22
 
Some think this is as far as we can go.
23 However, even if the notion is not analysable in 
other terms, there are clearly informative things that can be said about phenomenal 
properties. For example, many hold that certain phenomenal properties are constituted 
by the presentation or representation of certain kinds of objects and their properties (for 
more on this see Chapter Two). Can we say anything about experiential properties in 
                                                 
 
20 As Peacocke puts it following Nagel 1974, “Perceptual experiences and sensations, on the one hand, and 
so-called occurrent conscious propositional attitudes, on the other, differ in many respects. But there is one 
property they share. They both contribute to what, subjectively, it is like for the person who enjoys them” 
(2003: 83). Obviously we will want to distinguish between what it is like for a subject when they have a 
perceptual experience – something which might be taken to include the whole range of background 
phenomenology and attendant feelings which are occurring at the time of that event – and what it is like to 
undergo said experience. My focus is on the latter notion. 
21 This should not be read as committing to any kind of atomism about phenomenal character. 
22 Note in this regard that ‘being an experience of an x’ does not straightforwardly count as an experiential 
property. One can have an experience of a sparrow-hawk, say, but at such a distance and flying at such a 
speed that one perceptually discriminates only a dark blur high in the sky. In such a case, in contrast to 
simply seeing a sparrow-hawk in the aviary, one does not see the sparrow-hawk as such. Only the as-such 
properties will be experiential. Many philosophers have claimed that, strictly speaking, we never see 
sparrow-hawks as such since natural kind properties are not perceptual properties. See McGinn 1982, Tye 
1995, Clark 2000, Foster 2000, Millar 2000, Burge 2003 and Price 2005. Contrast Siewert 1998 and Siegel 
2006. The considerations for and against this view are complex and would take us far beyond the scope of 
this thesis. All I claim here is that temporal properties are frequently very obviously a part of the content of 
experience. The last thing we should do is deny that. 
23 Perhaps this is one thing that Block is suggesting with his notorious borrowing from Louis Armstrong: 
“If you got to ask, you ain’t never gonna get to know” (1980: 281). 
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general? The most obvious connection to draw upon is their connection to self-
knowledge. For it seems that the instantiation of phenomenal properties is something 
that is at least typically available for privileged self-conscious reflection. I explore this 
idea in depth in Chapter Three where I defend the idea that (roughly speaking) 
experiential properties are, in fact, just those properties of an episode that we are 
positioned to know about solely in virtue of undergoing said episode. For now, the idea 
of an intimate connection between phenomenal properties and availability is sufficient to 
allow us to motivate the idea that temporal properties of experience are experiential. 
 
3.2 The Accessibility of Temporal Structure 
 
Let us say that a property of experience is available for introspective self-reflection if and 
only if we can be in a position to know that our experience has such a property just in 
virtue of undergoing the experience. If a property is available in this way, then this is at 
least strong evidence that it is an experiential property in the relevant sense.  
 
Consider supposed neural properties of experience. Introspection offers us no inkling of 
the neural goings on within our skulls (unless we are actually peering into our own skulls 
whilst reflecting on our experience). We have no inclination, for example, to think that 
the spatial location of experience (if any) is accessible to introspective reflection just in 
virtue of undergoing experience. In contrast, it is overwhelmingly natural to hold that at 
least certain aspects of the temporal structure of experience (its ordering for example) are 
accessible to reflection on one’s experience.
24 And regardless of whether accessibility is a 
necessary condition for being experiential, accessibility does seem indicative of being 
experiential. 
 
Why do I say that it is overwhelmingly natural to insist on the accessibility of some 
aspects of temporal structure? For two reasons. Firstly, we can raise questions 
concerning the temporal structure of experience itself as opposed to the temporal 
structure of the objects of experience. Such questions are in good conceptual order and 
have answers which are objectively true or false depending on the facts. Secondly, we can 
                                                 
 
24 Cf. Lee who contrasting time and space writes, “Your experience might make you aware of spatial 
relations between external items, but experiences don’t seem subjectively to be themselves spatially 
structured” (2007: 372, fn.9).   
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answer these questions knowledgably merely by reflecting on our experience, i.e., just in 
virtue of having undergone a certain course of experience. Jointly, these commitments 
evidence the accessibility and so experiential nature of experience’s own temporal 
properties. 
 
One common way in which we raise questions concerning the temporal properties of 
experience in contrast to the temporal properties of the object experienced is in cases of 
partial viewing and hearing. For example, Ruby might, in many contexts, respond truly to 
the question, ‘Did you see the opera last night?’ even if she walked out before the final 
act. Likewise, in many contexts, Bertie will count as having seen the football match even 
if he dozed off and missed various periods of play. Thus, even when we are fully 
informed concerning the temporal features of the event witnessed, we can still learn new 
information by asking about the temporal features of the witnessing: ‘How long did Ruby 
stay and listen to that dreadful Tosca?’ ‘How long, in total, did Bertie actually watch the 
match?’ 
 
Similarly, imagine Tom who finds himself in the predicament of the imagined subject in 
(Grice 1961: 142). Tom has an apparently seamless course of visual experience as of a 
clock on the shelf. However, through certain periods of this time, his clock experience is 
not explained by the presence of the clock but rather by an apparatus which causes 
suitable stimulation of the visual cortex. In such a set up, although Tom will enjoy 
apparently seamless experience of a clock, we can enquire as regards the durations of 
periods where he is in perceptual contact with the clock and those where he is 
hallucinating: ‘How long was Tom perceptually aware of the clock?’, ‘He was conscious 
of it for about a minute before the apparatus was turned on and he started to hallucinate 
a clock instead. Then, after another minute, the apparatus was turned off and he saw the 
clock once more.’ 
 
Judgements of partial viewing have as their subject matter the temporal structure of 
experience itself. Since such judgements are commonplace, this bolsters the above 
picture. However, such cases are not of central interest. This is because, although they 
evidence our willingness to ask about the temporal properties of experience as opposed 
to its objects, questions raised in the context of partial viewings can be reposed so that 
their subject matter is the objects of experience: ‘How much of the match did Bertie 
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see?’, ‘How many acts of Tosca did Ruby endure?’. Even in the hallucination case we can 
ask, somewhat clumsily, ‘How much of the clock’s biography was witnessed by Tom?’ 
 
What is of real interest is the distinction between experiential temporal structure and the 
temporal structure of the apparent objects of experience which can be drawn even in 
cases where viewings are not partial, cases in which, in the limit, for every temporal part 
of the event in question, that temporal part is perceived. Even in such cases of maximally 
complete viewing one can, I suggest, consider theoretically whether the structural 
ordering of the experience of each of the temporal parts need match the ordering that 
they are presented or represented as having. Likewise, we can consider whether the 
relative duration of the experience of a given collection of parts is the same as the 
apparent relative duration of that collection of parts. For reasons which will become 
evident in Chapter Two, we rarely ask such questions in a way that contrasts with asking 
about the apparent objects of perception. Nonetheless, such questions are in perfectly 
good order. 
 
Even assuming that all perceptual experiences are complete or non-partial, I am 
suggesting that the following are perfectly good questions. ‘How long did your 
experience of the singing last?’ in contrast to the more usual, ‘How long did the singing 
seem to you to go on?’ Similarly, ‘Did your experience (as) of flash A come before or 
after your experience (as) of flash B?’ in contrast to the more usual ‘Did it appear to you 
that flash A came before flash B?’ 
 
These questions are not only perfectly coherent, but amongst them are questions that we 
feel able to answer simply in virtue of undergoing the experience. They may seem strange 
to us but that is simply because we are not used to contrasting act-time with object-time. 
Look at your left-hand and then your right-hand. Now consider: ‘Which experience came 
first, your experience of your right-hand or your experience of your left-hand?’ If you did 
as indicated, you can answer knowledgably and with ease: ‘My experience of my left-hand 
occurred before my experience of my right-hand.’ Whistle two notes in quick succession, 
sustaining the second. Now consider: ‘Did your experience of the first note last longer or 
shorter than that of the second?’ If you followed the instruction, you are in a position to 
answer knowledgably: ‘Shorter.’ The accessibility revealed in both these cases evidences 
the experiential nature of experience’s temporal properties. 
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As Martin puts it, acknowledging Strawson’s (1966: 100-1) insistence that experience 
must make room for the thought of experience itself, “Any of us, suitably linguistically 
sophisticated, can move back from judgements about the environment surrounding us to 
judgements which simply concern our experiential position” (2006: 395).
25 Our 
experiential position is a position that unfolds over and is structured in time. With 
suitable linguistic sophistication we can move back from judgements about the 
environment’s temporal structure and the way it unfolds over time to make judgements 
which simply concern the temporal properties of experience itself. 
 
3.3 Temporal Structure and Episodic Memory 
 
When I sensorily or episodically remember an event or process as opposed to merely 
remembering that an event took place, or that I saw some particular process going on, I 
remember the event or process through remembering consciously experiencing it.
26 This 
dependency of memory on conscious experience arguably explains the distinctive nature 
of episodic memory. Episodic memory has as its primary objects events or processes – 
my first kiss, moving house, Osipova’s performance in The Upper Room – but when we 
recall those events or processes we are best thought of as doing so through recalling our 
own past experience of them (our experience of kissing, moving or watching). Reflection 
on memory is thus probative of experience since experience is built into the structure of 
episodic memory. 
 
According to the above picture, episodic memory tracks experiential, conscious 
properties of experience. Contrast supposed neural properties of experience such as their 
locations. Such properties are not retained in episodic memory; we cannot recall the 
location of the experiential event; this is explained by noting that experiential locations (if 
                                                 
 
25 Cf. also Evans 1980: esp. 277. An even clearer statement which alludes to the temporality of experience 
is this remark of R.W. Sellars: “The concrete individual does, and can, distinguish between his 
consciousness (his changing field of experience, not the psychologist’s artifact) and a realm which his achieved 
ideas can intend as their object” (1917: 674, my emphasis). 
26 See Martin 2001, and also Foster 1982, Peacocke 1985, and Martin 2002 on sensory imagination. Some 
care is needed here because of cases where people remember events (e.g. wedding and dinner parties) but 
misremember their own locations relative to the remembered scene or cases where people remember 
seeing someone but misremember the time and place. See here Schacter 2001 on the sin of misattribution. 
Alive to the fact that remembering is often in part misremembering, we should more cautiously hold that 
we remember or misremember by remembering or misremembering experiencing. 
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they exist) are not experiential properties of experience. At most our location as the 
subject of the experience is recorded as it is given in relation to what is perceived. Insofar 
as a subject’s location is so recorded, this evidences that part of what it is like to undergo 
experience is to be aware of objects located egocentrically. 
 
Episodic memory does, however, reacquaint us with temporally structured experiential 
events and processes. Many can remember in vivid detail watching Ayrton Senna’s fatal 
crash at the 1994 San Marino Grand Prix at Imola. In less than two seconds, Senna’s car, 
traveling at 193 m.p.h., careered off the track at the Tamburello corner throwing up puffs 
of dust and struck an unprotected concrete wall, tearing off the right front wheel and 
nose-cone, and sending them into the air. Those who can graphically recall experiencing 
this whole event have as the object of their episodic memory an original experience with 
evident temporal structure, a beginning, middle and end. Firstly, their seeing the car 
leaving the track, immediately followed by their seeing each puff of dust, and finally 
watching its collision with the barrier and the various car parts flying into the air. The 
same is true across the modalities. Dwelling on those fateful moments in court, a 
prisoner may recall hearing the sound of the foreman’s cough, listening carefully to his 
verdict, and being deafened by the silence that followed. In other words, his recollection 
involves recalling a section of experience with temporal structure. Granting that when I 
episodically remember an event or process, I remember the event or process through 
remembering consciously experiencing it, the cases of recollection just sketched evidence 
the conscious, experiential nature of experience’s own temporal properties. 
 
Episodic memory does not typically preserve the structure relating different episodes in 
our stream of consciousness. When we recall longer periods of our lives, we must 
temporally locate and order episodic memories (with their internal temporal structure) in 
an overarching narrative. Thus, autobiographical memory involves both semantic and 
episodic memory. Nevertheless, this much remains true: we think of the narratives that 
we construct in autobiographical memory as being correct or incorrect depending on, at 
least in part, the structure that our past experience actually had. In this way, 
autobiographical memory aims to reflect accurately the temporal structure of our 
experience. Thus, the way we think of autobiographical memory also evinces our 
manifest commitment to experience as consisting of events and/or processes which 
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persist (i.e., occur in temporal intervals) and have an objective ordering (i.e., occur before 
and after each other). 
 
3.4 Realism and Uniqueness 
 
I have argued that the temporal properties of experience are experiential. That claim is 
evidenced by the fact that we are in a position to know of the temporal structure of our 
own experience simply in virtue of undergoing a given course of experience. Moreover, 
reflecting on episodic memory provides grounds to count certain temporal properties of 
experience as genuinely conscious or experiential. A consequence of this is that time is 
distinctive because of its unique combination of properties; it is arguably the only 
interesting experiential determination that is instantiated both by experience itself and by 
its apparent objects. Even if an identity theory is true, that is no reason to attribute 
location  as an experiential property to experience itself. As noted above, perhaps our 
location as the subject of the experience as it is given in relation to what is perceived does 
count as an experiential property (i.e., part of what it is like to undergo experience is to 
be aware of objects located egocentrically). Beyond this, however, we have no reason 
think that the location of experience itself contributes to what it is like to be a subject of 
said experience (at least not directly).
27
 
Are there any other properties which might be thought to be common to experience in 
its experiential aspect and the objects of experience? Causal relations are one possible 
candidate. It is increasingly accepted (though very far from uncontroversial) that we can 
perceive causal relations.
28 We can see a bat causing a ball to fly into the stand or feel the 
earth causing us to shake. Furthermore, our mental events stand in causal relations with 
one another. Hearing his vicious remark might cause me to become angry. Seeing paw-
prints might cause me to believe that a dog has passed this way. It is far less clear 
whether we should accept the following two claims, however: firstly, that experiences 
cause each other (or causally explain features of other experiences); and secondly, that 
                                                 
 
27 Thanks to Barry Dainton for pressing me here. Dainton also objected by noting that a doctor can ask a 
patient where exactly the pain in their leg is. Reply: it is plausible to think that pain is a certain kind of 
awareness of one’s body and that the pain’s location in this context is the bodily location of the object not 
the act of the pain-experience. See, for example, Crane 1998: §2 for discussion. 
28 For discussion see Siegel forthcoming. 
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such causal relations, if there are such, are amongst the experiential features of our 
experience. In particular, neither of the considerations above lend strong support to the 
second claim here. Introspection does not obviously provide access to the causal 
relations amongst our experiences (or within our stream of experience) if there are any. 
We can introspect our experience changing. For example, when we experience a 
chameleon changing colour we are positioned to be aware of our experience changing 
character. But this is not obviously a causal matter. That said, nothing in what follows 
will turn on resolving this issue. Temporal properties are plausibly unique in the above 
sense, but if other properties must be allowed to be common, so be it.
29
 
Let me summarize the key claims made so far in this chapter under the label Realism. 
 
Realism Experience itself in its experiential aspect consists of events and/or 
processes of which it is true that they persist through time and occur before and 
after one another. 
 
Realism is, I submit, a part of our ordinary conception of things. It is simply taken for 
granted by most writers on the perception of time. Moreover, that it is part of our 
ordinary picture of things is something acknowledged even by those who ultimately 
reject it. Consider Merleau-Ponty who begins his discussion of temporality by declaring 
that “all our experiences, inasmuch as they are ours, arrange themselves in terms of 
before and after … temporality … is the most general characteristic of ‘psychic facts’” 
(2002: 476). Here Merleau-Ponty appears to endorse Realism. As such he evidences that 
Realism is the natural or default view. 
 
Of course, Merleau-Ponty ultimately follows Kant in rejecting Realism and giving a 
transcendental idealist account of this datum. For him, the reason our experiences have a 
temporal structure is “because temporality, in Kantian language, is the form taken by our 
inner sense” (ibid.: 476); that is to say, (self-)consciousness “deploys or constitutes time” 
(ibid.: 481), at least the time in which we are aware of experience as being structured, and 
not the other way around. Nonetheless, the starting point for Merleau-Ponty (and Kant) 
                                                 
 
29 If causal relations are present in the stream of consciousness itself, we can ask questions like those 
pursued below. In particular, we can ask whether causal relations in the perceived world are represented by 
causal relations amongst experiences. I am sceptical. 
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is the datum of experience’s own temporal structure which is granted to be naïvely 
conceived as something concerning which there are objective facts that hold prior to and 
explain our self-conscious awareness of them. 
 
Likewise, consider Kant’s more recent heir, Daniel Dennett, who writes as follows. 
 
Our intuitions suggest that our streams of consciousness consist of events occurring in 
sequence, and that at any instant every element in that sequence can be classified as 
either having occurred “in consciousness” or as having not occurred “there” yet. (1991a: 
144) 
 
I shall come to Dennett’s hostility to this picture below where I consider his challenge to 
Realism. For now his agreement that our intuitive picture involves a form of realism with 
respect to the temporal structure of our streams of consciousness is all that is important. 
 
4. Mental Events and Physical Properties 
 
Given that Realism is the most natural way of thinking about our perceptual experience 
and is implicit in our ordinary ways of thought and talk about experience, it is striking to 
discover apparent rejections of the core claim that mental events have temporal 
properties from within the philosophically engaged scientific community. Let me give 
two examples. 
 
Firstly, consider the behavioural psychologist John Staddon who, in a paper discussing 
the supposedly “fruitless attempt” of philosophers to answer a certain question about 
motion perception, propounds the following. 
 
Dennett and Kinsbourne [1992b] write “Conscious experiences are real events occurring 
in the real time and space of the brain, and hence they are clockable and locatable within 
the appropriate limits of precision for real phenomena of their type’’ [235]. Well, no, not 
really. What can be clocked and located are reports of conscious experiences and 
measurements of physiological events. Conscious experiences are Domain 1 [that is, the 
‘domain of felt experience, the phenomenological domain’ (Staddon 2000: 874)], which 
has neither time nor space, but only ineffable qualia. (ibid.: 879) 
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According to Staddon then, temporality is simply not the right kind of property to be 
applied within the phenomenological domain. 
 
Likewise, consider the cognitive scientist Roger Shepherd who, again in responding to 
Dennett and Kinsbourne, discusses “the problematic attribution of physical relations 
(spatial orientations or temporal orders) to non-physical objects (mental images or 
subjective events)” (1992: 223). Shepherd notes that just as mental images cannot literally 
be rotated in space, neither can mental events like experiences literally be ascribed 
temporal properties. 
 
These passages are puzzling, all the more so given that neither writer provides any 
argument for their claim other than an implicit appeal to the assumption that physical 
predicates can never be applied to mental states and events. One influential psychologist 
does, however, attempt to argue for this puzzling view. Zenon Pylyshyn in his brief but 
influential paper, ‘Do mental events have durations?’, calls into question the claim that 
temporal structure is common to experience and its objects, suggesting that it is a 
mistake to think of mental events as having temporal properties. Interestingly, Dennett 
(1991a: 148, fn.6) refers to Pylyshyn’s paper with approval and, more recently, Treanor 
(ms.) avers that the paper betters Dennett in offering “a non-verificationist argument 
against the view that conscious experiences have duration”.
30 In this section I briefly 
discuss this argument, in part for its own interest but also because it introduces issues 
which receive fuller treatment in the next chapter. 
 
Pylyshyn writes as follows. 
 
[N]o one is disposed to speak literally of such physical properties of a mental event as its 
colour, size, mass and so on – though we do speak of them as representing (or having the 
experiential content of) such properties. For instance, one would not properly say of a 
thought (or image) that it was large or red, but only that it was a thought about something 
large or red (or that it was an image of something large or red). Physical predicates are 
never appropriate as literal descriptions of mental representations or events because the 
                                                 
 
30 I discuss Dennett’s argument at length in Chapter Five below including the notorious charge of 
verificationism. 
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contents of the latter depend only on their form and are intended to reflect what they are 
about, not how they are materially instantiated. (1979: 277) 
 
Pylyshyn here begins by pointing out (surely correctly) that common usage is in accord 
with Carnap’s second claim that psychological objects lack colours and spatial 
determinations. However, Pylyshyn then makes the much stronger claim that “[p]hysical 
predicates are never appropriate as literal descriptions of mental  representations or 
events”. Indeed, earlier, Pylyshyn suggests that “a general covering distinction” can be 
drawn between mental and physical events “by noting that the two types of events 
require  distinct vocabularies for their description” (ibid.: my emphasis). And the 
implication seems to be that the two vocabularies are mutually exclusive. 
 
Pylyshyn concludes: 
 
It ought to strike one as curious, therefore, that we speak so freely of the duration of a 
mental event. The temporal dimension has exactly the same status as size or mass: It is, 
in fact, one of the primary physical magnitudes. … Why, then, do we not speak of mental 
representations as representing duration, rather than as having duration, in the same way 
that we speak of mental entities as representing size or mass? (ibid.) 
 
The question, I take it, is rhetorical; Pylyshyn’s view is that we should not speak of 
mental events as having temporal properties, only as representing them.
31
 
Pylyshyn’s mode of argument appears, on one reading, rather strange. He begins by 
noting the “curious” fact that we “speak so freely” of the temporal properties of mental 
events. He then proceeds to use another fact about our thought and talk in relation to 
other kinds of properties (viz., that we don’t talk about the mass or colour of experiences 
etc.) as support for his general principle of mutually exclusive vocabularies. Yet if our 
ordinary ways of thinking are probative in this domain, why do they not tell against the 
principle itself? Surely, the most plausible explanation of the way we speak about 
different properties in relation to our mental lives is that Carnap is right: time is uniquely 
                                                 
 
31 Though I think Pylyshyn’s view is quite clear, it should be noted that he never explicitly answers his title 
question. 
 
 
27 
common to experience and its objects. Certainly that is an interesting fact about time, but 
it is not curious if ‘curious’ here implies dubiousness or ineptitude. 
 
Perhaps this is not the best way of reading Pylyshyn. Perhaps what he is saying is that 
time belongs to the same family of properties as mass, colour and size, viz., the physical 
magnitudes, and that this family comes as a package; objects either do or do not have this 
whole set of properties. That would ground the move from the claim that experiences 
lack mass or colour properties to the claim that they lack temporal properties. 
Unfortunately, the grounding principle cannot be right. First, electrons are not coloured 
but they do have other physical properties. Furthermore, even if we exclude colour from 
the primary physical magnitudes, modern particle physics posits massless bosons (e.g., 
photons, gravitons and gluons); again, these may lack mass but they have other physical 
properties (e.g., location, spin).
32
 
If we leave aside these considerations, how should we best understand Pylyshyn’s view? 
An obvious thing to consider is Pylyshyn’s metaphysics of mind on which he has the 
following to say. 
 
[O]f course each instance of a … mental event is realized as some particular (token) 
physical event which itself has the full range of physical properties. Thus one could 
speak of such things as the location, size, colour, and duration of these instantiating 
events. By extension, one might even speak loosely of the location or duration of the 
mental event that particular token physical event in fact realized on that occasion. This 
might be an innocent enough slip, providing that what one was referring to was some 
particular token occurrence of the mental event. (ibid.) 
 
Pylyshyn here implies a distinction between realization and identity. But he could as well 
think of realization as identity, agree with the materialist point above, but insist that we 
should distinguish one and the same event viewed as mental from that same event 
viewed  as physical. His rule of distinct vocabularies would then neatly carve our 
predicates into the mental ones and physical ones. In any case, it is clearly not Pylyshyn’s 
position that because materialism is true, mental events should be thought to have spatial 
                                                 
 
32 Not to mention that processes and events have spatio-temporal locations but are not naturally thought of as 
having  masses. Arguably, sounds, though perfectly real physical phenomena, have temporal and pitch 
properties but only derivatively locations (the locations of their sources). 
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properties as well as temporal ones. Quite the reverse – Pylyshyn thinks that once we 
understand the distinction between the mental and the physical properly we will realise 
than mental events have neither spatial nor temporal properties strictly speaking. 
 
The question remains: whence Pylyshyn’s hostility towards mental events having 
temporal properties? As we have seen the key principle Pylyshyn invokes is the 
following. 
 
Physical predicates are never appropriate as literal descriptions of mental  representations 
or events because the contents of the latter depend only on their form and are intended to 
reflect what they are about, not how they are materially instantiated. (ibid.) 
 
As I understand him, Pylyshyn here asserts two things. Firstly, that all descriptions of 
mental representations qua mental will be descriptions of their content (what they are 
about). Secondly, that representational or semantic content supervenes on syntactic 
properties of representations (i.e., their form). These are both substantial commitments. 
However, it is the first claim that is most relevant for present purposes. Indeed, it is 
essential if Pylyshyn’s argument is to be successful, whereas Pylyshyn’s claim about the 
supervenience of the semantic on the syntactic is arguably dispensable. 
 
The first claim is controversial because it is not at all obvious that we cannot describe 
aspects of mental representations which go beyond their contents, whilst still being 
genuinely mental. Perhaps temporal aspects are just such aspects. Given this, the 
immediate worry for Pylyshyn is that, in the absence of a compelling case for treating 
mental events as exhaustively describable in terms of their representational content, any 
supposed consequence of that claim is just as liable to be a reason to give the claim up. 
Thus, even granting that it can be shown to follow from his claim that mental events lack 
duration, we are very distant from endorsing any such conclusion. 
 
This is not to dismiss the claim that we can exhaustively characterize mental events in 
terms of their representational content. In the next chapter I consider in more depth a 
key line of thought which has been invoked to justify it – the transparency of experience. 
However, to anticipate the discussion there, I argue that the temporal properties of 
experience are indeed transparent but that this is quite in keeping with Realism. 
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In Pylyshyn’s defence it might be noted that his use of the term ‘mental’ is at least 
sometimes explicitly technical. In the technical sense, “A mental process is … a process 
viewed under a symbol-processing or algorithmic description” (277). According to 
Pylyshyn mental processes (in this sense) are instantiated in the neural architecture but 
are held to be multiply-realizable such that details of the physical (and so temporal) 
properties of one architecture leave open the ‘mental’ (i.e., algorithmic or syntactic) 
properties realized. However, this poses a dilemma for Pylyshyn. On the first horn, the 
technical use of ‘mental’ really is technical and thus Pylyshyn need not be taken as 
denying that mental events in the non-technical, everyday sense have temporal 
properties. On the second horn, the technical use of ‘mental’ is a genuine elucidation of 
our ordinary concept and, as such, claims about mental events having durations apply 
also to such events as perceptual experiences. This second horn would be of genuine 
interest. However, it faces precisely the difficulty raised above, namely, its reliance on the 
controversial joint assumptions which underlie the claim that mental processes in the 
non-technical sense are processes “viewed under a symbol-processing or algorithmic 
description,” i.e., are wholly understandable in representational and so syntactic terms. I 
take up the first of these assumptions in the next chapter where I consider the 
transparency of experience in relation to its temporal aspects. 
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Chapter Two: 
Time and Transparency 
 
 
As the bird trims her to the gale, 
I trim myself to the storm of time …
33
 
 
1. Act Time and Object Time 
 
ime is uniquely common to experience and its objects. But this fact leaves open 
the relation between time of representation and time represented or, in older 
terminology, between act time and object time. The contemporary common 
wisdom on this issue is that it would be a serious mistake to think that the two sets of 
temporal properties (those of experience and those of its apparent objects) must match 
up. Rather, so the wisdom goes, just like other cases of representation, the properties of 
the represented must be sharply distinguished from those of the representation since it is 
quite possible for the two series to vary dramatically from one another. My experience as 
of a protracted silence might itself last only a moment; my experience as of a flash 
followed by a bang might itself be structured in the opposite order. 
  T
 
Certainly, it is true that all that we can determine from a theoretical perspective is that there is 
a conceptual distinction between the temporal structure of experience and the temporal 
structure of its apparent objects. This leaves it an open question as to how the two are 
related. In this respect, I disagree with Roache who, commenting on a debate between 
Mellor (who argues that act time and object time must match) and Dennett (who 
demurs), claims, “it would be contradictory to assert that the order of perceptions may 
differ from the perceived order” (1999: 237).
34 In the abstract, the possibility of the order 
                                                 
 
33 Emerson (1867) ‘Terminus’ from May-Day and Other Pieces. 
34 Mellor argues as follows, “Suppose for example I see one event e precede another e*. I must first see e 
and then e*, my seeing of e being somehow recollected in my seeing of e*. That is, my seeing of e affects 
my seeing of e*: this is what makes me – rightly or wrongly – see e precede e* rather than the other way 
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of conscious perceptual experience coming apart from the apparent order of its objects is 
in no way contradictory. Indeed, I see no purely theoretical reason for thinking that the 
two times must stand in any particular relation to one another. 
 
On the other hand, this concedes a lack of theoretical grounds for positing a relation 
between act and object time series, not a lack of grounds. There may be other grounds 
for doing so. In the first part of this chapter, I raise some doubts about the 
contemporary wisdom that the two series can in fact come apart. In the second part, I 
argue that introspective reflection on our own experience provides precisely the grounds 
to reject that wisdom and to insist that act and object time are yoked together. Roache is 
right to this extent: we find the possibility of the order of perceptions diverging from the 
perceived order of their objects incoherent when we reflect upon our experience.  
 
Throughout I talk in terms of representation and represented, since in this context (even 
more than elsewhere) it is assumed that experience has a representational content. It 
remains possible to construe the debate in other terms, however. As I have mentioned, 
there is an older distinction which can be invoked, that between act and object. Thus, in 
The Problems of Philosophy, Russell warns us, in strikingly contemporary terms, that we must 
take great care to distinguish “on the one hand the thing of which we are aware – say the 
colour of my table – and on the other hand the actual awareness itself, the mental act of 
apprehending the thing” (1912: 21), emphasising that this “distinction between act and 
object in our apprehending of things is vitally important” (22). This traditional distinction 
between sensation or psychical occurrence or mental act or experience on the one side, 
and sense-datum or sensible object or mental content or object of experience on the 
other, is found in most views of perception bar adverbialist approaches that deny that 
experience has this structure. I take its application (and so the inadequacy of adverbialist 
approaches) for granted in this thesis. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
round. But seeing e precede e* means seeing e first. So the causal order of my perceptions of these events, 
by fixing the temporal order I perceive them to have, fixes the temporal order of the perceptions 
themselves” (Mellor 1981: 8; discussed in Dennett 1991a: 149). The argument of this chapter sides with 
Mellor with respect to the claim that “seeing e precede e* means seeing e first,” i.e., entails that my 
experience of e must come before my experience of e*. However, nothing I say commits me to Mellor’s 
views on the roles that memory and/or causation play in allowing for temporal experience of succession. 
On the role of memory see Chapter Six below. 
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The act/object distinction is, perhaps, wont to be overlooked because of a general 
grammatical ambiguity. John MacFarlane glosses the ambiguity as follows. 
 
Act-object ambiguity Ambiguity of many common words (e.g. “utterance”, 
“experience”) between an “act” reading (“the act of uttering something,” “the act of 
experiencing something”) and an “object” reading (“that which is uttered,” “that which 
is experienced”). Also sometimes called the ing-ed ambiguity.35
 
In what follows, talk of representation and represented can be freely translated into the 
idiom of act and object. Indeed, as I argue in Chapter Six, the possibility of experiential 
act-time and object-time coming apart is essential to most theories of temporal 
awareness, and can be seen very clearly in the diagrams of early theorists such as Husserl 
and Broad as well as more recent writers such as Tye and Gallagher.
36
 
2. Confusing Representation and Represented? 
 
Daniel Dennett, along with his collaborator Marcel Kinsbourne, is the most famous 
contemporary exponent of the view that a coming apart of time represented from time 
of representation is not only theoretically possible but actual.
37 Dennett contends that we 
must “distinguish time represented from time of representing” (1991a: 161) and goes on 
to suggest that the two can readily come apart. According to Dennett, it is quite possible 
for my experience as of a long silence to itself last only a moment, or for my experiences 
as of a flash followed by a bang to occur in the opposite order to which the events are 
represented as occurring in (cf. his 1991a: 144). For, on Dennett’s view, all that matters 
for determining the order of the apparent objects of experience is the temporal content of 
the experience and, he insists, there is no reason why such contents cannot be tokened in 
temporal orders quite distinct from the temporal orders of the events that they represent. 
To think otherwise is to confuse time represented with time of representing. 
 
                                                 
 
35 See MacFarlane’s philosophical glossary at http://johnmacfarlane.net/135/glossary.html. Calling it the 
“ing-ed” distinction is helpful since it removes the misleading suggestion that the distinction has anything 
to do with actions per se. In particular, talk of the act of experiencing something has no implication that 
experiencing is or has any close connection to acting. 
36 See Husserl 1964, Broad 1923, Tye 2003 and Gallagher 1998. 
37 See in particular Dennett and Kinsbourne 1992a, material from which is incorporated into and expanded 
upon in Dennett 1991a. 
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His central arguments for this claim focus on psychological experiments which involve 
short timescale phenomena. Dennett’s exploitation of these experiments (and what they 
in fact show) is discussed at length in Chapter Five below. For present purposes, 
however, I want to discuss some intuitive analogies that Dennett uses to warm us up for 
his main argument. In part this is because I want to make sure we remain stone cold; the 
analogies that Dennett pumps us with should be set aside because the supposedly 
analogous cases are in no way plausible models for temporal experience
38 except in one 
case where the analogy in fact tells against Dennett’s contention that time of 
representation can come apart from time represented. It is also because other writers 
who are impressed by Dennett’s ‘representation/represented confusion’ critique often do 
rely upon such analogies. 
 
First, consider Susan Hurley (1998: Ch.1, passim) who, citing Dennett, urges that we 
should not “suppose that temporal representations represent their own times, or project 
temporal relations between vehicles of content into the content of temporal 
representations” (ibid.: 29). Hurley argues as follows. 
 
In general representations do not have to resemble what they represent. This is clear 
enough in some cases: no one thinks the representation of something green must itself 
be green, or that the representation of something round must itself be round. But it is 
easy to slip into this confusion for more complex, abstract or relational properties, such 
as simultaneity. (1998: 29-30) 
 
Here it is not clear what kind of representation of green is meant. But, if as seems most 
likely it is the salient experiential case that she intends, then Hurley is right. Experiences 
which represent green trees do not themselves have to be green. Nor of course is Emily 
Dickinson’s reference to Spring – “This whole experiment of green” – itself green! Yet it 
is hard to see how this bears on the case in point. Time is uniquely common to experience 
and its objects. Consequently, there is no clear analogy at all between the representation 
of green in experience (or poetry) and the representation of simultaneity or relative 
                                                 
 
38 Reingold writes: “[Dennett & Kinsbourne] not only expose brilliantly an important confusion between 
the temporal properties of the process of representing and the temporal content of the representations 
themselves, but they also provide powerful metaphors that may help one sliding back into this ingrained 
confusion” (1992: 218). Precisely not. 
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duration in experience. Experiences do not have colour properties; they do have 
temporal properties.  
 
Second, consider Michael Tye, who writes as follows. 
 
It seems to me that there is a serious confusion here.[39] Granted, I experience the red 
flash as being before the green one. But it need not be true that my experience or 
awareness of the red flash is before my experience or awareness of the green one. If I 
utter the sentence 
 
  The green flash is after the red flash, 
 
I represent the red flash as being before the green one; but my representation of the red 
flash is not before my representation of the green flash. In general, represented order has 
no obvious link with the order of representations. Why suppose that there is such a link 
for experiential representations? (2003: 90; see also his 2006: 511) 
 
The same elements are in play here. Firstly, the assertion that writers who have thought 
that experiential temporal structure matches the temporal structure of its objects are 
seriously confused. Secondly, that they are making the same kind of mistake as the (I 
hope fictitious!) person who holds that the order of events has to match the order of 
referring terms in the English sentences used to refer to them. Finally, obliviousness to 
the possibility that time might be special – witness the last sentence which does not 
mention time at all.
40
                                                 
 
39 Tye is criticising Dainton (2000: 134) who picks up on Miller’s Principle of Presentational Concurrence (PPC) 
according to which “the duration of a content being presented is concurrent with the duration of the act of 
presenting it. That is, the time interval occupied by a content which is before the mind is the very same 
time interval which is occupied by the act of presenting that very content before the mind” (Miller 1984: 
107). See §6.2 below. 
40 Hurley and Tye are far from alone. Treisman writes, “The time represented by an element of 
phenomenological experience is not the time at which that element is generated – as the naïve realist with 
respect to time would suppose – but the time to which it refers, just as beige is not the colour of a 
conscious sensation but of my word-processor” (1992: 225). Shepherd backs up his agreement that “the 
experience of (A before B) does not entail (the experience of A) before (the experience of B)” by noting Kubovy’s 
observation that “to imagine (a rotation of (an object)) is not necessarily to rotate (an image of (an object))”. On this 
he comments, “The second statement in each of these … italicised pairs entails the problematic attribution 
of physical relations (spatial orientations or temporal orders) to non-physical objects (mental images or 
subjective events” (1992: 223). Perhaps so in the case of imagination but, as discussed in Chapter One, I 
cannot understand why Shepherd thinks it is problematic to attribute temporal properties to subjective 
events. Block who in other respects trenchantly criticises Dennett and Kinsbourne simply remarks, 
“[Dennett and Kinsbourne] correctly point out that the temporal order of outside events needn’t be 
represented by the temporal order of inside events. This Kantian point (Kant distinguished apprehension 
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It would not be fair to say that Hurley and Tye simply rely on these analogies. They also 
allude to Dennett’s more sophisticated argumentation.
41 However, like Dennett, they all 
begin by making the quite general point that in general representations do not have 
themselves to possess the properties they represent and draw the conclusion that there is 
no reason why things should be any different in the case of experience and time.
42 If we 
agree, Dennett’s discussion and diagnosis of various psychological phenomena may seem 
quite reasonable – just another case where the properties of a representation come apart 
from what is represented. 
 
Dennett plays this game by making repeated and vivid appeals to the way properties 
including time are represented in other media such as novels, letters, pictures and films 
followed by the implicit suggestion that our mental lives should be expected to operate 
along similar lines. However, as already noted, for such appeals to be probative the ways 
in which such media represent must be analogous to the experiential representation of 
time. In the rest of this section I consider the cases Dennett appeals to. I have two aims 
in doing so. Firstly, to bring out that, in most of the cases appealed to, there is a clear 
disanalogy between the experiential representation of time and the kind of representation 
in question. Secondly, to consider in more depth a case where the analogy does appear 
compelling: cinematic depiction. I argue that cinematic depiction is, on reflection, very 
plausibly a case in which, at least within scenes, the temporal structure of depiction does 
mirror the temporal structure depicted. As such, the case tells against Dennett, Hurley, 
Tye and others. That said, reflection on the analogy also helps to introduce, and to some 
extent motivate, a form of anti-realism about depictive temporal structure and, by 
analogy, the anti-realism about temporal experiential structure which is the focus of 
Chapter Five.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
of succession from succession of apprehension) is certainly correct” (1992: 206). Block here gives no 
indication of why he thinks Dennett and Kinsbourne are “certainly correct”. Indeed he rejects their 
Stalinist/Orwellian arguments; he does not appeal to analogies as they and others do; and the appeal to 
Kant only establishes a conceptual distinction and not a genuine possibility. Remarkably, of the twenty-
eight original commentators on Dennett & Kinsbourne (1992a), Rollins (1992) is the only one who 
questions the view that time of representing might come apart from time represented. Others who 
explicitly endorse the view include Clark (1992: 207), Farah (1992: 209), and Lloyd (1992: 215). 
41 Though Tye (1993) is extremely hostile towards Dennett’s arguments so it is not clear what weight he 
thinks that they can be given in this respect. 
42 Hurley (1992: 211) also makes some suggestive diagnostic remarks as to why we might be tempted to 
‘confuse’ vehicle with content in the temporal case. One can read the second part of this chapter (in 
combination with the chapter that follows) as explaining why we are right to be so tempted. 
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3. Relating Representation and Represented 
3.1 Novels 
 
Dennett illustrates his claim that time represented can come apart from time of 
representing by comparing experience to a novel (1991a: 148). He notes, obviously 
correctly, that a novel is not constrained to represent events in the order that they are 
represented as occurring in. A later paragraph can refer to events which are put forward 
(in the fiction) as occurring well before events described in the previous paragraph. This 
shows that there is a distinction here between the order of representation and the order 
represented. 
 
However, Dennett’s analogy is poor. Experience not only presents temporally structured 
events but is itself a dynamic event with temporal parts. In contrast, though a novel has 
an ordering (either spatial or simply structural) amongst its constituent chapters, 
paragraphs, and sentences, there is no sense in which a novel has a temporal structure of 
its own. A novel is not an event with dynamic properties, nor is it composed of such. It 
does not have temporal parts. As Gennette says, “The narrative text, like every other 
text, has no other temporality than what it borrows, metanymically [sic.], from its own 
reading” (1979: 34; quoted in Currie 1995: 94, fn.14). 
 
Now, as this remark suggests, novels are intended to be read or listened to, and reading 
and listening take time. However, this would only begin to introduce an analogy with 
experience if we held that the reading of a novel had to have a certain temporal structure 
to be correct. The temporal structure might then be thought of as the novel’s in some 
sense. But it is not plausible to insist that a novel must be read line by line (word by 
word?) starting at the beginning and working through at constant pace. No-one is forcing 
you to read the text in any particular order, nor to spend any particular length of time in 
doing so. Indeed, in theory, one is at liberty to take in a whole novel at once – speed 
readers do take in whole pages (and so presumably very short stories) at once. There is 
nothing incorrect about such a reading; there is nothing about the narrative that one 
cannot appreciate from non-standard readings. What is important in a reading of 
whatever sort is that the novel’s (non-temporal) structure is grasped by the reader; that 
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grasp does not require a reading with any particular temporal structure. Thus, there is no 
good sense in which a novel has its own temporal structure and so no analogy with 
experience. 
 
3.2 Letters 
 
Elsewhere Dennett (1991a: 146-7) appeals to an analogy with letters and messages 
arriving from different locations but with postmarks to determine their correct temporal 
order. Here things are a little more complex than with novels for there are further 
features of the letter or message potentially analogous to the time of occurrence of an 
experience. In particular, leaving aside internal structure, we can consider the time of 
arrival or reading of the letter or message as analogous to the time of occurrence of the 
experience, and the post-mark of the letter as representing the time of the content 
represented.
43 Postmarks are useful because they allow one to determine time of sending 
without reference to time of arrival. Consider a very simple SMS text message (to avoid 
problems arising from internal temporal structuring) which simply says, ‘I am leaving 
now.’ Imagine one is without reception and receives this message sometime later. The 
time of reading is not the time of sending. To interpret the message one looks at the 
digital postmark and determines what time ‘now’ refers to. In this way time of 
representing (receipt) comes apart from time represented (the reference of ‘now’). 
 
Our perceptual experience could work this way. We might, as Guyer imagines, find “a 
digital time-stamp on every one of our perceptions” (1987: 421). But we evidently find 
no such aspect to our actual experience immediately casting the analogy into doubt.
44 
Indeed, in contrast to the message case, it seems we are licensed immediately to make 
present tense judgements on the basis of our perceptual representation: ‘That is 
happening now,’ where ‘that’ is a visually grounded demonstrative.
45 We do not have to 
check the post-mark! 
                                                 
 
43 Of course, postmark and letter content timings can come apart. But let us assume that the present tense 
is in use throughout the letter. 
44 As Bennett nicely puts it, “Events don’t come with their ‘when’ written on their faces” (2004: 173). 
45 As Broad puts it, “It is of the essence of a perceptual situation that it claims to reveal an object as it is at 
the time when the situation is going on” (1929: 145). It is commonly objected to this idea that it takes time 
for light to reach the eye and for processing to occur. But this would only show that experience could not 
license present tense judgements if the present introduced by the present tense were strictly momentary. It 
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3.3 Paintings 
 
A case more plausibly analogous to the experiential case is pictorial representation. Here 
space is a common medium to most paintings and their represented scenes. Moreover, it 
is not difficult to imagine a painting (cf. Harman 1990: 34; also Dennett 1991a: 131, 147) 
in which the spatial relations between objects represented and the spatial relations 
between representings of those objects diverge in a manner analogous to that which is 
being suggested is possible in the case of time and experience. For example, consider 
Brueghel’s ‘Landscape with the Fall of Icarus’ (below). 
 
 
De val van Icarus, Pieter Brueghel the Old, Wikimedia Commons. 
 
Here the shepherd on the promontory is clearly represented as much higher up than the 
two rocks in the centre of the picture, the smaller ships and all the sea. Yet the painted 
figure representing the shepherd is lower on the canvas than much of the sea, those 
rocks and ships. Likewise, the painted figure of the tilling farmer is right up against the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
is far more plausible to think that the present tense introduces a contextually determined interval of time 
including the present moment. 
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shepherd on canvas and yet the figures are clearly represented as being some distance 
apart. (Dozens more examples can be pointed to.) 
 
Unfortunately, we really have no reason to think the analogy holds of temporal 
representation in experience. For one, the discrepancies noted above are due to the 
representation in two dimensions of a three-dimensional scene. No such gap is present in 
the uni-dimensional time case. Considering sculptures overcomes this issue and still 
appears to raise the possibility of differences between representing and represented most 
obviously in terms of scale.
46 However, it is more fruitful at this point to look at the best 
case for an analogy, viz., film which evidently possesses its own temporal structure. The 
issues concerning representation versus depiction that cinematic representation raises can 
then be carried back to the sculpture case. 
 
3.4 Films 
 
The best candidate for an analogy with experience is film. Dennett mentions them 
several times in passing, for example (1991a: 137, 152), and implicitly in his talk of 
editing rooms, institial frames and tape delay. We standardly recognise three distinct 
temporal structures with respect to films. 
 
(i)  The temporal structure of the scene that is filmed. 
(ii)  The temporal structure of the narrative represented. 
(iii)  The temporal structure depicted by the film.
47 
 
These structures rarely line up. Scene structure and depicted structure almost always 
come apart. The scenes depicted in modern Hollywood films are typically made up of a 
large number of individual shots combined in the editing room. Thus, although a single 
scene is depicted, many different scenes have been filmed (perhaps some in the studio, 
                                                 
 
46 Though given the points of Ch.1, §1.1 about metrical properties, this is not obviously relevant. 
47 How to understand depiction is, of course, a vexed issue. Nonetheless, it is widely agreed that there is a 
distinction between representation and depiction when it comes to pictorial or cinematic representation. 
Thus, Hopkins notes how much Western religious art merely represents the Holy Spirit by depicting a 
dove (1998: 9). Likewise, in Lynch’s Mulholland Drive what the significance (and so representative 
significance) of a mysterious blue box is may be quite obscure, yet there is no doubt that a blue box is 
being presented or depicted cinematically. Hopkins also argues that it is only the representation (depiction) 
of the dove which counts as distinctively pictorial. I suggest the same applies in the cinematic case. 
 
 
40 
some on location). A famous exception which attests to the general rule is Sokurov’s 
Russian Ark where the whole film comprises a single, stunningly choreographed, ninety-
minute Steadicam shot. The same applies to scene structure and narrative structure.  
 
Narrative and depicted structure also often come apart. An example is the use of reversal 
effects within the intended structure of a film such as Avary’s The Rules of Attraction which 
makes liberal use of such techniques. For example, at one point in the narrative, a piece 
of film of a plane moving through the sky is played backwards within the intended 
structure to indicate a backwards shift in narrative. What is strictly speaking depicted, 
however, is a plane moving backwards through the sky (this despite our knowledge that 
the scene actually filmed involved a plane moving forwards through the sky). The 
depicted order has the plane first at point B, then at point A; the narrative and scene 
structure places the plane first at A, then at B. 
 
In contrast to painting and photography, film is a paradigmatic temporal art. What 
exactly does this mean? The point is not that film uniquely represents motion or 
succession. Paintings and photographs can clearly represent motion. And it may be that 
Walton is right to claim that photographs depict motion also, for example, through 
blurring or unstable configurations (as in the photograph below).
48
 
Currie suggests the following: “with painting, temporal properties of events are not 
represented by temporal properties of representations, and the reason is clear: painting is 
temporalr [i.e., it represents temporal properties] but not temporalw [i.e., it does not itself 
possess temporal structure], so it does not have the capacity to be temporalc [that is to 
represent time by means of its own temporal structure]” (1995: 99). Walton makes a 
similar point.
49 Photographs contrast with films in that they do not represent movement 
or change by themselves moving or changing. He also notes that “a change in what 
something depicts is not necessarily a depiction of change” (2008: 163). In contrast, 
                                                 
 
48 See Walton 2008: 158f. for a variety of examples and discussion. I would not want to insist on this. It 
may well be that photographs merely represent movement in virtue of depicting multiple or blurred 
images, or unstable scenes. See also discussion in Le Poidevin 2007: Ch.7, esp. 134f.. 
49 See also Yaffe 2003. 
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Walton defines motion pictures as “pictures whose temporal properties do contribute to 
their representational content” (164).
50
 
 
Freak Out, Oblivion © Andrew Dunn, 2005, Wikimedia Commons. 
 
One might object at this point that a film only inherits its temporal structure from its 
watching and is consequently not really any different from a novel. However, in contrast 
to a novel, a film is created such that there is an intended temporal structure that the 
viewing public is to observe in watching.
51 If the film is to be viewed properly, the 
audience must watch the film projected in this intended manner. One can, of course, 
decide to view a film in some perverse way – at a different speed or, indeed, backwards. If 
                                                 
 
50 This should be borne in mind in considering the idea that a succession of representations is not a 
representation of succession in Chapter Six. Though Walton does not make this point, reflection on 
cinema suggests that in some circumstances a change in the depiction does amount to a depiction of 
change. 
51 Cf. Hamilton (ms.) on music: “Music is quintessentially an art of time … our experience of music is 
time-bound. Experience of painting, like all experience, takes place over time; but experience of musical 
performance is constrained by a specific intentional order of aural events.” 
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one does so, one has taken a decision not to view the film as it was intended to be seen, 
and so deliberately to view it incorrectly (though perhaps for good reason when it comes 
to some films). No such choice is typically present with still representations of time such 
as paintings or photographs.
52 And, as noted, no-one is forcing you to read a novel in 
any particular order and, in theory, one might take it all in at once. 
 
It is possible to build in the idea of a viewing time to a painting, insisting that the work 
be viewed, say, for precisely an hour to have its proper effect. The artist may explicitly 
intend his or her painting to be viewed in this manner. Or one might, more generally, 
hold it essential to appreciating the full meaning of a work that it be contemplated for 
several hours. Thus, Wollheim notoriously describes his practice of slow-looking as 
follows. 
 
I evolved a way of looking at paintings which was massively time-consuming and deeply 
rewarding. For I came to recognize that it often took the first hour or so in front of a 
painting for stray associations or motivated misperceptions to settle down, and it was only 
then, with the same amount of time or more to spend looking at it, that the picture could be 
relied upon to disclose itself as it was. (1987: 8) 
 
Does this undercut the distinction above between the temporal and non-temporal arts? It 
does not. Whilst we should certainly grant that appreciating static art takes time, we 
should note the following key difference. Wollheim’s slow-looking technique may well 
have been conducive (at least for him) to appreciating certain paintings. However, he 
notes that his method is merely a reliable means towards an end. The technique is not 
essential to attending to the work as it truly is. In contrast, watching a film as intended 
does introduce genuinely new possibilities for attention, possibilities which may have 
been simply unavailable during perverse viewings. One cannot attend to the backwards 
motion of the plane in The Rules of Attraction if one is viewing the film on rewind. Such 
novel possibilities are not essentially afforded by viewing a painting for an hour or three 
(or by attending in some particular order to different aspects of the work).
53 Certainly the 
effect a painting has on us can depend dramatically on our manner of engagement. And, 
                                                 
 
52 One might choose to view a painting upside-down, a point which evidences the fact that a painting has 
an intended orientation. This fact is further evidenced by the mistakes that galleries sometimes make in 
hanging artworks. 
53 Though there are difficult cases here such as Bridget Riley’s Movement in Squares and other Op. Art. Cf. 
Gombrich 1964: 306. 
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moreover, a certain amount of time may be necessary in order to see all of the painting 
(especially if the canvas is large).
54 Nonetheless, strictly speaking, no new element is made 
available for attention by viewing in any particular manner (such as slow-looking) as there 
is when a film is watched according to (or against) its intended structure.
55
 
Films – unlike photographs and paintings – then essentially have their own temporal 
structure. Thus we can consider how facts about the temporal order of the film relate to 
facts about the depicted temporal structure, the temporal structure of the narrative, and 
that of the scene. Jean-Luc Godard once famously commented, 
 
Indeed, naturally I think that a film should have a beginning, middle, and an end – but not necessarily 
in that order. 
 
One thing this indicates is that which events are represented as occurring first, last and 
in-between in the narrative can come apart from the order of their representation. A film 
may begin at the end and ‘flashback’ to events that happened earlier as exploited so 
effectively in Nolan’s Memento or Bresson’s Une Femme Douce. On a smaller scale, consider 
again the plane in The Rules of Attraction which in both actuality (scene) and in narrative is 
first at point A and then at point B. Contrast the intended viewing of the film in which 
we first see the plane at B and then at A. 
 
It is depiction though that is distinctive of cinematic representation. So what then of the 
relation between depicted structure and order of depiction? As mentioned above, Currie 
holds that “[w]hat is distinctively temporal about film is not its portrayal of time, but the 
manner of its portrayal: its portrayal of time by means of time” (1995: 96). Currie goes on 
to discuss whether the time of representation and time represented need match. 
 
                                                 
 
54 Something which casts into doubt a strict interpretation of Walton’s view that “At each individual 
moment during my five-minute observation of [a] photograph, I see (in imagination) the momentary 
occurrence that the picture depicts, a short time slice of the moving bicycles or the running kids, and see it 
in a moment” (2008: 181). 
55 Brough (2000: 228) presses the opposing view discussing the way a painter such as Brueghel guides the 
eye around the painting, deliberately aiming to keep us from noticing Icarus until the last. The question for 
Brough, however, is: Have I viewed the painting incorrectly if I do happen to cast my eye upon Icarus first 
off, or, indeed, am somehow able to take the elements in ‘all at once’? And, likewise, what have I missed in 
doing so? 
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Film’s representation of time by time can be automorphic or merely homomorphic. The 
represented fight lasts five minutes, and its lasting that long is represented by the 
relevant representation onscreen lasting just that long. It is the default setting for 
cinematic interpretation that the representation of duration in cinema is automorphic; it 
is the assumption we start with, and from which we move only when some aspect of the 
narration, some clash with real-world belief or some combination of the two suggests we 
should. In Pasolini’s Gospel According to St Matthew the representation of the Sermon on 
the Mount lasts a few moments. But changes in the background and lighting suggest that 
the whole performance lasted much longer and took place at various locations. Here the 
context of narration and real-world belief conspire to shift our understanding: the 
changes of scene were meant to indicate something, otherwise they would not have been 
made; landscape and lighting are, and are commonly known to be, by and large locally 
stable; so what is probably being suggested here is discontinuous shifting of place and 
time. (1995: 99) 
 
He then notes, 
 
You might argue that what is represented here is not the whole sermon, but just a few 
parts of it, and thus we can preserve the default setting. But to insist on this move in all 
cases would be, in effect, to identify what is represented with what is displayed, and that 
identification is hard to sustain. (ibid.: 99-100, fn.16) 
 
There are I suggest two ways of developing this picture. The first and most natural 
development emphasises the distinction between depicted (“displayed”) temporal 
structure and narrative (“represented”) temporal structure. In that light, Currie’s 
discussion of Pasolini reveals two things. Firstly, that although default in some sense, our 
interest is not always primarily in the temporal structure depicted, but rather that of the 
narrative. Secondly, that depictive representation, at least with respect to parts of the 
sermon, does appear to be consistently automorphic whereas narrative representation is 
merely homomorphic.
56 If this is right, cinema involves a distinctive and in some sense 
basic form of automorphic depictive representation.
57
                                                 
 
56 Yaffe (2003: 117f.) correctly points out that automorphic representation cannot simply be understood as 
any case where a representation has the very same properties as what is represented as in ‘black ink’. He 
suggests that representation is automorphic where the very properties represented are not just also 
possessed by the representation but also those in virtue of which said properties are represented. 
57 Compare also cases where films represent the passing of often lengthy periods in the narrative by 
exploiting the depiction of a rapidly sinking sun or a quickly turning clock hand. 
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Can we conclude on this picture that the temporal structure of the events depicted 
always mirrors the temporal order of depiction? Not quite. Godard is also said to have 
remarked, “Movies are a world of fragments.” And it might be thought that what 
Currie’s discussion indicates is that order of depiction and order depicted match within 
fragments. We do not, after all, think that a cut between two quite separate temporal 
perspectives in any sense depicts events as continuing on from earlier events. Much more 
plausibly, no connection is depicted. Nonetheless, it does seem right to hold that, within 
each fragment or scene, time of depiction and time depicted cannot come apart even if, 
at a grosser level, time of depiction need not map onto time depicted.
58
 
Does the analogy with depiction in film then support the idea that the temporal ordering 
of experience itself can come apart from the temporal ordering of events presented? It 
does not. Rather, at least within fragments, we are inclined to hold that the temporal 
order of depiction mirrors the temporal order depicted. Hence, by analogy, act-time and 
object-time should match at least within unified stretches of experience.
59
 
I mentioned a second way of developing Currie’s discussion of Pasolini. And here we 
find an analogue for a form of anti-realism about experiential temporal structure which 
presages discussion in Chapter Five. This second account begins by noting how Currie 
points to the way in which various non-temporal features of the film’s content (changes 
in background and lighting, for example) contribute to our grasp of the narrative 
temporal structure of the film. It is these non-temporal features which pull the narrative 
structure away from the film’s own temporal structure. Above, this led us to distinguish 
narrative temporal structure from depicted structure, the latter continuing to match the 
film’s temporal structure. However, the conclusion drawn here is that there is no 
                                                 
 
58 Note how we cannot really make sense (at least as cinema) of the extreme case where we make 
scenes/fragments simply one frame long. In other words, there must always be scenes of some length 
within which mapping occurs. 
59 Lee (2007: 343) attacks a “confused tendency in our thinking about temporal experience” which he 
labels the “Cinematic” view of temporal perception. Lee’s Cinematic View is the view that “experience 
presents temporal phenomenology in virtue of its own temporal layout” a claim which has the 
consequence that there is “a direct link between the temporal properties of perception, and its temporal 
content”. We should separate out claim and consequence here. I endorse the consequence and its 
“content/vehicle confusion,” regardless of the fact that “most would agree that the model is prima facie 
very dubious” (373, fn.9). On the other hand, I see no reason to accept the claim with its implication that 
experiential temporal content is possessed in virtue of the intrinsic temporal properties of experience. Why 
not think that the temporal structure of experience is what it is in virtue of the world’s temporal structure? 
That is, why not think that the world induces experience’s temporal structure (at least in the good case). 
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distinctive depiction of temporal structure in film apart from the temporal structure 
represented in the narrative.
60 We are misled into thinking that there is a distinctive kind 
of depiction because in simple, perhaps default cases, the narrative structure mirrors the 
film’s structure. But, on this second account, it is suggested that there is no reason to 
continue to believe in a form of depiction which mirrors the film’s own structure in cases 
where the narrative structure departs from the film’s structure. There is no more to the 
representation of time in films than the temporal structure of the narrative.
61
 
This is not the natural view of the matter. But we might be led to this kind of view by 
pressing cases where there is a tension between the narrative and depicted structure. 
Vivid examples come in letter scenes. We might imagine that one character receives and 
reads a letter sent by another character, the scene showing this by switching between the 
reader and writer.
62 We know full well that these switches are between quite disjoint 
times – the letter is not being read as it is written! Nonetheless, we are naturally inclined 
to think of such cases in terms of a single scene regardless of the fact that it involves two 
(or perhaps more) temporally separated perspectives. It can, in such cases, feel 
uncomfortable to insist either that there are in fact a series of separate scenes here spliced 
together and that only within each scene does depicted structure mirror order of 
depiction, or alternatively, that strictly speaking what is depicted is a temporally 
continuous sequence despite the striking contrast with the narrative (and what we know 
about letters) in this respect. 
 
On the first and most natural way of developing the picture above we must insist on one 
of these options, plausibly by distinguishing between different conceptions of a ‘scene’. 
However, if we place a great deal of weight on such cases it is possible to insist that what 
they really show is that there is no more to the supposedly distinctive depicted time 
structure than what is represented as being so in the narrative. The tension in the above 
cases is then resolved by discarding a false assumption, namely, the idea that there is such 
                                                 
 
60 Something like this reading is suggested by Yaffe (2003: 121) who holds that often “considerations of 
narrative coherence” account for representation of order as opposed to the temporal ordering of the 
representations. Yaffe does not distinguish narrative representation from depiction leaving him with 
something like the account above. 
61 Cf. the final sentence of Dennett and Kinsbourne 1992a: “The temporal sequence in consciousness is, 
within the limits of whatever temporal control window bounds our investigation, purely a matter of the 
content represented, not the timing of the representing.” 
62 Recall, for example, various adaptations of novels such as Austen’s Pride and Prejudice where Lizzie 
receives a letter from Darcy or Jane. Or think of the email exchanges in Ephron’s You’ve Got Mail. 
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a thing as distinctively depictive structure. As I say, this is not our natural view of things 
and the motivation just sketched is not in itself compelling. However, the picture is 
helpful in warming us up for Chapter Five where I explore a related, anti-realist view of 
the perceptual case. That view rejects the naïve idea that experience has an experiential 
temporal structure of its own which matches the temporal structure of the apparent 
objects of experience. Instead, it claims that there is nothing more to experiential 
temporal structure than the structure that experience is represented as having in 
autobiographical memory as grounded in aspects of experience’s non-temporal content. 
Though initially hard to believe, there are in fact powerful arguments in favour of such a 
view. 
 
For now we should conclude as follows. Firstly, cinema, the most plausible analogy for 
the experiential representation of time, in no way suggests that the temporal structure of 
experience and the temporal structure of the objects of experience easily come apart. At 
least within unified stretches of experience, it suggests that they must match. Secondly, 
reflection on cinema flags (though it does not significantly motivate) the availability of a 
form of anti-realism about experiential temporal structure which will be our central 
concern in Chapter Five. 
 
4. Transparency 
 
So far the discussion of how act-time and object-time might relate has been largely 
suggestive. I have argued that we should be sceptical of most supposed analogies with 
other representational media, and I have also noted that the best analogy available in fact 
suggests that act-time and object-time mirror one another. Might we argue for or against 
this conclusion directly? I think we can. Crucial in this regard is the idea that experience 
is transparent. In this section, I give a brief overview of that idea as I think it is best 
understood. In the next, I relate those general considerations to the case of time. 
 
What exactly is the thesis of transparency as it is understood in contemporary debates in 
the philosophy of perception? A profusion of transparency theses and distinctions makes 
this a difficult question to answer. Here I will focus on two canonical statements of the 
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supposed transparency of experience – those of Gil Harman and Michael Tye.
63 How do 
they understand the notion? 
 
The passage standardly cited from Harman’s classic paper ‘The Intrinsic Quality of 
Experience’ is the following. 
 
When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colours she experiences are all experienced as 
features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic 
features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic 
features of her experience. And that is true of you too. There is nothing special about 
Eloise’s visual experience. When you see a tree, you do not experience any features as 
intrinsic features of your experience. Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to 
intrinsic features of your visual experience. I predict you will find that the only features 
there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree, including relational 
features of the tree “from here.” (1990: 39) 
 
And here is a typical passage from Michael Tye’s influential work on transparency. 
 
Focus your attention on a square that has been painted blue.  Intuitively, you are directly 
aware of blueness and squareness as out there in the world away from you … [as] 
features of an external surface. Now shift your gaze inward and try to become aware of 
your experience itself, inside you, apart from its objects. Try to focus your attention on 
some intrinsic feature of the experience that distinguishes it from other experiences, 
something other than what it is an experience of. The task seems impossible: one’s 
awareness seems always to slip through the experience to blueness and squareness, as 
instantiated together in an external object. In turning one’s mind inward to attend to the 
experience, one seems to end up concentrating on what is outside again, on external 
features or properties. (1995: 30; see also Tye 1992, 2002) 
 
Both Harman and Tye instruct us to perform an experiment: “turn your attention to 
intrinsic features of your visual experience”; “shift your gaze inward to try to become 
aware of your experience itself, inside you, apart from its objects”; “focus your attention 
                                                 
 
63 The term ‘transparency’ originates with Moore 1903. However, as Martin (2002) points out (see also 
Stoljar 2004), Moore’s interest is in diaphanousness, the claim that sameness and difference in phenomenal 
character can be exhaustively understood in terms of sameness and difference amongst presented objects (of 
whatever kind). Martin proposes a more likely ancestor of transparency as here introduced in Grice’s talk 
of intrinsic qualities of experience in his (1962); Strawson 1979 is also a clear influence. 
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on some intrinsic feature of the experience that distinguishes it from other experiences”. 
Both think that, try as we might, we will fail in the attempt. 
 
What is the nature of the experiment to be performed? Evidently, they are not to be read 
literally, as suggesting that we shift our outward perceptual attention or gaze inwards, so 
that the very same capacity is targeted on the “intrinsic features of your visual 
experience” (Harman), or “your experience itself … some intrinsic feature of the 
experience” (Tye). The way in which we can attend to a tree in the middle distance, or to 
the birdsong emanating from it, is not a way in which we can attend to our experience 
itself. Our experience is not itself an object of sense experience. Nonetheless, there is a 
clear sense in which we can attend to our experience; we can think about it. As Martin 
puts it, 
 
In general, whatever we are prepared to call an object of thought – be it the things 
thought about, what one thinks about them, or the proposition one thinks in thinking 
these things – we can also take to be an object of attention. Conscious, active thought is 
simply a mode of attending to the subject matter of such thoughts. … Arguably, it is part 
of the manifest image of the mind that we are aware of objects of sense experience in a 
different way from being aware of the objects of thought, and that this is reflected in the 
ways attention can relate one to an object of sense as opposed to thought. (1997: 78)64
 
Harman and Tye are suggesting that, when one engages one’s cognitive attention in 
thinking about samenesses and differences amongst our experiences, “one seems to end 
up concentrating on what is outside again” (Tye); or, as Harman puts it, “the only 
features there to turn your [cognitive] attention [i.e., thought] to will be features of the 
presented tree”. 
 
When Tye and Harman instruct us to reflect upon what it is like to enjoy some particular 
episode of conscious experience, they claim that two things are revealed. First, that one 
of the things that one does in order to answer the question ‘What, subjectively, is our 
experience like?’ is to consider what the ordinary mind-independent objects of awareness 
are, and what features and properties they have (something that will evidently involve 
                                                 
 
64 Cf. the OED entry for ‘attention’ and James’ remark: “Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking 
possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible 
objects or trains of thought” (1890: 403-4). 
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deploying perceptual attention). Second, that one can do nothing else in pursuing this 
question. No aspect of one’s answer will involve reference to intrinsic features of 
experience or, more generally, features which are not aspects of the presented scene. 
 
One can, of course, think about all sorts of aspects of one’s experience (its possible 
neural correlate, whether it will prompt a dream tonight, whose birthday it might be 
occurring on) that are nothing to do with its objects. This is why we need to focus on 
answering the question, ‘What, subjectively, is it like to be enjoying your current 
experience?’ as opposed to ‘What properties does your experience have?’ We also need to 
focus on rationally appropriate strategies for answering this question. One might think 
that there are other ways of answering the question that do not go via making 
judgements about the world apparently presented, such as saying the first thing that pops 
into your head. This hardly generates counter-examples to transparency. 
 
In the terms of earlier discussion we can put Harman and Tye’s conclusion as follows: 
when one attempts to describe the experiential aspects of one’s experience, one (a) rationally 
does and (b) can only rationally do so through making judgements about and, since those 
judgements typically require it, perceptually attending to the ordinary, apparent objects of 
experience and their properties. This helps makes explicit a distinction between positive 
and negative aspects of the transparency claim. It might be that some experiential 
properties can be attributed on a number of distinct grounds. As a result, the fact that it 
is rational to attribute an experiential property via attention to the objects of experience 
does not rule out distinct grounds for attribution. Harman and Tye evidently hold that 
such distinct grounds are ruled out – consideration of the presented scene is the only 
rational way of attributing properties to experience (on the basis of reflection alone). 
 
We also need to flag a second key distinction between what we might call weak and 
strong transparency theses. It is helpful first to state what it is for a particular aspect of 
experience to be transparent according to Tye and Harman.
65
 
Property Transparency A phenomenal property is transparent iff for any 
particular experience with that phenomenal property, it is never the case that 
                                                 
 
65 I here include the negative claim discussed in the last paragraph as part of the definition of transparency. 
 
 
51 
when I consider how things are with me experientially, I am rationally positioned, 
(through reflection on my experience alone) to ascribe that property to my 
experience other than on the basis of a judgement concerning the apparent 
objects of perception or their features. 
 
Strong transparency is the claim that all phenomenal properties are transparent in this 
sense; weak transparency is the claim that some are. In other words, weak transparency 
tells us that when we reflect upon our experience in an attempt to answer the question, 
‘What, subjectively, is our experience like? What are its experiential properties?’ the 
rational answer to that question about our experience is in part and essentially determined 
by the rational answer to a question concerning the apparent objects (or content) of that 
experience, viz., ‘What is the scene presented like?’ Strong transparency tells us that when 
we reflect upon our experience in an attempt to answer the question, ‘What, subjectively, 
is our experience like? What are its experiential properties?’ the rational answer to that 
question about our experience is wholly and essentially determined by the rational answer 
to a question concerning the apparent objects (or content) of that experience, viz., ‘What 
is the scene presented like?’
66
 
Discussing transparency in terms of particular properties allows us to consider any 
particular experiential aspect of experience and ask whether that aspect is transparent, 
whilst holding in abeyance considerations regarding strong as opposed to weak general 
theses. All we need to consider is whether judgements attributing that property to 
experience are determined essentially by judgements concerning the apparent objects of 
perception. 
 
Reflection reveals that some properties are transparent in the sense of Property 
Transparency. When we reflect on the nature of our experience, we do so by making 
judgements concerning the (apparent) objects of perception. This observation was made 
forcefully by Strawson when he pointed out that, when asked to describe their 
experience, naïve subjects do so in terms of ordinary, apparent objects of perception and 
their features. Thus, as already mentioned, his imagined subject reports his visual 
experience by saying that he sees “the red light of the setting sun filtering through the 
                                                 
 
66 Cf. Way’s discussion of a different notion of transparency in his (2007: 223-4). 
 
 
52 
black and thickly clustered branches of the elms … [and] the dappled deer grazing in 
groups on the vivid green grass…” (1979: 43). This answering strategy will inevitably 
involve perceptual attention to the objects of experience – the more precise and detailed 
an answer we wish to give, the closer our attention (cf. Martin 1998b where he quotes 
the art historian Michael Baxandall). Moreover, with respect to such an aspect of 
experience this does appear to be the only strategy that we have for attributing this 
property to experience. Such a strategy is essential for attribution. Consequently, 
properties such as ‘being a presentation as of a group of grazing deer’ are transparent in 
the sense of Property Transparency. Henceforth that is what I mean by ‘transparent,’ 
unless the usage is otherwise qualified. 
 
Strawsonian considerations justify an existential claim, the claim that we do attribute 
properties to our experience in certain ways, namely, via describing the world 
encountered. This thought alone has been held to have consequences for how we should 
understand the nature of perceptual experience.
67 But endorsing Strawson’s claim does 
not commit one to strong transparency, viz., the claim that all experiential properties are 
transparent in the above sense, i.e., that there is no way of attributing experiential 
properties other than on the basis of making judgements about the represented scene.  
 
Two possibilities face us at this point. On the one hand, Tye and Harman might be right 
to defend a strong thesis – not only does one describe one’s experience through attention 
to and description of the encountered world, one cannot rationally make a judgement 
concerning the presence of an experiential feature on any other basis. Or, to paraphrase 
Tye, we can only rationally distinguish our experience from other experiences (in their 
experiential aspects) on the basis of differences in apparent objects and their apparent 
properties. Alternatively, one might think that there are ways in which we can rationally 
distinguish amongst our experiences in reflective awareness that do not turn solely on 
differences in the presented objects and properties of objects – differences in how things 
seem, despite sameness of presented objects and their properties. One issue here is 
whether introspection reveals not just properties represented or presented by experience, 
but also non-representational, subjective properties of experience. This is not the only 
way of construing the issue. A much-discussed example of difference in how things seem 
                                                 
 
67 In particular, it places an explanatory burden on any potential theory of experience that certain theories 
struggle to discharge. See, for example, Martin 1998b, 2002. 
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despite sameness of presented objects and their properties is the example of blurry vision 
(see, e.g., Crane 2006: 130 and Pace 2007). We might well think of blurriness as a matter 
of the way objects and their properties are presented, where that need not be a matter of 
subjective qualia or the like. 
 
Such concerns are not crucial to the argument of this chapter. For present purposes, it 
should simply be noted that Tye and Harman’s strong thesis is much less obvious than 
the weak thesis. As just suggested, it may well be that the way in which a given object or 
property is perceived is an important part of the characterisation of what it is like to have 
an experience. Moreover, as Martin (2002: fn.11) points out, claiming that all experiential 
properties are transparent looks unlikely to be justifiable solely by appeal to a handful of 
examples (especially given the limited menu from which they are chosen). 
 
Construing transparency as a thesis about particular properties of experience avoids these 
issues. It allows us to ask of any particular aspect of experience whether it is transparent. 
(I am, of course, specifically interested in experience’s temporal properties.) This enables 
us to leave aside particular potential counter-examples to a general thesis. Moreover, as 
we have seen, this way of approaching things does not deprive the transparency claim of 
real force. If any aspects are transparent, a purely subjective view will, arguably, struggle 
to account for them. Conversely, we can lay down a challenge to those who believe that 
experience has subjective properties (sense-data, qualia): find a phenomenal property of 
experience – an aspect of how things seem – that does not conform to transparency in 
this sense. 
 
One important issue remains. The claim that a property is transparent in the sense stated 
above is deliberately neutral with respect to what one might think of as the metaphysics of 
transparency.
68 To say that some experiential property is attributable to experience only 
on the basis of judgements concerning the represented or apparently presented scene is 
at most to establish that the phenomenal property attributed supervenes on that aspect 
of the experience’s representational content, or the presentation of that particular scene. 
More generally, epistemic claims about how we attribute properties to experience can at 
most establish that there cannot be differences in phenomenal character without a 
                                                 
 
68 It is possible that such neutrality is ultimately unsustainable but for present purposes I bracket that large 
issue. 
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difference in representational content/presented objects. This relationship is neutral on 
whether representational content/presented scene determines  phenomenal character or 
vice-versa. Transparency theorists are inclined to discuss transparency in terms of 
determination. Harman and Tye want us to think of phenomenal character as determined 
by representational content, or, in less partisan terms, that the phenomenal properties of 
experience are determined by how the scene is presented or represented as being. 
Certainly, such a determination claim would explain transparency in the above sense. But 
so might alternative accounts. 
 
Chalmers is sensitive to these issues when he writes the following. 
 
The plausible thesis that perceptual experiences have phenomenal content leaves many 
other questions open. For example, the thesis is neutral on whether phenomenal 
character is prior (in some sense) to representational content, or vice versa. It is 
compatible with the thesis that phenomenal character is grounded in representational 
content (as held by Dretske 1995 and Tye 1995, among others), and it is compatible with 
the thesis that representational content is grounded in phenomenal character (as held by 
Searle 1990 and Horgan and Tienson 2002, among others). (2006: 51) 
  
I see no reason for thinking that Searle, Horgan and Tienson are straightforwardly 
refuted by transparency considerations. It may even be that some phenomenal properties 
are determined by aspects of the presented or represented scene, whereas for others the 
determination runs the other way around. For the main part, I do not take a stand 
regarding this metaphysical debate. 
 
5. Time and Transparency 
 
Debates about the transparency of experience have been dominated by examples of the 
visual perception of spatial and colour properties: seeing a blue square (Tye 1995: 30), or 
delighting in “the intense blue of the Pacific Ocean” (Tye 1992: 160); staring at “the 
variegated colours and shapes of [a lavender bush’s] leaves and branches” (Martin 2002: 
380); or, more mundanely, one’s “experience of looking at a gray filing cabinet” (Stoljar 
2004: 341). 
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Yet we also perceive temporal properties, as well as properties which are determinations 
of time. Temporal properties form part of the content of experience. There is a striking 
difference between perceiving temporal properties and cases of seeing shape and colour 
properties. The difference is due to the fact already much emphasised that unlike shape 
or colour, temporal structure is common to experience and its objects. Experience itself in 
its experiential aspect has a genuine temporal ordering – our streams of consciousness 
are made up of events with relative durations, which occur determinately before and after 
one another. Experience is not, in its experiential aspect, coloured or shaped. Thus, time 
is uniquely common to experience and its objects. This introduces an additional element 
into discussion of transparency claims. 
 
My main aim in this section is to argue that the temporal properties of our experience 
such as succession and relative duration (the temporal structure of our stream of 
perceptual consciousness) are transparent in the quite general sense outlined above. 
Doing so will highlight the ways in which the transparency thesis looks rather different in 
the temporal case. As we saw above, Harman and Tye think that transparency is 
something that can be established by introspection. In particular, they think that, when 
we attempt to describe our experience, it turns out that our only rational way of doing so 
is by making a judgement about the apparent objects of experience and their apparent 
properties. So let us focus on a case where we set out to describe the temporal structure 
of our experience.  
 
Imagine you hear two notes played on a piano, first a G above middle C and then the C a 
fourth above it. For example, think of the opening notes of the Rondo in Beethoven’s C 
minor piano sonata op.13 (Pathétique) or (in a different key) the wedding march. 
Attending to the playing that is going on in the world, you judge the sound of the G to 
have occurred before the C. You note the temporal relation between the two sounds, 
how fast the C followed on from the G, you begin to have a sense of tempo, rhythm etc. 
 
Now imagine instead attending to – that is reflecting on the nature of – one’s experience 
as the notes are played. In particular, imagine reflecting on the temporal ordering of 
one’s experience of the notes. More precisely, imagine attending with the aim of 
answering the question, ‘What temporal relation does my experience of the C bear to my 
experience of the G?’ 
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Considering the problem entirely in the abstract, the following possibility seems quite 
consistent with the scenario as sketched so far: when one comes to reflect on one’s 
experience, one rationally judges that one’s experience of the C came before one’s experience 
of the G. Moreover, one judges that the time between the experience of a C and a G was 
significantly shorter than the time one judged there to be between the C’s sounding and 
the G’s sounding. The situation, theoretically hypothesized, is graphically depicted below. 
 
Experiential Time 
Object Time 
e(C)
C  G 
e(G)
 
 
However, I submit, when we actually engage in reflection on our experience, this 
theoretical possibility is revealed to be incoherent.
69 The way we go about trying to 
answer the question concerning the temporal structure of our conscious experience is by 
making a judgement about the temporal structure of the apparent objects of 
consciousness (the sounds heard), and then by taking our experience to be structured in the same 
way. This is what explains the practical difficulty we have in trying to make sense of the 
idea that the objects could be represented as having a different ordering, or bearing 
different relations to each other (let alone such dramatically different orderings and 
relations) to the ordering and intra-relations of representing experience. When we reflect 
upon the nature of our experience, the musical scenario sketched above seems quite 
unimaginable, quite incoherent. It simply does not seem that, reflecting on our 
experience alone, we could come to rationally judge that our experience had a different 
ordering to the apparent ordering of the objects of experience. If my experience 
                                                 
 
69 Note the implications for the status of the transparency claim. It is a claim about how perceptual 
experience is for us. It does not straight-forwardly rule out the existence of a radically different kind of 
perceptual experience which does not conform to transparency. 
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represents the C as succeeding on from the G, then we will rationally judge that my 
experience of the G came before my experience of the C. 
 
The apparent matching here is a direct consequence of the transparency of temporal 
properties. As understood above, an experiential property is transparent just if its 
attribution essentially goes via our reflection on the apparent objects/content of 
experience. The attribution of temporal structure to our experience necessarily goes via 
judgements about (and typically attention to) the apparent temporal ordering of the 
objects of experience. Thus, temporal properties of experience are transparent. It is this 
transparency which explains why, restricting ourselves to how things seem to us on 
introspective reflection, we can make no sense of a gap between the apparent ordering of 
objects and the apparent ordering of experience itself. Call this claim Temporal 
Transparency. 
 
Temporal Transparency For any particular temporal determination of 
experience, it is never the case that when I consider how things are with me 
experientially, I am rationally positioned, through reflection on my experience 
alone, to judge my experience to be so determined other than on the basis of a 
judgement concerning (and typically perceptual attention to) the temporal 
structure of the apparent objects of perception. 
 
6. Consequences 
6.1 Time and the Metaphysics of Transparency 
 
Sometimes it is suggested that the claim that all phenomenal properties are transparent 
establishes that there is no more to experience’s phenomenal character than its 
representational content, no more to the conscious aspects of experience than what is 
represented.
70 Witness the following statements of this view. 
 
[T]here is nothing to your experience over and above the way it represents the world as 
being. (Carruthers 2005a: 40) 
                                                 
 
70 Recall the discussion of Pylyshyn in Chapter One. 
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[T]here are no non-relational properties of experience qua experience. (ibid.: 47) 
 
If we stipulate that something is a visual phenomenal quality or a quale only if it is a 
directly accessible quality of an experience, then there are no visual phenomenal qualities 
or qualia. Still there are qualities of which the subjects of visual experiences are directly 
aware via introspection. They are qualities of external surfaces (and volumes and films), 
if they are qualities of anything. (Tye 2002: 141-2) 
 
[We] are not aware of those intrinsic features of [our] experience by virtue of which it 
has [its] content. Indeed, I believe that [we have] no access at all to the intrinsic features 
of our mental representation that make it a mental representation of seeing a tree [or of 
another scene for that matter]. (Harman 1990: 39) 
 
Finally, Byrne argues on the same basis that we should not be concerned with the mind-
body problem, urging a move to a fictitious world w´ where the mind-body problem isn’t 
taken seriously. Why is it not (and should it not be) taken seriously there? 
 
Well, the philosophers in w´ are much taken with the idea that experience is transparent. 
Introspection of one’s experience of blue, for example, merely yields what the experience 
is of or about – the ostensible scene before the eyes. As to the intrinsic nature of the 
experience, we are completely in the dark. If we like, we can say experiences of blue have 
a “qualitative character”, but that is simply because they represent that objects have a 
“qualitative” property – namely, blueness. The experiences are, in this respect, like the 
words ‘blue’, ‘purple’, ‘yellow’, and so forth. We may say that ‘blue’ is more similar in a 
salient qualitative respect to ‘purple’ than to ‘yellow’, but that can only mean that ‘blue’ 
represents a property that is more similar in a salient qualitative respect to the property 
represented by ‘purple’ than it is to the property represented by ‘yellow’. Hence, the 
philosophers in w´ [think that], if we can provide a satisfying naturalistic explanation of 
the qualitative nature of the colours, there will be no mysterious qualitative residue left in 
experience. (2006: 223-4) 
 
The reason that this conclusion seems so natural to the authors above is that they focus 
on properties such as colour and shape. The colours and shapes we experience are 
experienced as the properties of objects in the world and, crucially, when we reflect on 
our experience we do not find our experience itself to be blue or shaped – if that idea 
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even makes sense – nor do we find any objects other than the objects in the world to 
attach such properties to. Thus, in so far as we are only aware of such colour and shape 
properties, we are not aware of intrinsic, non-representational properties of experience. 
Consequently, the negative transparency claim seems to rule out introspective knowledge 
of any intrinsic, non-representational properties. As Byrne puts it, “As to the intrinsic 
nature of the experience, we are completely in the dark.”
71
 
The case of time shows that this is a mistake. For in the case of experience, we precisely 
do think of our experience itself as having a temporal structure of its own, as having 
intrinsic temporal properties that we can come to be aware of (i.e., know about). This is 
quite compatible with such properties being transparent in the above sense. The 
temporal properties of experience are intrinsic, non-representational properties of 
experience and yet also transparent. 
 
Nonetheless, the fundamental concern of the theorists above is to establish that 
representational properties fully determine phenomenal character. That might still be so in 
the temporal case. However, even here, Strong Transparency does not establish this 
metaphysical thesis. As I suggested above, to say that a property is transparent is non-
committal with regard to the metaphysical issue concerning the determination of 
phenomenal character by representational content or vice-versa. In the case of time the 
key issue can be stated as follows. Are the temporal properties of experience determined 
by the representational content of experience, or is it in virtue of having a certain 
temporal structure that experience represents the world as being temporally structured? 
Put another way: is the temporal structure of experience determined by the temporal 
structure of the apparently presented scene, or is the temporal structure that the apparent 
scene is presented as having determined by the temporal structure of experience? 
 
In arguing that there are temporal constraints on the representation of time, I have not 
taken a stance on this issue. Our judgements (and plausibly knowledge) as to what that 
                                                 
 
71 This discussion should not be assumed to build into it the idea that we do find representational 
properties as occasionally occurs, for example in Shoemaker’s remark that “qualia, if there are such, are 
diaphanous; if one tries to attend to them, all one finds is the representative content of the experience” 
(1990: 101). Here, as with Tye and Harman on occasion, the positive claim that one does find 
representational content is built in to the transparency thesis. This is misleading. Rather, as Martin (2002) 
argues, a strong transparency thesis presents the theorist with an explanatory burden which the 
representationalist but also the naïve realist is prima facie in a position to discharge. 
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temporal structure is are dependent upon, indeed always go via judgements about the 
apparent temporal ordering of the objects presented. This is quite compatible with 
thinking that experience represents the world as being temporally structured in a certain 
way in virtue of having a certain temporal structure of its own. 
 
6.2 Transparency and the Principle of Presentational Concurrence 
 
In discussing the views of Brentano and Husserl, Miller introduces the following 
principle which he calls the Principle of Presentational Concurrence or PPC. 
 
[T]he duration of a content being presented is concurrent with the duration of the act of 
presenting it. That is, the time interval occupied by a content which is before the mind is 
the very same time interval which is occupied by the act of presenting that very content 
before the mind. (1984: 107) 
 
Dainton (2000: 134) has recently endorsed this principle.
72 As noted above, Tye singles 
out PPC as a clear case where the properties of the represented are being confused with 
the properties of the representation, no different to assuming that, if a red light flashes 
before a green light, then the verbal representation of said events must be structured so 
that the representation of the red light comes before the representation of the green 
light, ruling out a representation such as, ‘The green light flashed after the red light.’ 
 
The discussion of Temporal Transparency suggests that those who endorse PPC are not 
confused. Although they do not make explicit appeal to introspection, the view that the 
properties of experience must match the properties of what is apparently experienced in 
the temporal case does have introspective support. Thus, they cannot be charged with 
making a simple act/object confusion. 
 
Having said that, a gap remains between PPC and the claim that the temporal properties 
of experience are transparent. Just because our only rational strategy for attributing 
                                                 
 
72 In this Dainton follows Foster who holds “we have to take experience to extend over a period of real 
time in a way which exactly matches the phenomenal period it presents” (1991: 249). Dainton ultimately 
denies the act-object distinction upon which PPC is premised. However, as noted above, he declares that 
“even if we draw an awareness-content distinction it makes no sense to suppose that an act of awareness 
can apprehend a content of greater temporal duration than itself” (2000: 180). 
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temporal structure to experience commits us to judgements which accord with PPC, we 
have not yet provided grounds for thinking that our rational judgements are always 
correct. We may be misled about the nature of our inner lives. The burden of the next 
chapter is to close this gap, and thereby defend PPC. 
 
Relatedly, and as already noted, I have yet to discuss the most striking arguments against 
PPC, namely, those found in Dennett’s work. Dennett agrees that PPC is an 
overwhelmingly natural view to hold. Indeed, having argued against it at length, he 
considers how we might react. 
 
You may still want to object that all the arguments in this chapter are powerless to 
overturn the obvious truth that our experiences of events occur in the very same order as we experience 
them to occur. … [This is] a thesis that is true in general, and does indeed seem 
unexceptioned so long as we restrict our attention to psychological phenomena of 
“ordinary” macroscopic duration. (1991a: 168, my emphasis) 
 
However, on the basis of short-term phenomena, Dennett notoriously rejects this 
picture. Quite how to understand Dennett’s view is a complex issue which I take up at 
some length in Chapter Five. However, two points should be noted. Firstly, Dennett’s 
view is not obviously one on which we are misled about the ordering of conscious 
experience when we engage in introspective reflection. Dennett is arguably better 
understood as endorsing an anti-realist view, according to which there is no more to the 
temporal ordering of conscious experience than the way we represent that order in short-
term autobiographical memory. If that is right, Dennett may be in a position to endorse 
Temporal Transparency under an anti-realist construal. In other words, Dennett is 
arguably best understood as attacking Realism not Temporal Transparency. 
 
Secondly, insofar as critics of PPC like Tye rely on Dennettian arguments, as opposed to 
dubious analogies, they certainly do not endorse other central tenets of Dennett’s view. 
Tye (1993), for example, offers a robust defence of what he calls Phenomenal Realism 
against Dennett’s attack. As noted above, one might well wonder whether Tye can really 
have his cake and eat it in this regard.    
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Chapter Three: 
Self-Intimation 
 
 
It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something 
would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying 
that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.
73
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
hat is the relation between consciousness, and self-consciousness or self-
awareness? Why is answering this question crucial to issues concerning 
experience and time? 
    W
We have already seen one reason. Chapters One and Two argued that experience has an 
experiential temporal structure of its own and that that structure is transparent in that it is 
rational to judge that one’s experience is temporally determined in a given way only by 
taking its temporal structure to mirror the apparent temporal structure of the world 
experienced. However, rational judgements need not be true, less still need rational 
beliefs count as knowledge.
74 As a result, nothing that has been said so far rules out the 
sceptical possibility that our introspective judgements in this (or any other) domain are 
systematically mistaken. Nothing rules out the thought that, although we may be rational 
to judge that our experience is structured in one way or another, such judgements about 
the temporal structure of our experience regularly, even always, fail to be true. 
 
                                                 
 
73 Kant 2003: B131-2. 
74 It is rational to trust news reports, teachers, encyclopaedia and maps (for example) even though 
sometimes the resulting beliefs are false, or even if true, do not count as knowledge for reasons beyond our 
ken. Certain maps contain ‘copyright traps,’ fictional post offices, streets, or even towns designed to catch 
plagiarism. Likewise, notoriously, the New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians (Sadie 1980) contains an 
entry concerning an entirely fictitious Italian composer. More pedestrian and common-place are the 
straightforward slips we all (journalists, teachers and editors included) make, mistakes which are 
occasionally accidentally right. 
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Perhaps our experience seems some way to us and yet is in fact some other way entirely. 
At the extreme, perhaps our apparent awareness of our experience as a continuous 
stream of overlapping and successive processes and/or events is only apparent. Perhaps 
it only seems that way – perhaps our experience is in fact a series of discrete and 
independent, instantaneous events.
75 Perhaps this supposed fact is something that we are 
constitutionally incapable of achieving awareness of. One aim of this chapter is to cast 
doubt on such scepticism. 
 
Consideration of this sort of scepticism also anticipates issues which occupy centre stage 
when it comes to considering Dennett’s influential views in Chapter Five. Dennett’s 
arguments concerning time and experience are often dismissed as verificationist.
76 Yet as 
Dennett writes, 
 
Some thinkers have their faces set so hard against “verificationism” and 
“operationalism” that they want to deny it even in the one arena where it makes manifest 
good sense: the realm of subjectivity. (1991a: 132)77
 
This chapter aims to explore what does make manifest good sense when it comes to the 
realm of subjectivity. As such, the considerations here underpin much of the discussion 
in Chapter Five. 
 
My strategy is not to present a decisive case in favour of one particular way of 
understanding the relation between consciousness and self-awareness. Rather I motivate 
and present a natural way of thinking about the relation and argue that extant reasons for 
rejecting it are unsuccessful. Thus, in the next two sections I sketch in broad terms two 
influential lines of thought regarding self-awareness and consciousness both of which 
drive us to the same conclusion, viz., a claim I call Self-Intimation. In subsequent 
                                                 
 
75 A possibility suggested by Austen Clark (1989: 291), for example. 
76 For example, Tye comments, “I am inclined to reply [to Dennett] by modifying a remark of Mr. 
McCawber: “Verificationism! Foul play, sir! Take a drop more grog and you’ll get over the weakness of 
believing in verificationism.” (1993: 894) 
77 Cf. Hurley 1992: 212, “To claim that a difference in the content of conscious experience must be a 
consciously experienceable difference is not to subscribe to verificationism, of which some may be 
tempted to accuse D & K.” Likewise, Searle (1995), who echoing Dennett declares, “ … where the 
existence of conscious states is concerned, you can’t make the distinction between appearance and reality, 
because the existence of the appearance is the reality in question. If it consciously seems to me that I am 
conscious, then I am conscious”. 
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sections I turn to standard objections to the picture adumbrated. Responding to these 
objections helps clarify and flesh-out the proposed view. 
 
2. Scepticism and Consciousness 
 
It is commonly held that knowledge of our inner, conscious lives is somehow sceptic 
proof. Such knowledge brings the Cartesian sceptic’s remorseless undermining of 
knowledge claims to a halt. We can begin to think about what exactly this amounts to by 
considering what could explain such a special epistemic position with respect to our 
conscious lives. 
 
One might think that some especially tight and reliable connection between second-order 
beliefs and conscious experience could do the trick. To this idea Chalmers objects as 
follows. 
 
The knowledge that a reliability theory grants us seems too weak to count as the kind of 
knowledge that we have of our conscious experience. … The trouble is that if our beliefs 
about consciousness were justified only by a reliable connection, then we could not be 
certain that we are conscious. The mere existence of a reliable connection cannot deliver 
certainty, for we have no way to rule out the possibility that the reliable connection is 
absent and that there is no consciousness at the other end. (1996: 194) 
 
Though I entirely agree that the reliabilist move is unsatisfying, it is not obvious that 
certainty is the right place to object to the reliabilist proposal. Certainty is not enough to 
explain the special status of self-knowledge of conscious episodes. After all, Chalmers 
invokes a specific principle about certainty in the above passage viz., that one cannot be 
certain in virtue of a reliable connection unless one can rule out the possible absence of 
the reliable connection. The reliabilist has two options at this point. She can simply reject 
the principle. Alternatively, she can claim that in the good case where the reliable 
connection does hold, a subject can come to know the relevant fact and in so knowing 
rule out the absence of the reliable connection. Either way, it seems that the reliabilist 
can make room for knowledge and certainty in the good case. 
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Nonetheless, the key Cartesian intuition noted at the start does conflict with the reliabilist 
idea. Indeed, Chalmers puts his finger on the crucial point as follows. 
 
In the case of perceptual knowledge, for example, one can construct a case … where the 
subject is a brain in the vat, say – and everything will still seem the same to the subject. 
… But in the case of consciousness, one cannot construct these sceptical hypotheses. … 
There is no situation in which everything seems just the same to us but in which we are 
not conscious … (ibid.: 195) 
 
In other words, it is not that the reliabilist cannot account for knowledge in the good 
case. Rather it is that they must allow for bad cases. But there cannot be bad cases in this 
realm.
78
 
This is not a problem just for the reliabilist. As Chalmers notes the same point affects a 
causal account of knowledge. We can be more general still – the problem is with any 
account of introspective knowledge which models it on perceptual knowledge. For any 
account of perceptual knowledge, however direct or immediate such knowledge is 
claimed to be in good cases, must allow for bad cases – cases of illusion or hallucination 
where things are not as they seem.
79 Yet that is precisely what we cannot make sense of 
in the inner arena. 
 
Shoemaker spells out the feature of perceptual knowledge which must not be translated 
to the introspective case as follows. 
 
[I]n perception we have access to things or states of affairs that exist independently of 
their being perceived and independently of there being any means of perceiving them. 
(1994: Lecture I, 252) 
 
                                                 
 
78 In the same passage Chalmers says that, “Our core epistemic situation already includes our conscious 
experience” (195). That is right. But note that the naïve realist can claim that our core epistemic situation 
includes objects of awareness in the external world in the perceptual case. Thus, it is the denial of bad cases 
which is crucial and not such claims about the good case. On this point see Martin 2006: 388. 
79 As Martin puts it, “all that need be denied is that we can make sense of a subject’s situation being this 
way: describing how things seem or are from a subject’s point of view characterizes her phenomenal 
consciousness one way; attending to how things really are, requires that we describe it another way” (2006: 
389). Such a possibility is evidently present in the case of perceptual belief. 
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The core mistake of perceptually modelled accounts of introspection, according to 
Shoemaker then, is to attribute this independence to self-conscious awareness. 
 
[T]he [broadly perceptual] view [of introspection is] that the existence of mental entities 
and mental facts is, logically speaking, as independent of our knowing about them 
introspectively, and of there being whatever means or mechanisms enable us to know 
about them introspectively, as the existence of physical entities and physical facts is of 
our knowing about them perceptually, or of there being the means or mechanisms that 
enable us to have perceptual knowledge of them. (1994: Lecture II, 271) 
 
In distilling the central failing of perceptual models, we need not commit ourselves or the 
perceptual theorist (as Shoemaker implicitly does) to the existence of mechanisms that 
make knowledge of consciousness possible. Strictly, all we need is Shoemaker’s idea that, 
on the perceptual view, the existence of perceptual experiences is (a) independent of their 
being known and (b) independent of their subject’s being in a position to know them.  
Moreover, since being in a position to know is strictly weaker than knowing, we can drop 
the first conjunct of the condition.
80 Thus, in rejecting this condition, we finally reach the 
idea that what is fundamentally correct about the Cartesian intuition is that a subject’s 
undergoing experience of some experiential kind is not independent of her being in a 
position to know that she is undergoing experience of that kind, is not independent of 
the availability of that experience to self-consciousness. Or again: there is no situation in 
which a subject can be truly said to be undergoing some course of perceptual experience 
of a given experiential kind and yet that subject not be in a position to know that they are 
enjoying experience of that type.
81
 
This echoes Chalmers’ insistence on the “fact that there is no way to construct a sceptical 
scenario in which I am in a qualitatively equivalent epistemic position, but in which my 
experience experiences are radically different” (196; my emphasis). Yet here note 
Chalmers’ caution revealed by the word ‘radical’. Such caution is hard to justify once the 
                                                 
 
80 It is not clear why Shoemaker includes it in any case since he happily acknowledges that people may have 
an experience of a certain kind and fail to notice it, remarking that he is concerned not with not-noticing 
but with the impossibility of noticing. See his 1994: Lecture II, 276 n.1. 
81 As Shoemaker puts it, “it is of the essence of various kind of mental states that they are introspectively 
accessible” (Lecture III, 291); “there is a conceptual, constitutive connection between the existence of 
certain sorts of mental entities [amongst which are perceptual experiences] and their introspective 
accessibility” (Lecture II, 272). See further Shoemaker’s argument against ‘self-blindness’ (276-8). 
 
 
 
67 
central point is granted that consciousness does not provide room for a gap between 
how things seem from a subject’s point of view and how they really are. Given that, it is 
very hard to see what could motivate anything less than the stronger claim that there is 
no way to construct a sceptical scenario in which I am in a qualitatively equivalent 
epistemic position but in which my experience differs at all (radically or not). If, as 
Chalmers holds, “there is something intrinsically epistemic about experience” (ibid.), how 
could there be some experiential aspects which were not intrinsically epistemic? Or, in 
Shoemaker’s terms, how could we be self-blind to any aspects of our conscious lives? 
How could there be any aspect which was independent of our epistemic position? 
 
The discussion so far puts us in a position to state the central claim to be defended in 
this chapter. 
 
Self-Intimation If a subject is undergoing perceptual experience of a certain 
experiential kind, then that subject is in a position to know that they are 
undergoing perceptual experience of that experiential kind simply in virtue of so 
undergoing. 
 
Self-Intimation tells us that there cannot be conscious, experiential properties which are 
simply beyond the ken of their subject. Note that the asymmetric dependency adverted 
to by stating the thesis in terms of what subjects are said to be in a position to know in 
virtue of their experience makes the formulation of Self-Intimation quite explicitly realist. 
Experience is assumed to be explanatory of a subject’s epistemic position. In Chapter 
Five I consider views of phenomenology which reject this picture and endorse some 
form of anti-realism about experience. For now the explicit realism is embraced. 
 
Chalmers raises a prima facie worry about this picture as follows. 
 
This raises a question. What is it that justifies our beliefs about our experiences, if it is 
not a causal link to those experiences, and if it is not the mechanisms by which the 
beliefs are formed? (ibid.: 196) 
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He also provides what I take to be just the right answer: “it is having the experiences that 
justifies the beliefs” (196).
82 Dretske (2003) has recently shown what happens if you 
reject this natural answer. Dretske assumes that if we know something, there must be 
some way we know it and then worries that in the absence of an inner sense model of 
some kind that we have no way of knowing about our own conscious lives.
83 His 
remarkable conclusion is that perhaps we do not in fact know that we are conscious, that 
for all we know we are zombies! As he puts it, 
 
We are left, then, with our original question: how do you know you are not a zombie? … 
To insist that we know it despite there being no identifiable way we know it is not very 
helpful. We can’t do epistemology by stamping our feet. Sceptical suspicions are, I think, 
rightly aroused by this result. Maybe our conviction that we know, in a direct and 
authoritative way, that we are conscious is simply a confusion of what we are aware of 
with our awareness of it. (2003: 9) 
 
The right response to this is to insist that my way of finding out that I am undergoing 
experience of some kind can on occasion simply be to undergo that experience – as Self-
Intimation insists, the having of that experience is not independent from our being in a 
position to know that fact. Perhaps Dretske tacitly subscribes to a principle held by 
traditional sense-datum theorists, viz., the constraint on knowledge that its objects must 
be logically independent of it.
84 Read in a certain way that might support Dretske’s view. 
But in the absence of a defence of some such reading of that eminently questionable 
principle, there is no reason to deny that conscious experience is itself the epistemological 
ground and source of our awareness of it. 
 
                                                 
 
82 Some writers on self-knowledge (e.g. Wright 1998) encourage the idea that because questions such as 
‘How do you know?’ are supposedly “always inappropriate” in response to claims such as ‘I am having an 
auditory experience as of a piercing shriek,’ that there is nothing on which such claims are based. We 
should insist that the avowal is grounded in the experience itself and that the correct reply to the question 
is simply: ‘Because I’m undergoing an experience of a piercing shriek’.  
83 Dretske notes, “The only way in which I am aware of myself seeing an ant is in the sense of being aware 
that I see an ant, but this, the awareness of the fact that I see an ant, is not my way of finding out I see an 
ant. It is a restatement (using the words ‘aware that…’) of the fact that I know I see an ant. If one fails to 
distinguish, in this way, the facts we are aware of from the objects (events) we are aware of, one will 
mistakenly suppose that our undisputed (…) awareness that we experience things is an answer to the 
question about how we know we experience them. This [would be] double dipping under the cloak of an 
equivocation: citing an awareness that p as one’s way of becoming aware that p” (2003: 8). 
84 For example, in a discussion of Kemp Smith on Berkeley, Prichard writes, “For we all, including 
Professor Kemp Smith, think that the existence of what we know is independent of our knowledge of it, 
on the ground that otherwise our knowledge of it would not be knowledge” (1938: 204). 
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In the next section I consider a distinct line of thought which leads us to the same 
conclusion. Once again, I do not claim that the considerations are decisive. They simply 
highlight a very natural way of thinking about consciousness and self-consciousness. 
 
3. Report, Judgement and Consciousness 
 
In his paper ‘Explaining Consciousness’ Rosenthal claims that 
 
Whatever else we may discover about consciousness, it’s clear that, if one is totally 
unaware of some mental state, that state is not a conscious state. (2002: 407) 
 
Of course, Rosenthal’s claim strikes many people as too strong and, I hazard, strikes 
most as far from clear. Cases of absent-minded truck drivers wholly unaware that they 
are consciously perceiving and responding to passing traffic do not seem obviously 
incoherent. However, what does seem incredibly difficult to conceive is a mental state or 
episode that is conscious and yet which is in no way available to self-awareness. We find it 
hard to credit the driver with consciousness of passing traffic if he is simply incapable of 
becoming aware of that fact.
85 Indeed, if one understands consciousness in terms of 
there being something it is like, subjectively, for you to be in a state/undergo an episode, 
it seems very hard to understand how there could be something it is like, subjectively, for 
you to be in that state/undergo that episode and yet that state/episode be irrelevant to 
how your mental life might even potentially seem from your own perspective. How 
would that be contributing to what it was like for you? What would the for-you-ness consist 
in? 
 
Just as Rosenthal’s statement of what is uncontroversial in this area over-reaches, so too 
does his motivation for his position. However, by considering what conclusion his 
motivating argument does support, one can motivate the weaker but more compelling 
view sketched above. 
 
                                                 
 
85 Compare the case of bodily action. It is controversial whether unwittingly jiggling your leg up and down 
counts as a voluntary, intentional action. But it seems to be uncontroversial that if one has no direct 
control at all over one’s leg and cannot stop or even modulate its movement, then it does not so count. 
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Rosenthal (1990) defends the claim that a mental state or event is conscious just if it is 
the intentional object of a (roughly) simultaneous higher-order thought formed neither 
by inference nor observation and having the content that one is undergoing just such an 
experience/in just such a state.
86 His basic argument for this view he calls ‘The Argument 
from Reporting and Expressing’ (1990: 736-7). It takes the form of an inference to the 
best explanation. 
  
(i)  “Reporting one’s mental states is distinct from verbally expressing those 
states” (747). If I believe The Magpies will win the Grand Final I can report 
my belief by saying ‘I believe the ’pies will win the Grand Final’ or I can 
express that belief by saying simply ‘The ’pies will win the Grand Final’. 
(ii)  “Reporting … has a special connection to consciousness. If we restrict 
attention to creatures with the relevant linguistic ability, a mental state is 
conscious if, and only if, one can report being in that state.” (ibid.) 
(iii)  If I sincerely, and with understanding, report that p, I express a propositional 
mental state of mine with assertoric content that p. 
(iv)  Thus, “When I report being in a mental state … my speech act expresses my 
[higher-order thought] that I am, myself, in that very mental state.” 
(v)  Consequently, a mental state of mine is conscious just in case I can express 
the relevant higher-order thought that I am in such a state. 
(vi)  Finally, “The best explanation of our ability to express these [higher-order 
thoughts] about all our conscious states is that our conscious states are 
actually accompanied by such [higher-order thoughts]. Similarly, we can best 
explain our inability to report mental states when they are not conscious by 
assuming we lack the relevant [higher-order thoughts].” 
 
Note the following about this argument. Firstly, there are in fact two purported 
explananda: (a) that we can always report conscious states/episodes and (b) that we can 
never report non-conscious states/episodes. If one is sceptical that consciousness is a 
necessary condition for reportability, one might still wish to hold onto the thought that 
(in the linguistically able) it was sufficient. That fact would still require explanation. This 
is fortunate since it seems highly doubtful whether consciousness is necessary for 
                                                 
 
86 As Rosenthal puts it, “a mental state’s being conscious consists simply in its being accompanied by such 
a higher-order thought” (2005: 56). 
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reportability. I often know what I believe or desire without there being anything it is like 
for me to have the relevant belief or desire. I know that I believe that Picasso is a much 
greater artist than Pollock but the belief reported by the statement that I believe Picasso 
is a much greater artist than Pollock doesn’t obviously need to be a conscious belief. Is 
there always something it is like to have that belief? Similarly, is there always something it 
is like, subjectively, to want one’s steak saignant rather than bien cuit? If not, does that 
prevent me informing the waiter? 
 
Let us focus then on the more plausible direction of the argument. As it stands it is 
patently too strong. For though Rosenthal claims that it “is unclear how one could have 
the ability to express some particular thought without actually having that thought” 
(1993: 204), as Byrne points out, “it isn’t at all unclear.” 
 
For it may simply be that in virtue of being in [some conscious mental state] S I have 
these two abilities: the ability to acquire a higher-order thought about S, and the ability to 
express it, when I have acquired it. One might sum up these facts by saying that in virtue 
of being in S I have the ability to express the higher-order thought that I am in S. And 
plainly I can have this composite ability without having the higher-order thought 
whenever I am in S. (1997: 109) 
 
However, assuming that we accept the point about reportability – viz., premise (ii) of the 
argument as read right to left – it does seem that Byrne’s weaker revised claim is well 
motivated. In other words: in virtue of being in S I have at least the ability to acquire (and 
express) the higher-order thought that I am in S. 
 
All this of course assumes that I am linguistically able. One clear situation in which I 
might be linguistically disabled would be if I was temporally or permanently mute. Clearly 
we do not think this circumstance would impinge on my conscious life, let alone render 
me unconscious! There is a difficult issue here regarding whether any ability to externally 
manifest one’s judgement is required. However, prima facie this seems implausible.
87 
                                                 
 
87 Of interest here are supposed cases of total locked-in syndrome (TLIS) or coma vigilante. Locked-in 
syndrome (LIS) is a condition caused by local and severe brain stem damage and clinically defined as 
quadriplegia (complete neck down paralysis) and anarthria (loss of speech-enabling motor-ability) with 
preservation of consciousness. In so-called ‘Classic’ LIS, patients often retain the ability to shift their gaze and 
move their eyelids. That is they retain the ability to publicly report on their condition. However, in TLIS 
patients lack even these limited means of communication, and yet there is good reason to think that they 
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What does seem plausible is that in situations where I cannot express the state I am in to 
others, if I am conceptually competent, I remain perfectly capable of forming the higher 
order belief that I am in the relevant experiential state and of manifesting that knowledge 
in a judgement in foro interno. Given this, we should replace Rosenthal’s linguistic 
qualification with a conceptual one. 
 
‘The Argument from Reporting and Expressing’ is badly named. It is really an argument 
from manifesting. And what the argument supports is not a higher-order thought model 
but rather Self-Intimation. Undergoing a conscious episode, I am in a certain epistemic 
position, a position which places me to form a judgement about said state which will 
manifest knowledge. In other words, undergoing a certain conscious episode puts me in 
a position to know about said episode. 
 
Two common intuitions (one stemming from the rejection of a certain kind of 
scepticism in the conscious realm, the other stemming from a connection between 
consciousness and reportability) lead us to Self-Intimation. However, many will be 
dissatisfied. Such dissatisfaction arises, I suggest, either because of the alleged existence 
of decisive counter-examples to Self-Intimation, or because of other commitments that 
many wish to hold which are supposed incompatible with Self-Intimation. In the 
following sections I clarify and defend Self-Intimation showing (a) that it is compatible  
with significant error about our mental lives (§4), (b) that it is not in conflict with 
relational or naïve realist theories of perceptual experience (§5), and (c) that it can be 
understood so as to reconcile it with the alleged non-transitivity of indiscriminability (§6). 
Following on from that discussion, I argue that Self-Intimation grounds a certain 
principle concerning how our experience can seem to us, a principle I call Seems → Is 
(§7). Seems → Is rules out systematic, ineliminable error about the positive phenomenal 
characteristics of our own conscious lives. I conclude by summarizing the picture of 
experience in time set-out in the first three chapters of the thesis (§8). 
                                                                                                                                            
 
are perfectly capable of thought and other mental acts and that they are well aware of things being said or 
done around them. The existence of such cases is evidenced by (a) the occurrence of transient or 
improving forms of TLIS, (b) the implausibility of a sudden cut off given the apparently very high degree 
of cognitive and mental capability in ‘classic’ LIS patients, and lastly (c) brain imaging of patients with such 
conditions. For a brief clinical overview, see Smith and Delargy 2005. For discussion of the relevant 
philosophical implications see Kurthen et al. 1991. On the evidence from neuro-imaging see Kotchoubeya 
et al. 2003 which concedes that such data can only strictly indicate what the authors describe as “the 
intactness of mechanisms necessary but not sufficient for conscious information processing”. Also see 
Block 2007: 483-4 with which I agree that we should focus on cognitive accessibility not reportability. 
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4. Self-Intimation and Error 
 
Self-Intimation, as it stands, does not mention the terms ‘self-consciousness’ or ‘self-
awareness’ (terms I use interchangeably) but it can easily be rephrased in those terms. 
Self-Intimation is the claim that conscious experience is necessarily available to self-
awareness, i.e., to self-conscious reflection. I talk about knowledge in part to distance 
myself from any commitment to introspective faculties conceived as a form of inner 
perception taking experience as its object.
88 I assume that all self-awareness is awareness 
that. It is a form of propositional knowledge, a knowledge of truths about our mental 
lives. 
 
Self-Intimation is quite compatible with our being profoundly ignorant of many aspects 
of our minds.
89 Self-Intimation is a claim about perceptual experience in its conscious aspect. 
This sets aside two obvious concerns often raised concerning self-knowledge. Firstly, 
Self-Intimation has no immediate bearing on our knowledge of other, non-perceptual 
aspects of mind. This is clearest in cases where the aspect of mind does not have intrinsic 
phenomenal aspects, for example the standing attitudes of belief and desire, and plausibly 
also knowledge.
90 It may be that Self-Intimation also holds of other conscious episodes, 
sensations such as pain being prime candidates. However, there are clear reasons to resist 
hasty generalisations in this regard. Perceptual experiences are, very plausibly, 
individuated by their phenomenology, i.e., by their contribution to what it is like to 
undergo them.
91 Given this, Self-Intimation commits us to the availability from a 
subject’s point of view of the kind or type of experience that they are undergoing. 
                                                 
 
88 My impression is that such a view is criticised far more commonly than defended. See Shoemaker 1994: 
esp. Lecture I for some scepticism concerning the attribution of an ‘Object Perception Model’ of 
introspection to Locke and Armstrong. 
89 Insofar as I endorse the Kantian thought at the head of this chapter, ‘representations’ must be taken to 
have a narrower extension than the contemporary use of the term does. 
90 Not that I regard knowledge of our mental states as independent of phenomenology. It seems likely, for 
example, that an epistemology of our standing attitudes will need to appeal to their conscious 
manifestations in at least some cases. This is very plausible when it comes to emotional states and moods 
such as love, fear and sadness. But it may well be true that our epistemology of self-knowledge will need to 
appeal to the manifestation of standing attitudes, such as the manifestation of belief in conscious judgement. 
91 As Soteriou puts it, “We should accept that two conscious experiences are of the same fundamental kind 
if and only if what it is like for the subject to be having the one experience is the same as what it is like for 
the subject to be having the other” (2005: 194). Note that such a claim implicitly assumes that certain ways 
of classifying experiences are the most privileged. To paraphrase Martin (2006: 361), that for all such 
events there is a most specific answer to the question, ‘What is it?’. 
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Occurrent thoughts also have phenomenal properties but are, very plausibly, not 
individuated by those properties. Thus, the considerations in favour of Self-Intimation 
will not straightforwardly entail that subjects are always in a position to know what they 
are thinking. 
 
Self-Intimation is also compatible with profound ignorance of many of the properties of 
our own perceptual experiences. Mere unaided reflection on my own experience cannot 
reveal to me that my experience occurs on the same day that Britney Spears was born on, 
or that it is the last taste I will ever have of an Old Fashioned. Moreover, if experiences are 
identical to physical events, then they have intrinsic physical properties. If so, there will 
be intrinsic properties of experience which unaided reflection cannot reveal to me, viz., 
these physical properties of my experience. Self-Intimation is silent as regard properties 
which do not themselves ‘contribute to what, subjectively, it is like for the person who 
enjoys them’. Its scope is only a subject’s experience’s, present, phenomenal properties. 
In talking about properties of experience, it is these properties I am concerned with. 
 
To illustrate this, consider a series of objections that Paul Snowdon raises to a principle 
closely related to Self-Intimation, a principle he calls the Negative Seems Principle (NSP) 
(2006: 194).
92
 
NSP  (∀e)((e is an experience ^ not Seems (F(e))) → not (F(e))) 
 
Snowdon offers four objections to NSP. 
 
(a)  “A proponent of NSP must claim that each episode of consciousness seems to 
fulfil NSP. I suggest that this is obviously false” (2006: 194). 
(b) “My pain can be improved by taking paracetamol. It does not seem so” (195). 
(c)  “[Arguably] perceptual consciousness depends on how the subject is neurally. But 
does it seem so?” (195) 
(d)  “The episode of phantom limb pain does not take place in the limb (because  
there is no limb) but elsewhere. It does not seem so” (195). 
 
                                                 
 
92 Snowdon finds NSP and PSP (see the discussion of naïve realism below) at work in Honderich’s 
argument for ‘Radical Externalism’ but principles like them abound in philosophical discussion. 
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These objections can be rephrased as objections to Self-Intimation for in each case the 
relevant property of experience is arguably not available to self-consciousness simply in 
virtue of undergoing the experience. However, Self-Intimation’s restriction to conscious, 
experiential properties disposes of these objections. Consider (a)-(c) first: although an 
experience of mine may play a certain epistemological role, be alterable by drugs, and be 
neurally dependent, these facts are not conscious, experiential aspects of my experience.
93
 
In this way, Snowdon’s objections (a) through (c) to NSP can be avoided by the 
amended, NSP*. 
 
NSP*  (∀e)(∀F)((e is an experience ^ not Seems (F(e))) → not ((F(e) ^ 
Experiential property(F)))) 
 
Handling case (d) needs a little more care. Snowdon’s objection relies on the assumption 
that because the episode of phantom limb pain does not take place in a limb (for there is 
none) it must take place “elsewhere”. A defender of NSP* might deny this. That is, they 
might deny that the pain takes place anywhere else, having only an apparent location. It 
would then be true that the experience had the property, ‘not taking place in a genuine 
limb,’ but there would be no reason to think that this was an experiential property. On 
the other hand, it might be true that the pain takes place elsewhere (say in the brain, as is 
commonly asserted that all pains do). However, here too the defender of NSP* can deny 
that this location property is experiential. 
 
A significant number of other candidate counter-examples can be found in the literature. 
Let me mention just one, paradoxical thermal sensations.
94 There are a wide variety of 
cases falling under this head, ranging from simple ones akin to everyday cases where cold 
                                                 
 
93 Precisely what status the epistemological property has is a difficult question. One might conceivably 
argue that conforming to a philosophical thesis was a conscious property of my experience. However, the 
only grounds for this claim seem to me to rely on the fact this knowledge is available to introspective 
reflection alone. If so, no counter-example is forthcoming. 
94 David Chalmers pressed me to mention this case and two others. One other candidate counter-example 
involves cases of consciousness outside attention where, one might hold, we are not positioned to know 
what phenomenal features we are aware of without attending, which, the thought would be, would be 
changing them. I see no reason to embrace this sceptical line of thought. Of course, foveating some location 
can dramatically alter our experience of that location. However, our ordinary conception of attention is 
quite compatible with features being attended to just as they were when unattended. A second source of 
difficulty too large to discuss here is the sceptical idea that the visual world might be a grand illusion. For 
discussion see the papers in Noë 2002. There is much to be said about the data put forward in support of 
such claims but, again, I am sceptical of the scepticism as it relates to claims in this chapter. 
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water is initially felt as hot (see the discussion in Susser et al. 1999 and references 
therein), to more complex cases, such as the Thermal Grill Illusion where “the 
simultaneous application of adjacent cutaneous warm and cold stimuli, whose 
temperatures are well below the heat and cold pain thresholds, is capable of producing a 
paradoxical painful sensation with a burning quality in a large majority of subjects” 
(Bouhassira et al. 2005: 164). 
 
This is not the place to delve into the literature on the extremely complex systems that lie 
behind our perception of temperature (and the closely related perception of pain). 
Fortunately, we need not do this to address the supposed counter-example since there is 
no obvious description of the phenomena which cannot be handled by a proponent of 
principles such as those defended in this chapter. Some paradoxical thermal sensations 
are simply illusions, cases where a cold stimulus elicits a sensation as of heat. As Defrin 
et al. (2002: 508) note, the usual hypothesis is that these sensations are due to “the 
‘inappropriate’ activation of thermal channels by cold and warm stimuli”. No doubt 
naïve subjects judge incorrectly concerning the stimulus temperature in such cases but 
there is no reason to think that we have here a mistaken judgement about the sensation 
itself. 
 
Perhaps there are cases where subjects do struggle to judge correctly concerning the 
sensation itself. This would be unsurprising if the sensation at some place were 
‘paradoxical’ in involving both a warm and a cold sensation simultaneously. However, 
there is no conceptual reason to rule out cases of simultaneous hot and cold sensation at 
some single location – and indeed, an empirical story which involved two or more 
thermal channels (and perhaps also the integration of thermal information with 
nociceptor activation) might even predict them. Whilst such cases may often elicit 
confused judgements and demand careful attention in order to be correctly classified, 
they do not flout manifestation requirements. If simultaneous, co-located hot and cold 
sensations are possible, then a subject who judges that they must be having just one or the 
other is not rationally responding to their experience. 
 
Even granting the qualifications above, a more general and common objection to theses 
concerning self-knowledge is that we can be grossly mistaken about our perceptual 
experience even in its conscious aspect. Consequently, it is vital to appreciate that Self-
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Intimation is perfectly compatible with making serious mistakes about one’s own 
conscious life. Subjects may fail to exploit their evidential positions. Just because a subject is 
undergoing an experience of a certain kind and consequently is, according to Self-
Intimation, in a position to know that he is, this does not mean that he will exploit his 
evidential position. Indeed, he may completely fail to exploit his evidential position for 
various reasons. A lack of attention or interest may result in one’s judgements being 
poorly constrained by the available evidence.
95 Temporary or permanent psychosis may 
render judgements wholly unconstrained by grounds.
96 This is quite compatible with 
these grounds nonetheless being available to one at that time. 
 
One of the major problems with Dennett’s discussion of self-awareness is his tendency 
to run together two quite distinct claims in this regard. In particular, Dennett fails to 
distinguish between the following claims. 
 
(a)  Necessarily, a subject cannot be conscious of a stimulus if they do not believe 
that they are conscious of that stimulus. 
(b) Necessarily, a subject cannot be conscious of a stimulus if their consciousness of 
that stimulus is beyond their ken (i.e., Self-Intimation). 
 
Dennett tells us that his own brand of “first-person operationalism … brusquely denies the 
possibility in principle of consciousness of a stimulus in the absence of a subject’s belief 
in that consciousness” (1991a: 132). This seems like a commitment to (a). However, in 
the same breath he supports this claim with the contention that “[p]utative facts about 
our consciousness that swim out of reach of both ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ observers are 
strange facts indeed” (ibid.: 133). This only justifies a commitment to (b), or equivalently 
to Self-Intimation. At least with respect to perceptual consciousness, Self-Intimation 
insists that there cannot be facts about our consciousness that are out of our reach. 
                                                 
 
95 Cf. Martin’s discussion of inattentive John (2004: §9 and 2006: 380f.). Horgan and Kriegel enjoin us to 
“Imagine that you are engrossed in a heated argument with your conversational partner, and therefore do 
not notice the refrigerator’s hum. You nonetheless have a dim auditory experience of the hum, but are 
simply not in a position to form true beliefs about your auditory experience” (2007: 131). They consider 
this case “plausibly effective” (ibid.) against any thesis of self-intimation. I take it our thesis counts as such. 
Yet it is very far from clear what grounds they have for claiming that an engrossed party really is not in a 
position at all to form beliefs as opposed to just not likely to. 
96 Martin makes this move in responding to A.D. Smith’s (2002) objections to disjunctivism. In cases of 
“hallucinogenic medication, schizophrenic delusion, or simply hypnotic suggestion”, Martin insists, “[a] 
subject … need not be rationally responding to how things sensorily seem to him,” i.e., to their actually 
sensory experience. See his 2006: 389. 
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However, to be out of reach or beyond our ken contrasts being within reach, or within our 
ken; it does not contrast with already being reached, or already known or believed. This 
though is what Dennett’s belief requirement, (a), assumes. It assumes that facts about our 
conscious lives not already believed would be strange facts. I see no reason to claim that. 
 
Dennett also supports his operationalism by insisting that we should reject any view that 
“creates the bizarre category of the objectively subjective – the way things actually, 
objectively seem to you even if they don’t seem to seem that way to you!” (ibid.) If one 
thinks that how things seem should be identified with the actual judgements that one 
makes, or actual beliefs one has, then endorsement of this intuition will commit one to 
(a), i.e., the brusque denial of the possibility of consciousness in the absence of belief in 
that consciousness. But Dennett gives no reason to think that we have to identify how 
things seem with actual judgements. If we identify how things seem with one’s current 
evidence, that is with what one is in a position to know (in virtue of undergoing one’s 
current experience), we can take the above intuition as an expression of the truth of Self-
Intimation. Running (a) and (b) together has led to an exaggerated sense of the 
importance of counter-examples to (a). They have been thought to establish the 
complete independence of consciousness and self-awareness. Focusing on (b) reveals 
that they do no such thing. 
 
Focusing on the evidential state of experiencers (what experiencers are in a position to 
know) may also allow us to avoid the objection that non-human animals and human 
infants present a clear counter-example to Self-Intimation. Non-human animals and 
young infants plausibly lack the concept EXPERIENCE, and thus straightforwardly lack 
abilities necessary to know or judge that they are enjoying experience with some 
property. Nonetheless it is implausible simply to deny that animals and infants lack 
conscious experience.
97
 
One can, as is commonly done, simply modify Self-Intimation so that it applies only to 
creatures with conceptual capacities. However, this is not wholly satisfactory. If Self-
Intimation captures something fundamental about perceptual consciousness, then it 
ought to speak to consciousness in all its myriad guises, including the kind of 
                                                 
 
97 Though Carruthers seeks to make this option less unappealing, see for example his (2005b). 
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consciousness enjoyed by infants and animals, as well as the constitutionally inattentive 
and irrational. Exploiting a robust conception of evidential state or availability suggests an 
alternative response. 
 
In his defence of disjunctivism, Martin argues at length that we need to distinguish 
between two kinds of discriminability: impersonal and individual indiscriminability.
98 
Martin explicates the distinction between the two kinds of indiscriminability as follows. 
 
In general, where we ascribe an incapacity to someone, we indicate not only that they 
have failed to do something, but also that there is some ground in virtue of which they 
so fail. When we think of an individual’s incapacity in relation to the specific ground for 
his or her incapacity – a ground which explains not only why they do not do F, but 
would not even do F in similar circumstances – we can still recognise that this 
impossibility or incapacity is quite consistent with the possibility that others do do F or 
at least could do it. On the other hand, when we talk of an incapacity or inability without 
indicating a subject lacking the capacity or incapacity, then we need not think in terms of 
a ground relative to an agent in virtue of which the act cannot be carried out. To say that 
something is invisible is not to indicate some specific lack in certain viewers, but rather 
to indicate something about it, that it cannot be seen. In parallel, when we talk of two 
things being indiscriminable, we need not mean that there is something about a given 
agent in virtue of which they cannot be told apart [individual indiscriminability], but 
simply that it is not possible to know that they are distinct [impersonal 
indiscriminability]. (2004: 75) 
 
In the present context, we need to consider availability and not discriminability. But the 
same point holds: to say that something is visible is not to indicate some specific 
capacities in some particular group of viewers, but rather to indicate something about it, 
that it can be seen, that it is available to vision. 
 
Similarly, to say that some state or fact (here that a subject is enjoying experience of a 
certain kind) is available to self-consciousness is not to indicate some specific capacities in 
the subject in virtue of which that fact is available to them to come to know (attentive 
and introspective mechanisms, say, or possession of relevant conceptual capacities). All 
we need mean is that the fact can be known about simply in virtue of undergoing the 
                                                 
 
98 Here see Martin 2004: 75f. and also Martin 2006: 379f.. 
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experience, i.e., that the fact is available to self-consciousness. If we understand the locution 
‘in a position to know’ in this sense, we can declare that bats and babies are in a position 
to know about their experience despite their lack of conceptual sophistication. They are 
enjoying experience that is available to self-consciousness. As such, they are positioned 
to know about that experience. This claim is quite consistent with the idea that 
samenesses and differences are beyond the ken of the particular creature or child, for 
here we do indicate a specific deficit to explain the unavailability.
99  
 
Relatedly, note that focusing on what we are in a position to know also has a strategic 
value. Discussions of self-consciousness and consciousness typically begin by focusing 
on the self-consciousness side of the relation and then engaging in what we might call the 
epistemology of introspective judgement, seeking to understand the privileged status that 
self-conscious or introspective judgements apparently enjoy. However, any attempt to 
proceed in this way with introspective epistemology must, at some point, specify which 
judgements are to count as introspective. After all, a view which claims a special status 
for some class of judgements will lack content unless it provides some way of gaining a 
grasp on that class. 
 
The literature contains two broad approaches here. On the one hand, one might seek to 
provide a positive description of what it is to be an introspective judgement. On the 
other hand, one might try and define introspective judgements in a negative way, as 
judgements not formed on the basis of observation or inference. Either way we face 
severe difficulties. In the latter case, it is difficult to know how to exclude judgements 
formed on no basis at all from those granted a special status. Yet clearly ungrounded 
judgements are not epistemically privileged in any way. It is simply not true that every 
judgement that has our inner lives as its subject matter is epistemically privileged. 
 
In the former case, the obvious approach is to treat introspective judgements as 
judgements that result from the operation of some kind of mechanism or faculty. 
However, if introspection is some kind of mechanism by which we track our inner lives, 
then (assuming that that claim has genuine content) it must make sense for the 
mechanism in question to misfire, and so for our judgements to go wrong. Yet, as we 
                                                 
 
99 Those sceptical should toe the standard line, treating Self-Intimation and related claims as restricted to 
the conceptually sophisticated. 
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saw above (§2), intuitions driving Self-Intimation suggest that such failure is impossible – 
for failure would introduce a kind of sceptical scenario concerning our inner lives, which 
we are unwilling to allow.
100 Consequently, picking out introspective judgements as those 
that result from the operation of some faculty or mechanism (however weakly conceived) 
is something a friend of Self-Intimation does well to avoid. On pain of begging the 
question against themselves, they should focus on what consciousness puts us in a 
position to know. 
 
5. Self-Intimation and Naïve Realism 
 
A commonly held view is that Self-Intimation and its kind are a vestige of a disreputable 
Cartesian internalism concerning the mind. In particular, it is very often suggested that a 
defender of Self-Intimation will have to reject relationalist, disjunctivist or naïve realist 
approaches to perception. Depending on one’s prior philosophical commitments this 
may or may not seem like a serious bullet to bite. Regardless, I think it is a mistake to 
think that Self-Intimation is inconsistent with disjunctivism. In this section, I explain 
why. 
 
The argument from hallucination can be thought of as proceeding in roughly the 
following manner. Consider a subject S, and a normal, veridical perceptual experience 
that they enjoy of a phenomenal kind K. For any such experience, we must concede the 
possibility of a situation in which S is enjoying a hallucinatory experience that they 
cannot discriminate from experience of kind K. Furthermore, if mind-independent 
objects literally constitute aspects of the phenomenal character of experience (as naïve 
realists contend), and assuming that experiences are individuated by their phenomenal 
characters, then such hallucinations must differ in phenomenal character and so kind 
from veridical experiences. 
 
It certainly can appear to follow from this that there are differences in phenomenal 
character that are inaccessible to their subjects. After all, don’t hallucinations seem just 
the same as veridical perceptions and yet differ in phenomenal character? That in turn 
                                                 
 
100 As Martin puts it, “Introspective judgement cannot result from the correct operation of a specific 
mechanism of introspection without the possibility of one’s phenomenal consciousness merely seeming 
some way to one” (2006: 393). For extensive discussion see his 2006: §7. 
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appears inconsistent with Self-Intimation. In what follows, I show why this is mistaken. 
That said, it must be acknowledged that, in one specific regard, the disjunctivist will have 
to allow that experience can seem some way and yet not be that way. I discuss this point 
shortly (§7). 
 
Let us then assume a naïve realist account of perceptual experience according to which 
perception is conceived of as a relation to mind-independent objects, which (in part) 
literally constitute the phenomenal character of such experience. Consider in particular a 
perceptual experience as of a yellow mango as such. According to the disjunctivist such 
cases divide into two distinct kinds. For simplicity, call them the good case and the bad 
case. (Of course there are intermediate cases where the mango is misperceived, say, as 
green when it is in fact yellow. I set these cases aside for present purposes.) We can now 
consider the application of Self-Intimation in each case. 
 
5.1 The Good Case 
 
In the good case, I perceive the yellow mango in front of me as such. One of the 
properties of my experience according to the disjunctivist is ‘being an encounter with a 
yellow mango as such’. In accordance with the above proposal, in virtue of undergoing 
the experience, I am in a position to know that my experience is an encounter with a 
yellow mango. As a consequence, I am in a position to know that there is a mango in 
front of me purely in virtue of undergoing the experience. 
 
One might challenge this as follows. What about hallucinations? Do you not concede 
that there is a distinct experiential state (viz., the state I would be in were my neural states 
to remain precisely as they currently are and yet the mango be removed from view) in 
which, if I were in that state, I would not be in a position to tell it apart from a genuine 
perception of a yellow mango despite making the very same judgement made above? 
(Reply: Yes.) Does this not undermine the claim that I can know that I am in the good 
case when I am in it? 
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Reply: No. For it to undermine the claim to know in the good case, one would have to 
assume that, just because the bad case is indiscriminable from the good case, that the 
good case is indiscriminable from the bad.
101 The disjunctivist can and should deny this. 
Instead, they should hold that, if you are lucky and in the good case, then you are in a 
position to know that you are – and hence in a position to know that you are not in the 
bad case. In the good case, you can discriminate your experience (activate knowledge) 
that you are not in the bad case. This is far from ad hoc. If one thinks, (a) that one’s 
experience literally involves objects in the good case but not in the bad, and (b) that there 
is an intimate connection between one’s experience and one’s epistemic position, then it 
will hardly be surprising that one’s epistemic position is not neutral across the two cases. 
 
Someone might press this: What if the possibility of hallucination is highly salient in your 
context? Perhaps – as Martin imagines (2001: 444) – you are inside a highly reliable 
hallucination generator, designed to cause you to hallucinate a yellow mango. A one-in-a-
million electrical fault occurs and the machine does not work so, by chance, one happens 
to see (quite veridically) the yellow mango that has fortuitously been placed in front of 
you. Given the salience of the hallucination case, many would argue that you are not in a 
position to know that your experience is a genuine presentation of a yellow mango. 
 
We can envisage two ways of telling this story. In the first I am fully aware that I am in a 
hallucination machine and have no idea that it has misfired. In this case we need to 
distinguish what one is in a position to know from what it is reasonable to judge. In the 
scenario just described, I claim that one is in a position to know that one’s experience is a 
presentation of a yellow mango. However, it would be quite unreasonable for one to judge 
this, knowing what one knows. One has the evidence but it is not reasonable to exploit it. 
As Martin puts it, 
 
Someone who is alive to a genuine possibility of illusion or hallucination will allow 
doubts about whether they really are perceiving to constrain the judgements he or she 
makes. Even if a subject is in the privileged situation, the presence of doubts can put 
him or her in a position where he or she cannot responsibly exploit the privilege that 
                                                 
 
101 Here compare Pryor’s objection that ‘phenomenally indiscriminable’ is a symmetric relation noted by 
Martin (2006: 364, fn.16) and also Ruben’s assumption of just this symmetry in his discussion of 
disjunctivism (2008: 228). 
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they have. And it is in this way that collateral information can defeat the justificatory role 
that otherwise perception would play. (2001: 447) 
 
In the second telling of the story, one has no idea that one is in such a machine. One has 
been tricked into entering it and believes that all is entirely normal. Does the nearness of 
a world where one is in fact hallucinating deprive one of knowledge? It is not at all 
obvious that it does. If one thinks that there is an intrinsic epistemic connection between 
experience and evidential position, then one is in a certain epistemic position if one is 
having the experience. Facts about nearby possibilities are irrelevant. I remain in a 
position to know; I am simply stupendously lucky.
102
 
5.2 The Bad Case 
 
In the bad case, I am undergoing a hallucination as of a yellow mango as such. My 
experience lacks the property of being a presentation of such a fruit though it seems to 
have it. I am not in a position to know that my experience has such a property because I 
cannot know what is false. But nor am I in a position to know that my experience is not 
a presentation of the world. Things seem the same but my evidence is not the same. My 
experience misleads me not only about the world but about itself. Does the bad case 
present a counter-example to Self-Intimation? Recall that Self-Intimation was the claim 
that for any conscious property of experience, one is in a position to know that one’s 
experience has that property purely in virtue of undergoing it. Which conscious property 
am I in the dark regarding here? The disjunctivist interested in defending Self-Intimation 
must retort: None. Certainly, I overshoot in my judgements insofar as I claim that my 
experience is a presentation of a yellow mango. However, I am wholly aware of all the 
conscious aspects of the hallucination. 
 
How can that be? How can my hallucination differ in phenomenal character from a 
veridical perception and yet lack any conscious properties which distinguish it from a 
veridical perception? Put this way the answer is obvious. There is no logical difficulty in 
claiming that every conscious property of a hallucination is had by corresponding 
                                                 
 
102 Of course this is far from the only story that we might want to tell. Another popular option would be to 
think of one being in a position to know ceteris paribus, i.e., in the absence of defeat. Taking such a route 
would weaken Self-Intimation but would far from deprive it of force. 
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veridical perceptions, whilst denying the converse, i.e., insisting that veridical perceptions 
have aspects of conscious character which distinguish them from hallucinations. This is a 
feature of Martin’s approach to hallucinations. (See Martin 2004, 2006.) According to 
Martin, hallucinations are exhaustively and fundamentally characterizable in epistemic 
terms, as not knowably not a certain kind of veridical perception. Any corresponding 
veridical perception, not being discriminable from itself, will have this property (a 
property manifest to subjects), but will also have more determinate aspects, like actually 
being a presentation of a yellow mango. 
 
Hallucination is a form of experience in which subjects are deceived about the nature of 
their own experience. They will rationally judge that their experience has properties 
which it does not have. A cost of disjunctivism is being forced to allow that there are 
cases where one’s experience seems to one some way and yet is not that way (§7). 
However, that consequence does not involve a rejection of Self-Intimation. 
 
6. Self-Intimation and Non-Transitivity 
 
The supposed non-transitivity of indiscriminability poses perhaps the most serious 
challenge to Self-Intimation for the following reason.
103 Let us say that A-kind experience 
is indiscriminable (in the sense relevant for present purposes) from B-kind experience 
just if it one is not positioned to know that A-kind experience is not B-kind experience 
simply in virtue of undergoing it. Let us also assume what Self-Intimation maintains, 
namely, that we are in a position to know of all phenomenal aspects of our experience 
simply in virtue of undergoing said experience. We can now informally derive the 
following contradiction with assumptions which represent the standard gloss on the non-
transitivity of indiscriminability. 
 
(1) Assumption: A-kind experience is indiscriminable from B-kind experience. 
(2) There can be no phenomenal aspect of our A-experience which is incompatible 
with being B-experience otherwise (given Self-Intimation) we would be in a 
                                                 
 
103 For a flavour of the large literature on this topic see Dummett 1975, Wright 1975, Fara 2001, Mills 
2002, Hellie 2005 and discussion in Chapter Seven. For the style of objection here considered see 
Williamson 1996 and 2000. 
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position to know that our A-experience was not of the B-experience kind (contra 
1). 
(3) Assumption: B-kind experience is indiscriminable from C-kind experience. 
(4) There can be no phenomenal aspect of our B-experience which is incompatible 
with being C-experience otherwise (given Self-Intimation) we would be in a 
position to know that our B-experience was not of the C-experience kind (contra 
3). 
(5) Assumption: A-kind experience is discriminable from C-kind experience. 
(6) So there is some phenomenal aspect of A-experience which is incompatible with 
it being C-experience placing us to activate knowledge that our A-experience is 
not C-experience. 
However: 
(7) There can be no phenomenal aspect of our A-experience which is incompatible 
with being C-experience otherwise (from Self-Intimation) we would be in a 
position to know that our experience was not of the C-experience kind and 
(given 4) not of the B-experience kind (contra 3). 
Contradiction. 
 
Why think there are three kinds of experience which conform to assumptions (1), (3) and 
(5)? That is, why think that we can enjoy three kinds of experience: A-experience, B-
experience and C-experience, such that A-experience is indiscriminable from B-
experience, and C-experience is indiscriminable from B-experience, but discriminable 
from A-experience? The reason is that this seems entailed by the existence of situations, 
Σ1-3, such that a subject fails to distinguish the scene in Σ1 from that presented in Σ2, 
likewise fails to distinguish the scene in Σ2 from that presented in Σ3, but nonetheless 
succeeds in distinguishing the scene in Σ1 from that presented in Σ3. Consider, for 
example, three scenes each involving a different pair of straight-lines from the set {L1, L2, 
L3}. A subject may fail to distinguish L1 from L2, and likewise L2 from L3, but 
nonetheless discriminate L1 from L3. 
 
Now one option here is to deny that such cases genuinely exist. Fara (2001) can be 
understood as pursuing this strategy. Chapter Seven discusses aspects of Fara’s view and 
raises some doubts about the plausibility of that approach, committed as it seems to be 
to a gap between what we experience and what we are in a position to notice (i.e., to 
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unnoticeable appearances). In any case, it seems to me that a different tack is needed in 
general if we are to secure Self-Intimation as a general thesis against the above line of 
argument. The idea can be outlined as follows.
104
 
That a subject on occasion fails to distinguish the scene in situation Σ1 from that 
presented in Σ2, likewise fails to distinguish the scene in Σ2 from that presented in Σ3, but 
nonetheless succeeds in distinguishing the scene in Σ1 from that presented in Σ3, does 
not immediately show that we have three kinds of experience in play here which conform 
to the assumptions in the above argument. Rather it may be that a given situation can 
give rise to more than one kind of (non-illusory) experience. If that were so, we might 
imagine that Σ2 was a situation in which subjects were liable to enjoy two distinct kinds 
of experience as follows. 
 
Σ1 → E1 
Σ2 → E1 or E2 
Σ3 → E2 
 
In this light, consider the following margin for error principle invoked by Williamson: 
 
[C]ases in which one is in a position to know p must not be too close to cases in which p 
is false, otherwise one’s belief in p in the former cases would lack a sufficiently reliable 
basis to constitute knowledge. (2000: 17) 
 
Now, take situation Σ2. Here one’s situation is such that one might very well have 
enjoyed (non-illusory) experience of one of two distinct kinds. Imagine one enjoys, as it 
happens, experience of kind E1. Consequently, one is not in a position to discriminate 
one’s situation from Σ1; after all, one is enjoying just the kind of experience that one 
would be having if one were in Σ1. But, because of the margin for error required for 
knowledge, the fact that in the very same situation (Σ2) one might as easily have enjoyed 
experience of kind E2 means that one is too close to E2 experience to know that one is 
enjoying experience of kind E1 as opposed to E2. As a result one is not in a position to 
                                                 
 
104 The discussion here is heavily indebted to Martin 2004: 76-9. He there points out that non-transitivity 
worries are generated by speckled-hen type cases as well as the cases of supposed phenomenal continua 
Fara discusses. That might seem a reason to prefer the account in the text. In fact, it seems that Fara would 
likely make parallel moves in the speckled-hen cases.  
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discriminate one’s situation from Σ3 either, since in Σ3 one is enjoying precisely the 
experience that one is not in a position to discriminate from one’s current experience. 
 
Nonetheless, for all that, experience of kind E1, is of a kind that is distinguishable from 
E2-type experience; put another way, it is impersonally indiscriminable from E2-kind 
experience. This is because E1-type experience can be had in a situation which does not 
afford the risk of having E2-type experience, viz., Σ1. E1-experience in Σ1 is safe. 
Although it is true that E1-type experience can be enjoyed in a situation where it would 
not be discriminable by its then subject from E2-type experience, this does not mean that it 
is not impersonally discriminable from E2-type experience. 
 
How does Self-Intimation fare in this light? Recall, 
 
Self-Intimation If a subject is undergoing perceptual experience of a certain 
experiential kind, then that subject is in a position to know that they are 
undergoing perceptual experience of that experiential kind simply in virtue of so 
undergoing. 
 
Non-transitivity shows why, in certain cases, this is not quite correct. Enjoying a 
perceptual experience in certain situations (such as Σ2) above need not place a subject in 
a position to know whether they are enjoying E1- or E2-type experience. Nonetheless, 
according to the above account, a subject enjoying experience of that kind is undergoing 
a kind of experience such that knowledge that one is undergoing experience with its 
phenomenal properties is to be had solely in virtue of undergoing said kind of experience. 
The point is that knowledge can sometimes be blocked in a given situation by the 
closeness of other experiential kinds that the situation in question affords. 
 
Now, of course, given the nature of cases in question, it may well be that almost any 
similar situation (for example, any case where a subject is presented with a line of some 
length, or a colour swatch of some shade) in fact affords multiple distinct kinds of 
experience. In other words, the vast majority of situations here in view may be of the 
form: Σi → Ei or Ej … or En But this is not obviously a problem. What it shows is that it 
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may be that no situation affords knowledge of all properties of experience. But this does 
not entail the existence of any property which cannot be known about.
105
 
Thus, strictly speaking, Self-Intimation should be the denial that there are (determinate) 
types of experience (i.e., phenomenal kinds) such that knowledge that experience is of 
that (determinate) type is simply unavailable solely in virtue of undergoing said 
experience. That does not rule out cases where margin for error principles prevent the 
occasion of having the experience from being one where the subject is in a position to 
know. It does rule out cases where some (determinate) aspect of experience is never such 
that a subject is in a position to know about it simply through undergoing the experience. 
In other words, if a perceptual experience has some (determinate) experiential property, 
then a subject of that kind of experience can be positioned to know that it has said 
property solely in virtue of undergoing it, even if they happen not to be so positioned on 
a given occasion. 
 
This emendation, though crucially important in this context, has no significant impact on 
the argumentation that follows. As a result, I retain the original simpler formulation of 
Self-Intimation, simply noting the interaction at the relevant points. 
 
7. Self-Intimation and Seems → Is 
 
Paul Snowdon uses hallucination as an objection to a principle he calls the Positive 
Seems Principle (PSP).
106
 
PSP  (∀e)((e is an experience ^ Seems (F(e))) → F(e)) 
 
In now familiar terms his objection runs as follows. 
 
If when I see a large pink elephant the consciousness seems to me to consist of a pink 
elephant then when I am having a large rat hallucination it will equally seem to me to 
consist of a large pink rat. Clearly, though the hallucinatory episode cannot consist of 
                                                 
 
105 Here compare Goodman’s (1977) criteria for the identity of qualia. 
106 Snowdon 2006: 192. 
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that, there being no pink rat to do the constituting. I conclude that we cannot rely on 
PSP (2006: 194) 
 
Snowdon’s objection must be granted. However, I do not think that this means we 
should simply abandon all hope of establishing a claim in the vicinity of PSP. In this 
section, I suggest that, hallucination notwithstanding, a commitment to Self-Intimation 
does in fact involve a commitment to a close cousin of PSP.  
 
Self-Intimation tells us that the experiential properties of certain experiences are within 
their subject’s ken. Consider again the example of experiencing a yellow mango as such. 
Self-Intimation tell us that the subject of such experience is in a position to know that 
they are undergoing experience of something yellow. Given this, could it seem to them 
that they were instead having an experience of something green? That depends on how 
one understands seeming. Someone paying little attention and perhaps harbouring certain 
expectations might judge that they were seeing something green. Clearly such inattentive 
judgements are not always correct. Nor are irrational judgements. As Martin puts it, “[a] 
subject who is deluded into supposing that he now experiences angels talking to him 
need not be rationally responding to how things sensorily seem to him” (2006: 389). 
Thus, if we identify how things seem with what subjects do in fact judge, then experience 
can certainly seem other than it is in these ways. 
 
However, it is hard to make sense of a fully rational and attentive subject judging that 
they are enjoying experience of something green as such, despite being in a position to 
know that they are enjoying experience of something yellow as such. In order to make 
sense of this kind of situation, we need to find a barrier or explanation of the failure to 
exploit the available knowledge.
107 In this light, the following principle might seem 
acceptable. 
 
PSP*  Experience cannot systematically seem some way to rational introspective 
reflection and yet be some other way. 
 
                                                 
 
107 In addition to inattention and delusion, believing that such a judgement would be unreasonable in the 
circumstances is such an explanation. See above. 
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Here the term ‘systematically’ rules out experience which is, in its very nature, such as to 
seem a way that it is not. As such it handles complications just discussed relating to non-
transitivity. Unfortunately, the disjunctivist will be forced to allow that hallucinations are 
systematically misleading in one fundamental respect; they appear to involve mind-
independent constituents (yellow mangoes, pink rats, and the like) but they do not. 
 
Nonetheless, there is a simple amendment to PSP* that the disjunctivist can make which 
renders it acceptable. That amendment depends upon accepting a negative, epistemic 
characterization of hallucination.
108 This is the claim that hallucinations are most 
fundamentally characterized as episodes that are not knowably not veridical perceptions 
of a certain kind. In other words, the only positive mental characteristics of hallucinations 
are negative epistemological ones as opposed to positive ‘hallucinatory’ character 
properties. As Martin puts it, hallucinations of this class are characterizable “in nothing 
but epistemological terms, in terms of their unknowable difference from cases of 
veridical perception” (2004: 38). 
 
Accepting this characterization, the following substantive principle does still hold. 
 
Seems  → Is If some course of experience has a phenomenal property of a 
certain kind, then that course of experience cannot systematically seem to differ 
phenomenally in that regard. 
 
This principle is supported by the discussion of the yellow mango above. If your 
experience does present or apparently present you with a yellow mango as such, then that 
experience cannot systematically seem to present you with a green mango as such. Things 
cannot be like this: a phenomenal aspect of your current experience is its being as of a 
yellow mango as such, yet it systematically seems to be an experience as of a green 
mango as such. 
 
The new principle also avoids the objection from hallucination which refutes PSP*. If 
hallucinations are characterized epistemically in terms of their indiscriminability from 
                                                 
 
108 As already noted, such a characterization is defended at length by Martin (2004, 2006). Strictly speaking 
Martin only makes claims concerning causally matching hallucinations, i.e., hallucinations brought about by 
replication of the proximate causes of veridical perceptual experiences. Martin discusses the first steps of 
extending the account to other cases in his 2004: 80-1. See also Siegel 2004. 
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ordinary veridical perceptions, then hallucinations do not have phenomenal properties 
with regard to which they seem to differ. They seem to be indiscriminable from veridical 
perceptions and they are. It is true that they seem to be presentations of mind-
independent objects though they are not. But they do not have presentational 
phenomenological properties which differ from those they seem to have, only properties 
of being epistemically indiscriminable from experience with presentational 
phenomenology. 
 
Of course, the complexities here only arise if one is committed to naïve realism or 
disjunctivism. For all that has been said here, a common factor theorist can rest content 
with the simpler formulation, PSP*. In any case, the weaker principle, Seems → Is, has 
all the strength needed to serve as premise in what follows and I only appeal to that claim 
henceforth. 
 
8. A Naïve View of Temporal Awareness 
 
A natural, if one likes naïve, picture of perceptual experience is the following.
109 
Perceptual experience is the taking in of world by mind. In such experience we are 
directly acquainted with the structure of the world; the world presents itself to us in 
experience. In the light of the above principles, a natural working out of this thought in 
the temporal case is the following. The temporal structure of experience is quite simply 
directly inherited from the temporal structure of the world; mind to the external world is 
fitted. On this view, the ordering and relative duration of experiential episodes exactly 
mirrors the ordering and relative duration of the events experienced. If one event lasts 
twice as long as another and you directly experience the whole of both events, then your 
experience of the first will last twice as long as your experience of the second. If a series 
of six tones is played to you in a certain order, your experience of them will be ordered in 
just the same way. This picture is too naïve of course – temporal illusion abounds.
110 
However, the spirit of the picture can survive the lesson of illusion if it claims instead 
                                                 
 
109 Naïve in the sense of being a philosophical articulation of what “we all pre-theoretically accept 
concerning the nature of our sense experience” (Martin 2006: 404). 
110 For temporal order illusions and debate about their interpretation see: Warren et al. 1969, Bregman and 
Campbell 1971, Sussman et al. 1999, Näätänen et al 2001, Macken et al. 2003, and Micheyl et al. 2005. For 
temporal duration illusions and similar debate see: Brown 1995, Kanai et al 2006 and brief discussion in 
Chapter Five, below. 
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that the temporal structure of experience matches the apparent temporal structure of the 
world. Then, at least in cases of veridical perception, mind to the external world is indeed 
fitted. 
 
In the last three chapters I argued for a series of claims. They can be combined so as to 
articulate the naïve view of temporal awareness just sketched. Here are the claims. 
 
Realism Experience itself in its experiential aspect consists of events and/or 
processes of which it is true that they persist through time and occur before and 
after one another. 
 
Temporal Transparency For any particular temporal determination of 
experience, it is never the case that when I consider how things are with me 
experientially, I am rationally positioned, through reflection on my experience 
alone, to judge my experience to be so determined other than on the basis of a 
judgement concerning (and typically perceptual attention to) the temporal 
structure of the apparent objects of perception.  
 
Self-Intimation If a subject is undergoing perceptual experience of a certain 
experiential kind, then that subject is in a position to know that they are 
undergoing perceptual experience of that experiential kind simply in virtue of so 
undergoing. 
 
Seems  → Is If some course of experience has a phenomenal property of a 
certain kind, then that course of experience cannot systematically seem to differ 
phenomenally in that regard. 
 
Realism tells us that experience has its own experiential temporal structure. Self-Intimation 
tells us that we are always in a position to know experience’s own temporal structure. 
Temporal Transparency tells us how; our grip on that structure can only come via taking 
the temporal structure of experience to match the temporal structure of the apparent 
objects of experience. Putting these claims together we can conclude that we are always 
in a position to take the temporal structure of experience to match the temporal structure 
of the apparent objects of experience. Moreover, Seems → Is insists that (since, after all, 
 
 
94 
we are always in a position to know) we cannot be systematically in error when we make 
judgements about the temporal character of our experience itself. Thus, the temporal 
structure of experience cannot systematically come apart from the temporal structure of 
the apparent objects of experience. 
 
We have arrived at a picture strikingly close to the naïve view sketched above. In what 
follows, I refer to the set of claims above in those terms, as our natural or naïve view of 
temporal awareness. Natural as it is, the view of experience in time just articulated has 
come under attack from many quarters. The rest of this thesis considers the most 
important of these challenges and strives to answer them. 
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PART II – EXPERIENCE OF TIME 
 
Chapter Four: 
Anhomoeomery and Experience 
 
 
Time should be imaged with a paint-brush instead of a scythe; he knows how to wield the former 
even better than the latter.
111
 
 
1. Preview 
 
he rest of this thesis is devoted to the treatment of a number of puzzles that 
arise in relation to our experience of time. Although a great deal of work has 
been generated by these puzzles, they are rarely connected, nor are they framed 
against a clear view of how we naturally conceive of experience in time. I have two 
central aims in discussing these puzzles. First, to vouchsafe the naïve picture of temporal 
experience developed in Part One. For a common reaction to at least two of the puzzles 
is to reject some element of that picture. Second, to argue that at the root of three of the 
seemingly distinct puzzles is the same mistaken way of thinking about experience. The 
mistake is to think that experience is homoeomerous down to very short durations or 
instants. The core thought here is the idea that we can analyse experience down to a 
series of independent short-chunks or slices, and explain the nature and features of the 
stream of consciousness in terms of those temporal units. In contrast, I argue that 
experience is significantly anhomoeomerous. When we come to explain the nature of the 
stream of consciousness there are significant, extended periods over which we must 
explain the properties of sub-parts in terms of the properties of the whole duration and 
  T
                                                 
 
111 Sherwood (1897: 134) An Epistle to Posterity. 
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not vice-versa. That is, the stream is structured such that over short periods the 
explanatory direction runs from temporal whole to temporal parts. 
 
If we reject the assumption of homoeomery, the puzzles dissolve. Indeed, I argue that a 
commitment to the picture of temporal experience developed above commits us to 
rejecting homoeomery. Seeing this allows us to appreciate the difficulties philosophers 
have encountered when trying to account for temporal awareness whilst wedded to the 
naïve picture of experience in time and also to a commitment to homoeomery. Before 
introducing the puzzles, I introduce the general concepts of homoeomery and 
anhomoeomery since they serve as the backdrop to subsequent discussion. I begin with 
the spatial case. 
 
2. Spatial Anhomoeomery 
 
We naturally distinguish between countable things and amassable stuffs. Cars are a kind of 
thing and one prima facie mark of being a thing like a car is lacking proper parts which 
are themselves cars; cars are not made of cars. In contrast, gold is a kind of stuff and one 
prima facie mark of being a stuff like gold is that any volume contained within a lump of 
gold also counts as a lump of gold. Gold is thus homogeneous or, better, 
homoeomerous, literally “like-parted”; it is gold all the way down. 
 
Of course, this is all too picturesque. For one, we can imagine constructing a car out of 
cars such that the former car literally has car parts – cars as parts. For another, once we 
drop to volumes of gold measuring only a few cubic picometres, we will no longer find 
ourselves with lumps of gold for we are at the level of atomic nuclei, electron clouds and 
(mostly) ‘empty’ space.
112 Thus, even if van Inwagen is right to think that “[i]t was 
possible for an ancient Greek to believe that matter was continuous and that all stuffs 
were ‘homoeomerous’ ” (1993: 27), it seems that chemists and physicists have now 
demonstrated that none in fact are. 
 
                                                 
 
112 See, for example, van Inwagen on bronze, who concludes, “Every stuff that is visible to the naked eye 
arises from an arrangement of atoms that are not themselves made of that stuff.” (1993: 27) Also Taylor 
1985: 69. 
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One does not need the aid of microscopy to find examples of stuffs where spatial 
homoeomery breaks down. Barry Taylor’s nice example is fruitcake, division of which 
may or may not leave us with fruitcake as remainder. After all we may simply find 
ourselves with a sultana and “a mere sultana does not in itself constitute a lump of 
fruitcake” (Taylor 1985: 70). Many stuffs are like fruitcake in this respect – salad, 
moussaka, rope, chain-mail, granular sedimentary rock (e.g., coquina), and cloth (e.g., 
hessian).
113 Whereas gold is homoeomerous down to the molecular scale; these stuffs 
seemingly cease to be homoeomerous at macroscopic, indeed, perfectly visible scales. 
 
Despite the realisation that many stuffs are not homoeomerous down to arbitrary scales, 
we are inclined to think that a bowl can be filled with fruitcake, a table covered with cloth, 
and so on. Someone might object to this, ‘But, look, here is a sultana in the middle of the 
fruitcake; sultanas are not fruitcake; so the bowl isn’t filled with fruitcake because this 
volume of the bowl isn’t!’ In response, we need to recognize that although Taylor is very 
plausibly right to say that a sultana, in itself, is not a lump of fruitcake, a sultana-filled 
volume of the bowl can count as a fruitcake-filled volume in virtue of what fills a larger 
surrounding volume. Whether a small volume is filled with fruitcake is thus essentially 
dependent on what is true of the volume’s surroundings. We explain the nature of the 
small volume in terms of facts about the larger, surrounding volume. Put another way, 
with anhomoeomerous stuffs, like fruitcake, the direction of explanation at a certain scale 
is whole-to-part not part-to-whole. This has important consequences. 
 
Imagine asking whether any fruitcake occupies a finite volume picked out by a set of 
Cartesian co-ordinates. This seems to be a perfectly good question. And, at first blush, it 
seems that to answer it we only need to consider what fills the volume specified. But 
what has just been said shows that we need to be very cautious. We need to distinguish 
between two questions that we might be asking. Firstly, we might be asking whether 
there is any of the stuff, fruitcake, filling the relevant volume. What the above discussion 
suggests is that this question cannot be answered solely on the basis of what is contained 
within the volume, considered in independence from what fills surrounding volumes. If 
the volume contains half a sultana, then it may or may not be a volume which is fruitcake 
filled. That depends on whether the half-sultana is part of a fruitcake or not. In other 
                                                 
 
113 Note that Aristotle’s examples are natural substances like wood and bone, flesh and metal. There is 
some plausibility to the idea that such stuffs appear homoeomerous. See Aristotle 1922: 314a. 
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words, the volume only counts as a fruitcake filled volume in virtue of what fills a larger 
volume encompassing it. Its own filling is insufficient to establish an answer.  
 
On the other hand, we might be asking whether the volume by itself counts as a lump of 
fruitcake. What the above discussion shows is that this question is quite independent of 
whether the volume is filled with fruitcake. Even if it is, it may be that only half a sultana 
fills the volume in question, and so the volume in and of itself will not count as a lump 
of fruitcake. Taylor seems to me right that even if the half-sultana is a part of a fruitcake, 
half a sultana is not in and of itself a lump of fruitcake.
114 One might deny this and insist 
that the half sultana does count as a lump of fruitcake in virtue of its being embedded as it 
is in the fruitcake. Although I find this way of speaking counter-intuitive, I do not want 
to take issue with it. What is important is the thought shared by both views, that the 
nature of the volume in question – whether it is filled with fruitcake and/or constitutes a 
lump of fruitcake – is essentially dependent on the nature of the volume’s surrounds. 
Either way, we explain the nature of the small volume in terms of facts about the larger 
volume. 
 
For someone who thinks that a volume can count as a lump of something in virtue of 
being embedded in a lump, there is a sense in which stuffs turn out to be ‘like-parted’ 
after all. Any volume contained within a lump of the stuff will count as a lump of the 
stuff.
 115 However, there remains good reason to think of such stuff as anhomoeomerous 
because small volumes considered in independence from their embedding will not count 
as lumps of the stuff. In what follows, I shall speak about anhomoeomerous stuffs in this 
broad sense. Anhomoeomerous stuffs have parts the nature of which constitutively 
depends on the nature of the wholes in which they are located. Gold was not traditionally 
conceived to be like this. Fruitcake visibly is. 
 
If, on the other hand we think, with Taylor, that a volume may only be stuff-filled and 
not necessarily a lump of stuff in virtue of being embedded within a lump of stuff, we 
face the question of how to differentiate stuffs from things. We cannot of course do this 
                                                 
 
114 Just as Inwagen seems to be right to say that the atoms that make up visible stuffs are not in general 
themselves made of that stuff. 
115 Or at least any genuinely constitutive volume. No-one will want to claim that anything embedded in a 
fruitcake might count as a lump of fruitcake. A ring that slips off one’s finger and into the mixture whilst 
making the cake needn’t so count. 
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by saying that any volume of a lump of stuff is also a lump of that stuff. Taylor provides 
an alternative way of fleshing out the intuitive idea that stuffs fill, where substances delimit 
the spaces that they occupy as follows. If S is a stuff then S fills the spaces it occupies 
either homoeomerously or anhomoeomerously. If S is a homoeomerous stuff, then the 
above condition holds – any volume of a lump of the stuff is also a lump of that stuff. If 
S is an anhomoeomerous stuff, on the other hand, there will be parts of the stuff which 
do not count as lumps (chunks, hunks etc.) of the stuff (as sultanas do not count as 
lumps of fruitcake). Nonetheless, any volume containing a lump of stuff will so count. Add 
a sultana to a lump of fruitcake and you still have fruitcake. Add another gold atom to a 
lump of gold and you still have a lump of gold. In contrast, a thing like a car may have a 
car as a part. However, it is not true that any volume containing that car part will count 
as a car. Thus imagine this super-car of cars has a car as a roof. The car-as-roof may be a 
car but the car-as-roof plus windscreen and wipers is not.
116
 
As I say, I am inclined to follow Taylor here and deny that sultanas, however embedded, 
count as lumps of fruitcake. However, what is important in what follows is a thesis about 
explanation which holds independently of this claim. Thus, to repeat, for our purposes, a 
stuff is said to be anhomoeomerous just in case a lump of that stuff has a sub-part whose 
nature (be it as a lump of stuff, or simply as a volume filled with stuff) depends 
constitutively on facts about the stuff beyond the volume of the particular sub-part in 
question. I also talk about stuffs being homoeomerous down to points as well as to tiny 
areas. Thus, a stuff is homoeomerous down to areas of a cubic centimetre in size just if, 
for any area A of at least a cubic centimetre which falls wholly within a lump of the stuff 
in question, A is also a lump of that stuff in its own right and independent of any facts 
about surrounding areas. Exploiting this flexibility, we need not worry if all stuffs turn 
out to be anhomoeomerous – some may still be homoeomerous down to any finite 
volume, for example. 
 
Issues concerning anhomoeomery do not arise simply when we consider individual very 
small volumes. Consider, for example, a fairly large volume with precise boundaries. We 
might naïvely think that questions such as, ‘Does this volume contain any fruitcake?’ or 
‘How much fruitcake does this volume contain?’ can be answered by establishing what is 
                                                 
 
116 This offers a rough and ready summary of the picture detailed by Taylor 1985: 72. I am inclined to drop 
his condition (ii)(a) given the possibility of an infinite universe filled with luminiferous ether. 
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within the volume, in independence from what is outside of it. However, imagine that 
the original volume overlaps one protruding half-sultana which is part of a fruitcake. In 
that case, the original volume overlaps part of a fruitcake-filled volume, and so does 
contain fruitcake. Yet the above method would not have reached that conclusion. Rather, 
ignoring the fact that the half-sultana was part of a fruitcake, it would have concluded 
that there was merely a half-sultana in the volume. 
 
3. Temporal Anhomoeomery 
 
Mourelatos (1978) proposes that the thing/stuff distinction mirrors the event/process 
distinction. 
 
Events … occupy relatively to other situations [Mourelatos’ generic name for the 
referents of verb predications] a position analogous to the one objects or things or 
substances occupy relatively to stuffs and properties or qualities. (1978: 430) 
 
Thus, mirroring the above discussion, consider the prima facie plausible claim that events 
are like cars in lacking proper parts which are of the same type. Thus, “the capsizing of a 
boat is not made up of boat-capsizings” (Mourelatos 1978: 430); the second world war is 
not made up of second world wars; and a performance of Shostakovich’s Second Piano 
Concerto is not made up of performances of Shostakovich’s Second Piano Concerto. In 
contrast, processes are prima facie analogous to stuffs like gold in being temporally 
homoeomerous. For example, prima facie, it seems that if the glider is gliding through 
the sky from noon until one o’clock, then any interval between noon and one will be an 
interval during which the glider has glided. Again, prima facie, if a spinning top is 
spinning on the table for twenty seconds, then any period of time within that twenty 
seconds will be a period of time during which the top has spun. 
 
Once again this is all too picturesque. For one, we can imagine bringing about certain 
events which have events of the same kind as sub-parts. For example, a large town might 
put on a large fireworks display which has as parts sequential smaller displays organized 
by individual neighbourhoods: a firework display with fireworks displays as parts. More 
importantly, there are also examples of processes where homoeomery breaks down. 
Given the importance of this breakdown in what follows, I consider several examples. 
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3.1 Walking and running 
 
Consider first the two processes (which are also activities), walking and running, and the 
following passage taken from a textbook on human motion. 
 
Human gait involves alternating sequences in which the body is supported first by one 
limb, which contacts the ground, and then by the other limb. Human gait has two 
modes, walking and running. One distinction between these two modes lies in the 
percentage of each cycle during which the body is supported by foot contact with the 
ground. When we walk, there is always at least one foot on the ground; and for a brief 
period of each cycle, both feet are on the ground. Accordingly, walking can be 
characterized as an alternating sequence of single and double support. In contrast, 
running involves alternating sequences of support and nonsupport, with the proportion 
of the cycle spent in support varying with speed. For both walking and running, 
however, each limb experiences a sequence of support and nonsupport during a single 
cycle. The period of support is referred to as the stance phase, and nonsupport is known 
as the swing phase … one complete cycle … is defined as a stride. (Enoka 2002: 179) 
 
What this passage reveals is that, regardless of whether someone is running or walking, a 
certain sub-period of that process will include a single support stance phase. During this 
period not enough is going on for what is going on, just on its own and independently of 
what is going on during surrounding periods, to count as running or walking. If enough 
was going on, we would face an impossible trilemma: Is enough going on to count as 
walking, running or both? Yet as the above passage suggests not enough of a cycle has 
gone on to determine the answer to this question.
117
 
This suggests that the process of running, whilst prima facie homoeomerous, is in fact 
only homoeomerous down to small intervals.
118 The same goes for walking, and plausibly 
also skiing, marching, dancing, gambolling, strutting, ambling, striding, staggering and 
                                                 
 
117 Note that this is not an epistemological worry but a metaphysical one. Not enough has gone on to 
ground running or walking. 
118 Contra Vendler “running and its kind go on in time in a homogeneous [i.e., homoeomerous] way; any 
part of the process is of the same nature as the whole” (1957: 146). Cf. Rothstein: “a cumulative predicate 
such as run, although intuitively homogeneous [i.e., homoeomerous], has non-homogenous minimal parts: 
there are parts of running events which are just too small to count as events of running.” (2004: 11) 
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moseying. Indeed, the more activities we list, the more powerful the above consideration 
becomes. For consider a very brief period of human body movement. It is highly 
implausible to hold that for all activities such a period might be a sub-interval of, that 
enough always goes on during such a period to determine which it is a sub-interval of 
and which not. This would be like saying that although sultanas are used in baking 
dozens of different cakes, there is always enough in any individual sultana to determine 
which kind of cake it is and isn’t a part of! This is clearly nonsense. 
 
Such activities (and so processes) are not homoeomerous down to very small intervals. 
Arguably, in many contexts, they are not homoeomerous down to quite significant 
durations. On certain occasions, one can truly say, ‘I have been walking all day,’ even if 
from time to time one has paused to catch one’s breath or take in the view. Indeed, on 
some occasions, one can truly claim to have been walking all day despite having sat-down 
for a pint of Jennings and a ploughman’s lunch at The High Cross Inn. Consider (a) the 
appropriateness of the claim, ‘We walked all day, taking lunch at the inn en route,’ and 
(b) the inappropriateness in certain contexts of the reply, ‘No you didn’t [walk all day], I 
saw you sat in the pub garden at lunchtime,’ and, finally, (c) the jokey ineptitude of the 
following exchange at the bar: ‘What are you up to this fine day?’ ‘We’re walking the 
Haystacks.’ ‘Doesn’t much look like it!’. 
 
Of course, there are high standards cases, i.e., contexts to be found in which it would be 
false to make the claims above. One can imagine an army training exercise which 
demanded that those involved walk all day around a mountain, where that instruction 
meant, without stopping at all even to catch your breath. But this does not mean that ordinary 
fell-walking should be held to be a discontinuous process as opposed to a continuous but 
anhomoeomerous process.
119
 
Just as we ordinarily think that a fruitcake can fill a bowl, we consider that someone, say 
Paula Radcliffe, can be running or walking throughout a certain period of time. Someone 
                                                 
 
119 It is an interesting question how we should think of these different cases. If I am watching the army 
exercise from a vantage point all day I might truly say, ‘I saw a dozen men walking all day around the 
mountain’. I suggest that this would be true even if the officer in charge of the exercise caught some or all 
of the men resting briefly and so quite rightly criticised them for not walking all day as they were ordered 
to do. This suggests a contextualist as opposed to a subject/event-sensitive account. In other words, in 
some cases, whether a given process counts as continuous or discontinuous will depend on the concerns of 
the context that you as speaker/thinker are in. 
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might object, ‘But take that brief interval during a period you claim that Paula is running 
throughout; Paula only accomplishes a single support phase during that interval; a single 
support phase isn’t running (or walking for that matter); so Paula isn’t running 
throughout the period.’ As in the spatial case, we should respond by noting that a period 
and its sub-periods may be filled with Paula’s running (just as a tin can be filled with 
fruitcake) in virtue of the fact that Paula ran over the period. We explain the nature of 
the sub-interval (its being an interval during which Paula was running) by reference to a 
larger whole (over which Paula ran). Thus, again, explanation is essentially whole-to-part 
and not part-to-whole. Such explanations cannot refer solely to the past either. Imagine 
Paula has just stepped out the door. With her single-footfall she has neither run nor 
walked. Nonetheless, she may well have started running or walking. If she has, that can 
only be in virtue of what is yet to come. 
 
3.2 Talking 
 
Mourelatos gives the examples, “thundering, giggling, or talking … as paradigms of 
anhomoeomerous process” (1978: 430).
120 Why might Mourelatos think that talking (and 
also: speaking, chatting, discussing, shouting, rambling on etc.) is such a process? One 
plausible reason is that to count as having talked one has at least to utter a 
phoneme/distinctive feature (i.e., a genuine phonological unit), otherwise one would 
simply be making noise. Analogous arguments to the running/walking case here apply; 
not enough has been achieved in a very brief period considered in independence to 
ground talking as opposed to mere noise-making, or indeed singing, stuttering, grunting 
and so forth. Intentions are of no help here since the person intending to talk might well 
be struck dumb (or struck by lightning) before succeeding in having talked. 
 
Another, equally plausible reason is that two people can truly be said to be talking for 
hours on end despite there being silences between words, between remarks, and indeed 
lulls in the conversation where nothing is said by either participant in the exchange for 
                                                 
 
120 Cf. Taylor: “… an example like ‘chuckles’ provides a case more naturally conceived on the analogy of a 
heterogeneous [i.e., anhomoeomerous] stuff, since any sounds emitted in a microsecond during a period of 
chuckling (at the normal rate) hardly constitute chuckling themselves, but rather appear to stand to 
chuckling as a sultana might stand to fruit-cake, viz. as at best falling within some period of chuckling 
though themselves occupying a time too short to constitute such a period” (1977: 212). Taylor also 
mentions: ‘giggles’, ‘talks’, ‘walks’, and ‘strokes (the dog)’ (ibid.). 
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some time. There seems no reason to think that from the perspective of many, perhaps 
all contexts, some silences during the maximal period of talking (i.e., some periods which 
on their own are not periods where anyone has talked) are compatible with a continuous 
stretch of talking.
121 Such periods will count as periods during which talking is going on 
in virtue of being located within durations over which the participants talk. 
 
3.3 Other Examples 
 
Other examples of anhomoeomerous processes include: 
 
Watching (and also: listening, tasting, feeling etc.) – for one can truly claim to have been 
watching television all evening despite popping to the bathroom or running to the door 
to pick up the pizza delivery, let alone blinking. 
 
Swimming (and also: playing, exercising, sparing etc.) – for one can truly claim to have 
been swimming for thirty minutes straight even if one has put one’s feet down at the 
shallow end every other length. 
 
Growing (and also: rising, falling, shrinking, dying, swelling etc.) – for one can truly claim 
to be growing all year despite doing so only at night, or despite not gaining any height or 
even shrinking for a brief period, just as the FTSE can have been gaining all year despite 
the occasional drop as judged minute by minute. 
 
Likewise, consider: nudging, downloading, interrogating, writing, painting, dressing, and 
snoring. In each case, it is quite implausible to think that all sub-intervals of periods 
during which these processes are occurring will count on their own as periods during 
which the relevant process is going on, that is, on their own make it true that someone 
has nudged etc. over that period. In most of the above cases, this holds even from the 
perspective of the strictest of contexts. In sum: many processes are analogous to 
fruitcake and not to gold.
122
                                                 
 
121 To say, ‘We were talking for hours,’ is entirely felicitous despite clear silences etc. 
122 Of course, there may be reasons to think that just as gold is not homoeomerous, no process is actually 
homoeomerous for reasons to do with fundamental physics. For example, it may be that Planck time (5.39 
× 10-44 seconds) is the in principle minimum time period for which any process can go on for. My point in 
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4. Consequences 
 
These everyday facts about walking, talking and so forth have important consequences. 
Imagine asking whether walking is going on during some interval. We might be asking 
two distinct questions. Firstly, we might be asking whether the interval is an interval 
throughout which walking is going on. What the above discussion shows is that this 
question cannot be answered just on the basis of what is going on during the interval in 
question considered in independence from what is going on in surrounding periods. If, 
during the interval, only a single support stance phase is unfolding, then the interval may 
or may not count as one during which walking is going on when considered 
independently – whether it does so depends on what is going on in the surrounding 
interval. In independence, everything that is going on in the interval is compatible with 
running and not walking; whatever is going on during the interval considered in 
independence is insufficient to establish an answer to the walking/not walking question. 
 
On the other hand, we might be asking whether the interval by itself counts as a period 
over which the individual in question has walked. What the above discussion shows is 
that this question is independent of whether the interval is one in which walking is going 
on. Even if walking is going on throughout the interval, it may be that only a single 
support stance phase fills the interval in question, and so the interval by itself will not 
count as one during which the individual has walked. A single support stance phase is 
not enough for walking in this sense – though walking can be said to be going on during 
an interval in virtue of its being part of a period during which the walker has walked.  
 
Again the issue is not just about individual small periods. Imagine a long stretch of time, 
at the end of which someone completes a single support phase. Has that person run at all 
during the long stretch? We cannot say without taking into account what occurs in the 
following period. Perhaps the person is running during the period in virtue of that last 
support phase being a part of a period during which they do run. Or again, perhaps they 
have just begun walking. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
the text has been that many processes are not homoeomerous even at quite gross timescales, timescales 
which will be relevant to our experiential lives. 
 
 
106 
 
The metaphysical moral is this: if we try and ask very precise questions about the lengths 
of time certain processes go on for, their precise starting points, or their characteristics, 
we must consider long enough periods of time. Failure to do so may blind us to the 
presence or nature of a process unfolding during the period of our primary concern. For 
instance, if we probe whether a given process, say a computer’s humming, is going on 
over a given time period, we must consider how things stand with respect to a period, 
long enough to support the process in question (which is not to say long enough for the 
process to be going on within it, but long enough on its own and in independence of 
surrounding periods to count as a period during which the computer has hummed). 
When the process is spinning or falling, the relevant length of time may simply be some 
finite duration. However, when the process is walking or talking, the length of time may 
be considerably longer. And indeed, in the case of some processes (in certain contexts), 
the relevant timescales may be surprisingly long. 
  
An important consequence of this is that we should be extremely wary of assuming that, 
just because x has not Ф-ed over some period δt, a process of x Ф-ing is not going on 
throughout some period ∆t where δt  ⊆  ∆t. Conversely, we cannot assume that, just 
because a process is going on throughout some period ∆t, x will have Ф-ed over any 
period δt such that δt ⊆ ∆t. In the case of some processes, it may be that questions such 
as, ‘Is Ф going on at some instant t or over some short duration δt?’ are problematic in 
just the same way as questions like, ‘Is there fruitcake at some point p or in some tiny 
volume (δx, δy, δz)?’ These questions may only be answerable if we know whether a 
process is going on throughout ∆t where δt  ⊆  ∆t, just as the analogous question 
concerning fruitcake requires us to know whether there is fruitcake filling a volume (∆x, 
∆y, ∆z) where (δx, δy, δz) ⊆ (∆x, ∆y, ∆z). 
 
To say that a process is anhomoeomerous then is to say that it has temporal sub-parts 
whose nature depends constitutively on facts about the nature of the process before 
and/or after the particular temporal part in question. In other words, the process is 
structured such that over certain short periods the explanatory direction runs from 
temporal whole to temporal parts and not vice-versa. A key contention of subsequent 
chapters is that experience is significantly anhomoeomerous, just like walking and talking. 
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This is not obvious and will require extensive argument. However, the above 
considerations demonstrate two things. First, that if experience is a process, it would not 
be especially unusual if it were an anhomoeomerous process. Second, that if experience is 
anhomoeomerous, then it would be seriously mistaken to think that we could always 
appreciate whether a given experiential process was occurring at very short timescales (or 
with limitless precision) in independence of a subject’s experience over longer timescales. 
It is possible that at such brief timescales considered in independence of surrounding 
periods we will simply not appreciate how things are experientially, since how things are 
experientially depends on what is unfolding over longer, encompassing periods. 
 
Just as there was a question above as to whether a sultana counted as a lump of fruitcake 
or merely as a fruitcake filled volume in virtue of its embedding, there is a question about 
how best to think of parts of anhomoeomerous processes. If Paula has only 
accomplished a single support phase she may certainly be running throughout that 
interval in virtue of what follows; but has she run in virtue of what follows? I am strongly 
inclined to think not.
123 But again the crucial point is one about explanatory direction and 
so for our purposes we can treat any process as anhomoeomerous just if the process has 
temporal parts whose nature (be it as periods filled with S’s Φ-ing, or periods over which 
S has Φ-ed) depends constitutively on facts about the process beyond the period of the 
temporal part in question. 
 
Similarly, just as I talked about stuffs being homoeomerous down to points and small 
areas, so I talk about processes being homoeomerous down to instants and small 
intervals or durations. Thus, a process, P, of x Φ-ing is homoeomerous down to periods 
of a second in duration just if, for any period Q of at least a second which falls wholly 
within the course of P in question, Q is period during which x has Φ-ed in its own right 
and independent of any facts about surrounding areas. Exploiting this flexibility, we need 
not worry if all processes turn out to be anhomoeomerous – some may still be 
homoeomerous down to any finite duration, for example. Above I proposed gliding and 
spinning as plausible examples of temporally homoeomerous processes at least down to 
                                                 
 
123 In this I take my lead from Rothstein and Soteriou who deny that running is homogeneous, defining 
homogeneity in the following ways. Rothstein: “If a predicate is homogeneous then x  P-ed  for  y time 
ENTAILS that at any time during y, x P-ed was true” (2004: 14). Soteriou: “[w]here Ф-ing is an activity, if it 
is true that S was Ф-ing from t1 to t10 (e.g. walking), then at every point during that interval it is true that S 
Ф-ed” (2007: 552). 
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any finite duration. Another is falling; all finite sub-durations of a period during which an 
object is falling are plausibly durations during which the object has fallen.
124 My principle 
interest in this thesis is to argue that experience is significantly temporally 
anhomoeomerous, i.e., not homoeomerous below temporal  intervals of significant 
duration (i.e., of the order of several hundreds of milliseconds). 
 
Finally, just as we can distinguish stuffs from things without claiming that all stuffs are 
homoeomerous; we can distinguish events and processes even if we deny that, if S Фs 
(e.g., runs) throughout a period, then it is true that S has Ф-ed (i.e., run) during every 
sub-period.
125 A process fills time either homoeomerously or anhomoeomerously. If the 
former, the condition just given holds. If the latter, then any sub-period of the process 
which contains a period during which S has Ф-ed will itself be one during which S has Ф-
ed. If Paula has run during a one second period, then a one and a half second period 
comprised of that period together with a further half second during which she is running 
will be one over which she has run. Contrast events. An event such as a war may be 
made of up separate smaller and sequential events of the same kind. For example, the 
Hundred Years’ War comprised a number of other wars, some distinguished by locality 
such as the Breton War of Succession and the Castilian Civil War; others by their dates, 
such as the Caroline War, 1369-1389, and the Lancastrian War, 1415-1429. The Hundred 
Years’ War is nonetheless a war (event) and not simply warring (process) because it is not 
true that any sub-period of the Hundred Years’ War which contains a war will itself 
count as a war. Warring during the period 1369-1417 is not itself a war even though the 
Caroline war occurred during a sub-period of that period. More generally, if war W is 
made up of war, w1, followed by w2, followed by w3, then w1 together with the opening 
salvos of w2, need not be a war. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
124 Cf. Taylor: “there are cases where the analogy with homogeneous stuffs is appropriate: even a 
microsecond within a period of falling is plausibly reckoned as itself genuinely a period of falling, even 
though it can be told as such by means of normal empirical criteria only indirectly, via the knowledge that it 
does indeed come within some wider period long enough for those criteria to be applied.” (1977: 212). As 
already mentioned, this claims only holds with respect to certain contexts. 
125 For his detailed treatment of temporal homoeomery see Taylor 1977: 213 and 1985: Ch.3. 
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5. Experience as process 
 
The discussion above assumes that experience is a process. It might be objected that 
philosophers of mind often treat experience as a state or event. However, philosophers 
of mind rarely display sufficient sensitivity to ontological categories.
126 The linguistic 
evidence clearly demonstrates that experience is best thought of as a process. For 
example, the verb ‘to experience’ takes the progressive form. It is rarely used in such a 
form since there are usually more specific things to say. But consider Mary released from 
her black and white laboratory. 
 
I am experiencing colour for the first time! 
 
And similarly the following examples (garnered from a quick Google search). 
 
I am experiencing a nuisance odour/problems with noise in my neighbourhood. 
I am experiencing palpitations/sharp pains in my lower back. 
I am experiencing auditory, tactile and visual hallucinations. 
I am experiencing after-images on certain objects/a pleasant sensation. 
 
Vendler claims that only process predications have progressive forms.
127 Certainly, they 
contrast with state predications such as the following. 
 
* I am knowing what it is like to see colour for the first time!  
 
                                                 
 
126 Three representative examples: “Visual experience is a state characterised by its typical causal role” 
(Lewis 1980: 274); “the most philosophically convenient way of describing experience is an event one” 
(Sprigge 2002: 235); “belief and perception form a single class of mental phenomena marked by their representational 
nature and any mental difference between any two members of the class must be a difference in what they represent” (Thau 
2002: 14-5). Confusion here is compounded by the availability of both the mass noun ‘experience’ 
(process) and the count noun ‘an experience’ (event). More on that distinction below. But even when the 
concern is specifically with experiences, they are often misclassified as states as in, “A visual experience is a 
state whose phenomenological properties enable me to identify it without external observation” (Nagel 
1986: 46). 
127 “The question, ‘What are you doing?’ might be answered by ‘I am running (or writing, working, and so 
on),’ but not by ‘I am knowing (or loving, recognizing, and so on).’ On the other hand, the appropriate 
question and answer, ‘Do you know . . .?’ ‘Yes, I do,’ have no counterparts like ‘Do you run?’ ‘Yes, I do.’ 
This difference suggests that running, writing, and the like are processes going on in time, i.e., roughly, that 
they consist of successive phases following one another in time” (1957: 144). 
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As mentioned, Mourelatos improves upon Vendler’s typology. He also improves on 
Vendler’s test for being a process predication by introducing the idea of a nominalization 
transcription (the idea of which will be clear from the example below). According to 
Mourelatos, all and only process predications have mass quantified nominalization 
transcriptions.
128 Thus, a nominalization transcription of, “I am experiencing colour for 
the first time!” is, “There is, for the first time, (some) experiencing of colour by me!” 
This is mass quantified; hence experience is a process. Contrast the event predication, “I 
saw colour for the first time!” which transcribes as, “There was a (one) seeing/sighting of 
colour for the first time by me!” This is count quantified and so an event predication. 
 
This linguistic evidence supports the intuitive classification made vivid in James’ 
metaphor of the stream of consciousness. Our experience flows or unfolds in time 
(flowing and unfolding being paradigm processes); it consists of successive phases which 
occur before and after each other. 
 
Thinking of experience as a process is not in competition here with our count quantified 
talk of experiences which are best thought of as events. Particular experiences result when 
we conceptually divide up experience up in certain ways. Sometimes the division will fall-
out naturally where the object of experience is an event with its own temporal shape as, 
for example, when you recall your experience of a lightening strike. Sometimes the 
division will be arbitrary as, for example, when you contemplate your experience from 
10:52 a.m. until 11:24 a.m. In either case, we have what is distinctive of events, namely, a 
final temporal part – the last moment of experiencing before 11:24 a.m., or the last 
moment of experiencing the lightening. Experience qua process consists of successive 
phases which occur before and after each other, but does not require a final temporal 
part, it does not climax as say, “Hillary and Tenzing conquered Everest” does with the 
moment that they reach the summit. 
 
There are reasons for taking experience qua process as primary. In particular thinking of 
the stream of consciousness as divisible into experiences but denying that it is built up 
from separate experiences allows us to dissolve certain worries about the diachronic unity 
                                                 
 
128 See Mourelatos 1978 and Steward 1997. 
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of consciousness.
129 However, the considerations below do not turn on this point for 
events are clearly anhomoeomerous.
 If I wrote this thesis during 2008, it certainly does 
not follow that I wrote this thesis during March 1st 2008. I may well have been writing it 
then, of course. Thus, the central contention of this chapter would stand regardless of 
whether we treated experience as a process or as an event. However, I suspect that the 
fact that processes have traditionally been assumed to be homoeomerous in part lies 
behind the assumption that experience is homoeomerous. Given that, the most 
sympathetic way to understand the debate is to treat experience as a process. In this way, 
when we see why the assumption of experiential homoeomery should be rejected, it will 
be for deep as opposed to shallow reasons. I now turn to those considerations. 
                                                 
 
129 A thought which goes back at least to Bergson 1914: 3. Much the same idea plays a central role in Tye 
2003. I see no reason to make the further denial – as Tye does – that there are such things as experiences 
(events) in the sense noted above. 
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Chapter Five: 
Phenomenal Anti-Realism 
 
 
Tell us, too, the way 
Time, in its fullness, fill us 
As it flows: tell us the beauty of succession 
That Breton denied: the day goes 
Down, but there is time before it goes
130
 
 
1. ‘Time Seemed to Slow Down’: a Warm-Up Case 
 
In the discussion of cinematic representation above (Ch.3, §3.4) I discussed a view which 
denied that there was any more to the depiction of temporal properties than the 
representation of temporal features in the narrative. I suggested that such a view might 
provide a starting point for thinking about anti-realism in relation to the temporal 
structure of experience. In this section, I want to consider an objection to the naïve 
picture developed in Part One. Although I do not think the objection is, in itself, one 
that seriously troubles that picture, answering it opens up the prospect of a more 
extreme, anti-realist view. Approaching anti-realism in this way helps prepare us for this 
chapter’s main concern, the serious challenge to the naïve view posed by Dennett’s 
arguments. 
 
The basic objection to the framework developed above is that it is ill-equipped to handle 
the phenomenon of ‘time slowing down’. Consider the following narrative, which relates 
the experience of a 6.7 magnitude earthquake in Northridge, California. 
 
I had just gotten up to go to the bathroom when the earthquake came. It was 
unbelievable. It threw me off my feet. My roommate and I ran to get underneath the 
dining room table. As I was running I saw my computer flying through the air. Once we 
                                                 
 
130 Tomlinson (1997) ‘In the Fullness of Time’ from Selected Poems. 
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got under the table we held on for dear life! It felt like it lasted forever but really it was 
only a few seconds. Once it stopped we went outside and saw the mess. Pipes had 
broken and everything was flooding, there were little sand volcanoes in the front yard. 
There was lots of damage to peoples houses and chimneys but everyone on our block 
was uninjured. It was the most frightening experience of my life.131
 
Statements such as, ‘It felt like it lasted forever but really it was only a few seconds,’ are 
very common expressions of people’s experience in extreme circumstances, such as 
earthquakes, falls and car crashes. Of course, the claim here is an exaggeration. But this 
need not detain us since our problem is generated by any claim that some event, like an 
earthquake, felt like it lasted a long time, when in reality it only lasted a few seconds. It is 
also generated by claims to the effect that time seemed to slow down which are found in 
similar contexts. How should we account for such judgements? 
 
Given our framework, one thing that it is not open to us to say is that such statements 
express judgements about how long some event seemed to last in contrast to the temporal 
extent of the experience of the event, as if our experience shifted in the way illustrated 
below. 
 
Act Time 
ORDINARY CASE  EARTHQUAKE CASE 
Object Time 
 
 
                                                 
 
131 This is one of dozens of narratives collected as part of a project funded by the U.S. Geological Survey 
Earthquake Hazards Program. See http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learning/teachers/Mag_vs_Int_Pkg.pdf. 
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Divertingly, a recent paper by Stetson et al. (2007) entitled, ‘Does Time Really Slow 
Down during a Frightening Event?’ takes this kind of model seriously and attempts to 
put it to the test. Their idea is that during a stressful or frightening event there should be, 
according to the above picture, an increase in temporal resolution. To test this, subjects 
were dropped fifty metres from a platform into a net, freefalling for about two and a half 
seconds. A chronometer was strapped to their forearms, set to show random numbers 
alternating just too fast to be detected in normal circumstances. Subjects were asked to 
attempt to read the digits as they fell. As the authors surmise, 
 
If higher temporal resolution were experienced during the freefall, the alternation rate 
should appear slowed, thus allowing for the accurate reporting of numbers that would 
otherwise be unreadable. (2007: 2) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the authors found no evidence to support this hypothesis.
132
 
James, in discussing related phenomena suggests an important idea, namely, that “tracts 
of time … shorten in passing whenever we are so fully occupied with their content as not 
to note the actual time itself” (1890: 626). Evidently, this is precisely the wrong 
explanation of the earthquake case. Here an occupation with content leads time to 
‘lengthen’ in passing. However, there are two ideas here that can be considered in 
abstraction from the particular hypothesis in play. First is James’ basic thought that our 
occupation with the content of experience is at the root of our talk of time slowing down 
or speeding up. Second is James’ suggestion that this engagement of attention means that 
we do not notice the actual time-span itself. Employing the first of these ideas, we can 
develop the following account of what is going on in the cases in question by way of an 
objection to the naïve picture articulated above. 
 
The objector might put things this way. Our judgements of duration and rate of passage 
are not based on the temporal content of experience (as Temporal Transparency would 
                                                 
 
132 Not that their experiment should be thought of as decisive. Someone might claim that stress slows 
down the apparent alteration rate but also lowers resolution at the same time. Stetson et al. go on to 
suggest that duration judgements are due to misremembering. What follows suggests that this is at best 
half-right. Certainly, duration judgements will be grounded in propositional memory. However, if metrical 
properties are not amongst the perceptible features of events and so not amongst the experiential 
properties of experience, we should not think of this as misremembering what we once perceived correctly, 
but rather as part of the autobiographical narrative that we construct around our episodic memories. 
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have it) but rather on non-temporal aspects of the content of experience. The content of 
our experience captures our attention in various ways but, roughly speaking, the currency 
of attention is interest. Thus, a moving, varied or unusual stimulus can be expected to 
engage attention to a greater extent than a static, monotonous or mundane stimulus. 
Judgements of absolute duration are based on the engagement of attention. This, in 
essence, is the explanation of the phenomena above. This shows, the objector continues, 
that the naïve theorist is wrong to think that temporal judgements are sourced in the 
temporality of experience itself; rather they are grounded in facts about how attention is 
engaged in undergoing experience, facts which determine what gets written into our 
retrospective, autobiographical representation of our stream of consciousness. 
Consequently, we have no reason to believe that experience itself has any temporal 
structure independent of our representation of it in autobiographical memory. 
 
How should the naïve theorist react to this? The idea that it is the interest of what is taking 
place in the perceived world (and so the degree to which our attention is occupied, as 
opposed to temporal features presented in experience) which grounds our metrical 
durational judgements seems very plausible in the earthquake case. The description 
above made vivid how much there was to capture the individual’s attention over the 
course of a few seconds – the scramble to get under the desk, the computer flying 
through the air, the noise and so forth. Consequently, the hypothesis that such dramatic 
and engaging stretches of experience are judged to last longer than more pedestrian ones, 
is compelling.
133 The naïve theorist should agree; what she should disagree with is the 
way that this claim is developed into an objection. 
 
The judgements in earthquake cases concern metrical temporal properties. In Chapter 
One (§1.1) I argued that metrical temporal properties do not form part of the content of 
perceptual experience. Given that, it should be common ground that judgements 
concerning metrical durations will be not grounded in temporal aspects of experience. 
There are no such aspects. Events are not presented as taking, say, six seconds (or 
proceeding at a certain metrical rate). Given that a judgement that a stretch of experience 
lasted six seconds (or just ‘a long time’) cannot have its source in the (metrical) temporal 
                                                 
 
133 The idea that interest drives these judgements is plausible but extremely monotonous experience can 
also seem to drag on for an age. We might account for this by noting that in such cases attention is being 
deployed in watching out for change of some kind. Thus, in both cases, it is plausible that the extent of 
attentional involvement connects with the judgements of duration.  
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content of experience, it must have some other source.
134 The hypothesis above provides 
an attractive account of that source, and so our thought and talk about time slowing 
down and events seeming to take ‘forever’. However, the hypothesis does not provide 
any basis for denying that non-metrical temporal properties are genuinely experiential 
properties that ground our judgements about the temporal structure of experience. Since 
that is all the naïve picture claims, the objection fails. It offers no reason for rejecting the 
claim that the stream of consciousness is temporally structured in a way that contributes 
to what it is like, subjectively, to undergo it. 
 
For all that, the dialectic above does reveal the possibility of a more radical objector. The 
more radical objector urges that, once it is granted that metrical temporal judgements are 
not sourced in the metrical temporal content of experience, we should take seriously the 
thought that no temporal judgements (including those concerning structural properties) 
are grounded in temporal content of experience. The objector proposes, for example, 
that we judge that one event was experienced after another, not because of the temporal 
structure of experience, but rather because taking experience to have been so structured 
is the best way that we have of making sense of the non-temporal content of our 
experience. Less metaphorically, the objector might propose that autobiographical 
memory constructs a narrative that represents the stream of consciousness as having a 
certain structure based on its non-temporal content.
135 The radical conclusion is that 
there is nothing more to the experiential temporal structure of experience than the 
                                                 
 
134 Often people cite dreams as the paradigm case of transparency failure. Treanor (ms.), for example, 
writes, “dreams … seem to go on for ages though evidence suggests they were really quite brief. Here I am 
thinking of a dream in which, for instance, some loud banging precipitates an (apparently) extended course 
of events. Upon wakening, you find a friend is at the door and knocked just a few seconds ago.” Cf. 
Walton 2008: 180. Dreams are not my focus. Nonetheless, points in the text are relevant here. If we 
assume that dreams are a vivid kind of imaginative episode and that we imagine events in dreams through 
imagining perceiving them, two points can be made. Firstly, given what I say above, imagining seeing will 
not be imagining an episode with experiential metrical structure. Thus, metrical judgements can enter in 
two ways. As above, they can enter through the content of the imagined experience. Alternatively, they can 
enter through associated propositional imagining. That is, we may simultaneously imagine some event and 
imagine that it is taking a certain amount of time. Since dream-contents are unconstrained by physics, 
dreams may well be about events that would normally take a long time. It would therefore be no surprise if 
both these mechanisms led to the kinds of judgements Treanor suggests. For some extremely interesting 
and perhaps surprising empirical findings concerning judgements about dream duration, see Noreika 
(forthcoming). 
135 Here we have a way of thinking about Kantian synthesis where the narrative structure is compelled to 
conform to the principles of the Analogies. Here we also have a way of thinking about Dennett and 
Kinsbourne’s notion of content-sensitive settling (see their 1992a), where a far less constrictive set of 
heuristics are in play. 
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structure represented in autobiographical memory’s narrative, sourced in non-temporal 
aspects of experience. 
 
The objector has not provided any argument in favour of his extreme view. 
Distinguishing between metrical and non-metrical properties allows us to endorse the 
claim that autobiographical narrative driven by attentional occupation is the source of 
our metrical judgements, whilst resisting the view that all temporal aspects of experience 
should receive this account. Nonetheless, in the light of the account of duration 
judgements tentatively endorsed above, the radical objector’s extreme anti-realism no 
longer appears the alien prospect that it might initially have seemed. As yet it is 
unmotivated. Nonetheless, where we do find motivation, such a view must be taken 
seriously as a prima facie viable competitor to the naïve view of Part One. 
 
1.1 Empirical Connections 
 
Clearly many of the claims made above are subject to empirical investigation and to try to 
put flesh on the skeleton explanation of duration judgements renders us hostage to 
empirical fortune. In that light, let me quote the following passage from a recent paper, 
which attempts to summarise the current state of play on the issue. 
 
Because time cannot be directly measured at a given moment, it has been proposed that 
the brain estimates time based on the number of changes in an event. Consistent with 
this idea, dynamic visual stimuli are known to lengthen perceived time. However, the 
kind of information that constitutes the basis for time perception remains unresolved. 
(Kanai et al. 2006: 1421; for references see original) 
 
This passage deserves a number of comments. (1) In the first sentence, it is claimed that 
“time cannot be directly measured at a given moment”. It is not clear what this means.
136 
However, if I am right that metrical properties are not part of the content of our 
perceptual experience, then we can rephrase the point as the claim that metrical durations 
of events are not perceptible features. (2) Talk of the brain estimating time is perhaps 
better put in terms of the neural mechanisms under-pinning judgements of apparent 
                                                 
 
136 Though compare discussion of PSA in Chapter Six. 
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duration. (3) The idea that moving stimuli “lengthen perceived time” should be 
understood as the claim that (when presented on their own) moving stimuli are judged to 
last longer than stationary ones; it should not be taken to be a claim about 
phenomenology. In general, the empirical literature uses the phrase ‘time perception’ to 
refer to judgements concerning stimulus durations rather than phenomenological 
durations. (4) The authors note that the presumption in the field is that the amount of 
change (in some sense) lies behind our duration judgements. This is very much in line 
with the discussion above. They also note that the precise basis is as yet unclear.  
 
Kanai et al. go on to provide evidence “that the temporal frequency of a stimulus serves 
as the ‘clock’ for perceived duration. Other aspects of changes, such as speed or 
coherence, were found to be inconsequential” (1421). This suggests a rather simple basis 
for duration judgements in the simple paradigms considered. I take it that it is an open 
question whether such a simple mechanism can account for all the phenomena. It seems 
more likely that a variety of mechanisms come into play in more complex situations. 
Stetson et al. “speculate that the involvement of the amygdala in emotional memory may 
lead to dilated duration judgements” (2007: 3). Here the fact that “highly salient events 
may be erroneously interpreted to have spanned a greater period of time” (ibid.) is 
plausibly a consequence of emotional salience as opposed to frequency per se. And we 
might speculate that judgements are affected by how stressed or aroused the subject is.
137 
All this remains entirely in line with the general idea in play above. 
 
It is well-attested that, at time scales of 200-1000ms, moving stimuli are judged to persist 
longer than stationary stimuli even when presentation times are identical. In general, the 
effect increases with stimulus speed.
138 In the literature, such effects are often termed 
illusions. It is not clear that this is the most appropriate terminology. If it correlates with 
the rather misleading use of the phrase ‘time perception’ to refer to duration judgements 
(and if I am right about the absence of metrical properties from perceptual content), then 
these are, strictly speaking, delusions not illusions. That said, I am by no means ruling out 
cases of genuine temporal illusion. Perhaps one event may look to last longer than 
another despite their occurring during the very same interval of time; perhaps the ‘rat’ of 
                                                 
 
137 It is also noteworthy in this context that (at least anecdotally) schizophrenics tend to over-estimate the 
lengths of time periods and depressives tend to under-estimate them. 
138 For a survey, see Brown 1995. 
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a postman’s ‘rat-tat’ may sound as if it lasts longer than the ‘tat’ even though both last the 
same amount of time. These cases do not trouble Temporal Transparency for they 
provide no reason to deny that experience itself is structured in the same manner as its 
apparent objects. 
 
2. Dennett on Time and Consciousness 
 
The rest of this chapter is devoted to Daniel Dennett’s writings on time and 
consciousness, wherein we find the most forceful arguments for anti-realism that have 
been propounded in recent times.
139 However, its aim is not primarily exegesis; rather, I 
focus on two related questions. Firstly, to paraphrase Wright (2002), what could anti-
realism about phenomenology (and in particular temporal phenomenology) possibly be? 
Secondly, why would anyone feel driven to endorse such a conception of the stream of 
consciousness? 
 
Dennett’s arguments in Consciousness Explained and, in particular, those based on ‘Time 
and the Observer’ (co-authored with Marcel Kinsbourne) concerning masking and 
apparent motion phenomena, created a storm in the early nineties and have spawned a 
vast secondary literature. The storm evinces the widely held view that Dennett presents a 
powerful challenge to our intuitive ways of thinking about the stream of consciousness. 
There is little consensus within that literature concerning precisely how one should 
understand Dennett. Nonetheless, most commentators agree that he is arguing for some 
form of anti-realism about consciousness, where that term is a catch-all for fictionalist, 
eliminativist and irrealist views, as well as more traditional anti-realist positions. Thus, 
Searle (1995) claims, “Dennett denies the existence of consciousness”; Seager avers that 
for Dennett “there is no such thing as phenomenal consciousness!” (1999: 85); Anthony 
holds that “the most charitable reading of [Dennett and Kinsbourne’s] critique commits 
them to the view that consciousness does not exist – to eliminativism” (1992: 201); McGinn 
insists that Dennett “has to regard conscious states as fictional” (1995: 246).
140
                                                 
 
139 For convenience I often talk about Dennett’s view, noting only here that Dennett’s views on time and 
experience were largely developed in collaboration with Marcel Kinsbourne. 
140 See also Aronson et al. who conclude: “[D & K] seem to have thrown the baby out with the bath water: 
They seem to have rejected the essential phenomenology of consciousness in an attempt to avoid dualism 
and implausible neurophysiology” (1992: 202). Block (1992), Van Gulick (1992: 228) and Lloyd (1992: 216) 
also find anti-realism explicit in Dennett; see also Tye 1993 discussed below. 
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These characterisations certainly apply to Dennett’s 1979 view, which he described in the 
following terms. 
 
I am left defending the view that such [phenomenal] judgements exhaust our immediate 
consciousness, that our individual stream of consciousness consists of nothing but such 
propositional episodes … My view, put bluntly, is that there is no phenomenological 
manifold in any such relation to our reports. There are the public reports we issue, and 
then there are the episodes of our propositional awareness, our judgements, and then 
there is – so far as introspection is concerned – darkness. (1979: 95) 
 
However, it is not clear whether Consciousness Explained represents a change of view or 
rhetorical strategy.
141 Certainly, post-1991, Dennett has resisted such straightforward 
characterisations.
142 Thus, Dennett and Kinsbourne respond to their early critics as 
follows. 
 
[W]e consider our position to be unproblematically “realist” and materialist: conscious 
experiences are real events occurring in the real time and space of the brain, and hence 
they are clockable and locatable within the appropriate limits of precision for real 
phenomena of their type. (…) Certain sorts of questions one might think it appropriate 
to ask about them, however, have no answers, because these questions presuppose 
inappropriate – unmotivatable – temporal and spatial boundaries that are more fine-
grained than the phenomena admit. (1992b: 205)143
 
Carmen offers the following explanation of the situation. 
 
                                                 
 
141 For evidence of the latter see his aptly named, ‘Caveat Emptor,’ where Dennett replies to Mangan’s 
criticism of Consciousness Explained as follows: “I take pleasure in confirming one of [Mangan’s] charges. He 
accuses me of deliberately concealing my philosophical conclusions until late in the book, of creating a 
“presumptive mood,” of relying on “rhetorical devices” rather than stating my “anti-realist” positions at 
the outset and arguing for them. Exactly! That was my strategy … Had I opened with a frank declaration 
of my final conclusions I would simply have provoked a chorus of ill-concealed outrage and that brouhaha 
would have postponed indefinitely any remotely even-handed exploration of the position I want to 
defend” (1993: 49). That said, there are also suggestions that Dennett wishes to distance himself from his 
earlier stance. 
142 Cf. Jackson (1993: 899) who comments, “Dennett has long resisted those who demand a definite 
answer to whether he is or is not a realist about mental states, and, correspondingly, to whether he is or is 
not an instrumentalist about the mind.” See also Clark 1992. 
143 Note though the scare-quotes around “realist”. 
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Dennett is often criticized for denying the existence of consciousness, and he has often 
denied denying it. Disagreement of this sort can arise, it seems to me, only because his 
view equivocates between on the one hand a subtle and plausible challenge to a cluster 
of traditional assumptions about consciousness, and on the other hand a boldly 
counterintuitive conjecture that challenges not just expert opinion but also common 
sense, indeed manifest appearance (assuming there is such a thing). (2007: 100) 
 
I think that there is something quite right about this. Dennett does indeed offer “a subtle 
and plausible challenge to a cluster of traditional assumptions about consciousness”. To 
that extent, I aspire to be a fellow traveller. A central aim of this thesis is to challenge 
certain traditional assumptions about temporal consciousness, which prevent us from 
making sense of various phenomena such as the perception of succession or constant 
motion. That said, if Carmen’s subtle Dennett i s  t o  b e  a n  a l l y  i n  a  d e f e n c e  o f  a  
sophisticated realism, we must at the very least tackle the arguments of the anti-realist 
Dennett that Carmen and so many other commentators have found. If we can show how 
a subtle realism can fully account for the problematic phenomena Dennett adduces 
without embracing anti-realism, we will have demonstrated that Dennett should have 
changed his 1979 view, whatever the truth of the matter. 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In §§3-6, I introduce the Dennettian 
considerations which have courted the anti-realist charge and show how they can be 
marshalled into an argument threatening a form of anti-realism about temporal 
phenomenology, drawing on resources from Crispin Wright’s Truth and Objectivity. 
Whether or not the argument is Dennett’s own is not of great importance; my aim is only 
to show that the argument can be made, and made forcefully. In doing so, I raise 
(without attempting to resolve) a number of subtler issues related to the formulation and 
tenability of anti-realism in the phenomenological domain. 
 
In §§7-9, I argue that the reconstructed Dennettian argument only threatens an anti-
realist conclusion if we make an assumption about the metaphysics of experience – viz., 
that experience is homoeomerous down to very small durations. If experience is 
significantly anhomoeomerous like many of its sibling processes, all such arguments 
collapse. Someone who finds Dennett’s other assumptions plausible, but who finds the 
anti-realist conclusion unwelcome, should encounter welcome refuge in anhomoeomery. 
Indeed, if I am right, realism requires anhomoeomery. In the final section, I return briefly 
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to exegesis. I suggest that many of Dennett’s explicit claims about time and experience 
are in fact quite compatible with the account defended; where disagreement may lie is 
rather with Dennett’s quite independent views concerning phenomenal judgement (§10). 
 
3. Visual Masking 
 
Dennett offers a number of considerations designed to overturn our ‘intuitive’ or natural 
ways of thinking about experience in time.
144 Those which have, in my view rightly, 
garnered the most attention, involve appeals to psychological phenomena which arise at 
short timescales. Backward visual masking provides the simplest introduction. 
 
Backward visual masking is typically described as the reduction and even elimination in 
visibility of a target object, brought about by the presentation of a second masking object 
a short time after the presentation of the target. Enns and Di Lollo introduce the 
phenomenon as follows. 
 
[A] target that is highly visible when presented briefly by itself can be rendered 
completely invisible by the subsequent presentation of a non-target object in the same 
(or nearby) spatial location. ‘Backward masking’ of this kind has its strongest influence 
not when target and mask objects are presented simultaneously, as intuition might 
suggest, but rather when a brief temporal gap is inserted between the presentation of the 
target and the mask. (2000: 345) 
 
In metacontrast masking, a form of masking “which involves closely adjacent but non-
overlapping contours” (ibid.), a plot of visibility versus stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), 
i.e., the temporal gap between target and mask presentation times, gives a roughly U-
shaped curve, with visibility at its lowest at an ‘optimal’ SOA of about 50-100 ms. A 
wide-range of parameters are involved in determining this function and certain effects 
can be found in some paradigms with SOAs as long as 200-300ms. However, in what 
follows, we can focus on the following, highly simplified case.
145
                                                 
 
144 I do not discuss the other considerations Dennett brings to bear. Chalmers (1996: 360, fn.9 and 
references therein) offers powerful reasons for thinking that the realist should be unfazed by the arguments 
in Part Three of Consciousness Explained. 
145 Todd 2006 provides a useful introduction to masking as well as trenchant criticism of Dennett and 
Kinsbourne (1992a) for failing to consider the details and range of masking phenomena. 
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The case to be considered involves a brief (10ms) presentation to a subject of a disc, 
followed very shortly afterwards (SOA = 70ms) by a similarly brief presentation of a ring 
in the same location. The ring’s inner circumference is just larger than the disc’s 
circumference (as below) and both presentations are at constant luminance. 
 
First stimulus  Second, masking stimulus
 
 
As Dennett correctly notes, the standard understanding of backwards visual metacontrast 
masking in the literature is that “the second stimulus somehow prevents conscious experience 
of the first stimulus” (1991a: 142; his emphasis).
146 Certainly, this much seems true (and I 
assume that it holds in the set-up here in question), those subject to such an experiment 
consistently “swear that there was only one stimulus: the ring” (141).
147 In other words, if 
they are genuinely conscious of the ring, this is not something that they are in a position 
to attest to. 
 
Dennett notoriously suggests two rival accounts of masking phenomena, a Stalinist 
account and an Orwellian account. The Stalinist account claims that only the ring is 
                                                 
 
146 Alpern (1953) is typically credited with the first detailed examination of metacontrast masking. 
However, his results only indicate that the “brightness of a flash of light is reduced when it is followed by a 
second flash in an adjacent region of the field” (1953: 648). Dennett, although he cites Alpern, discusses a 
case of complete, first stimulus elimination masking. For such cases and for evidence that they are 
standardly interpreted in the way Dennett suggests, witness: “Some very efficient metacontrast masking 
conditions can be used even to completely block a visual test stimulus from accessing conscious 
perception: Metacontrast masking can be so strong that the test stimulus can no longer be discriminated 
and becomes invisible” (Ansorge and Heumann 2006: 62). See also Enns and Di Lollo 2000: 345 above 
and Todd 2006: 480 which talks of “the striking invisibility of the disc at optimal SOA”. 
147 Neumann and Klotz (1994) describe masked stimuli as “non-reportable”. Lachter et al. (2000) state, 
“With … backward masking observers claim no conscious experience of the first stimuli.” Todd (2006: 
481) avers that “at the optimal SOA the subject will report that [the target] is not visible”. 
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perceived and posits a delay in consciousness to explain the missing first disc; the 
Orwellian account eschews delay and instead claims that both disc and ring are perceived 
but the disc rapidly forgotten. Dennett then argues that there is nothing that can decide 
between these two accounts.  
 
Why might the seeming availability of these two accounts threaten anti-realism? A 
potentially helpful way to construct the argument is to exploit Wright’s notion of 
Cognitive Command. According to Wright a discourse about some given domain exerts 
Cognitive Command just if: 
 
It is a priori that differences of opinion formulated within the discourse, unless 
excusable as a result of vagueness in a disputed statement, or in the standards of 
acceptability, or variation in personal evidence thresholds, so to speak, will involve 
something which may be regarded as a cognitive shortcoming. (1992: 144) 
 
Very plausibly, realism concerning the domain of some discourse is committed to the 
discourse meeting this constraint. Thus, as Wright puts it, “show that a discourse lacks it 
and you will blow away with one stroke all conceivable forms of realist resistance” (148). 
In the case at hand, the question is whether a subject’s own discourse about their 
phenomenal stream exhibits Cognitive Command. In particular, we are interested in 
whether there can be (and what we should say about) differing accounts a subject might 
consider concerning their own mental life.
148
 
With the notion of Cognitive Command at hand, we can construct an anti-realist 
argument as follows. 
 
i.  Assumption: Cognitive shortcoming on the part of the subject of 
experience is ruled out a priori with respect to their own current 
experience.
149 
                                                 
 
148 Non-subjects will evidently exhibit cognitive short-coming given that they do not have the privilege of 
undergoing the stream in question. 
149 I consider what exactly ‘cognitive shortcoming’ amounts to shortly. I do not mean to suggest that we 
cannot make mistakes about our own, current stream of consciousness. 
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ii.  Thus, assuming Cognitive Command, competing accounts of a subject’s 
own phenomenology must also be ruled out a priori or excusable as a 
result of vagueness etc. 
iii.  But, competing accounts of a subject’s own phenomenology can be 
found which are not so excusable (i.e., Orwellian/Stalinesque accounts of 
the masking case). 
iv.  Thus, the assumption of Cognitive Command is false; discourse about 
the phenomenal does not exhibit Cognitive Command. 
v.  Hence, realism cannot be true. 
 
This reconstruction makes good sense of one standard response to Dennett. An 
exemplar is Tye (1993) who takes Dennett’s target to be what he calls Phenomenal 
Realism, “the view that there really is such a thing as phenomenal experience or 
consciousness, conceived of as distinct from judgement or belief” (1993: 893). As Tye 
reconstructs him, Dennett proceeds as follows. 
 
Dennett holds that if Phenomenal Realism is true, then there are two possible alternative 
accounts (one Orwellian and one Stalinesque) of the relationship of experience to belief 
or judgement. Since these accounts ultimately do not differ, according to Dennett, the 
conclusion he draws is that Phenomenal Realism is false. (894) 
 
To this Tye responds thus: 
 
[T]he defender of Phenomenal Realism will balk. Is there really no possible way for us to 
decide between the two accounts? And even if there were, would that establish that there 
was no genuine difference? After all, by hypothesis, the Orwellian account admits a very 
brief phenomenal experience of [the first disc] while the Stalinesque story does not. This 
looks like a pretty definite difference, whether or not we are ever smart enough to devise 
scientific experiments, the results of which favour (by standard scientific criteria) one 
account over the other. To deny that this is the case is to embrace old fashioned 
verificationism. And to this I am inclined to reply by modifying a remark of Mr. 
McCawber: “Verificationism! Foul play, sir! Take a drop more grog and you’ll get over 
the weakness of believing in verificationism.” (ibid.) 
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In other words, Tye rejects premise (i) and insists that cognitive shortcoming is perfectly 
possible with respect to one’s own current experience.
150
 
Now, as already noted, Dennett pleads guilty to verificationism as entirely appropriate in 
the ‘inner’ realm. Tye understands that special pleading in terms of Dennett’s identifying 
phenomenal seeming with judging or believing. Given that assumption, Orwellian and 
Stalinist accounts will, of course, collapse since the judgements made are the same 
according to both accounts. However, Tye now complains that such special pleading is 
simply to assert the falsity of Phenomenal Realism. 
 
The first major problem here is that, with this reasoning in place, Dennett’s main 
argument against Phenomenal Realism becomes redundant. For the defence of the 
second premise of that argument now rests on a claim which itself directly entails that 
Phenomenal Realism is false. The second obvious difficulty is that no advocate of the 
Orwellian or Stalinesque story would accept Dennett’s identification of phenomenal 
seeming with judging or believing. (895) 
 
I briefly return to Tye’s interpretation of Dennett in §10 below. For now, I want to draw 
on resources developed in Chapter Three, to show that a version of premise (i) which 
avoids identifying judging and seeming can be formulated, and should be endorsed. 
 
In Chapter Three, I suggested that it does not make sense to think of us as being ‘self-
blind’ to a genuinely conscious aspect of our experience. It makes no sense, I claimed, to 
think of there as being conscious, experiential properties which are simply beyond the 
ken of their subject. What I labelled Self-Intimation holds: If a subject is undergoing 
perceptual experience with a certain experiential property, then that subject is in a 
position to know that they are undergoing perceptual experience with that property 
simply in virtue of so undergoing. 
 
I acknowledged that subjects sometimes fail to exploit their evidential position (perhaps 
through inattention or irrationality). In such cases a subject’s judgements may come apart 
from how things genuinely seem to them. However, it is not plausible to hold that 
                                                 
 
150 See also Lycan (1992: 217) who complains, “Can’t we finally call a halt to these creaking verificationist 
arguments?” and many others, for example, Block (1993: 190) and Lee (2007: 364).  
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subjects in masking cases are systematically failing to exploit an evidential position that 
they are nonetheless in. There is no positive reason to think that subjects occupy such an 
evidential position. Nor do they fail any necessary condition for report, which would 
plausibly explain their lack of report despite the presence of conscious experience. The 
only plausible thing to say is that the only stimulus they are in a position to know about is 
the second stimulus, the ring. Given this, we can ground the standard presumption in the 
literature, viz., that subjects have no conscious awareness of the first stimulus disc, in an 
implicit commitment to Self-Intimation.
151 This kind of reasoning holds quite generally. 
Thus, Self-Intimation commits us to a version of premise (i) on which systematic cognitive 
shortcoming on the part of the subject of experience is ruled out a priori with respect to 
their own current experience.
152
 
Tye then cannot simply dismiss the anti-realist argument on the basis that it identifies 
judging and phenomenal seeming. If he wishes to reject premise (i) he must reject Self-
Intimation and cling on to his extremely strong Phenomenal Realism, which insists on 
the total mutual independence of self-consciousness and consciousness, i.e., allows that a 
subject can undergo phenomenal experience of some kind without being in any position 
to know about it. As Chapter Three made clear, that is a serious bullet for the realist to 
bite. 
 
                                                 
 
151 To this extent we will want to explain better than chance performance in forced-choice guessing as to 
whether one stimulus was presented or two by appealing to unconscious processing of the disc. See 
Dennett 1991a: 142. There is nothing especially problematic about this. 
152 As discussed in Chapter Three, strictly we should allow for occasions of having a certain experience 
where one is not in a position to know the nature of one’s experience despite the experience being of a 
kind such that knowledge of its nature is to be had solely in virtue of undergoing it. This raises the 
following challenge. Why not think that, in the masking case, subjects do enjoy disc-experience even 
though they aren’t in a position to know it and, moreover, think of the non-masked case precisely as an 
occasion where subjects enjoy experience of the same type (i.e., of a disc) but are in a position to know it? 
Two significant disanalogies with the cases discussed in Chapter Three show why this line of thought is not 
persuasive. In the cases in Chapter Three, margin for error principles were invoked on the basis that a 
single situation plausibly afforded two distinct kinds of experience, entailing that in such a situation one 
was always too close to having had another kind of experience to obtain knowledge. Here, in contrast, the 
suggestion is that one actually always experiences both disc and ring but is, for some unspecified reason, 
too close to an experience of a ring on its own to know what one experiences. Note firstly how, in the 
masking set-up, one actively judges that one only saw a ring, one does not simply withhold judgement on 
the basis that one cannot tell whether one’s experience is a disc-then-ring experience or a ring-alone 
experience. Secondly, note that no explanation of closeness seems available which would allow margin for 
error principles to get a grip; it is precisely not the case that the same situation affords both ring-alone 
experience as well as disc-then-ring experience. 
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Block (2007) argues forcefully for this kind of strong Phenomenal Realist picture and in 
doing so defends an Orwellian line. Block’s paper has received much criticism (as well as 
praise) so let me confine myself to just three very brief points. 
 
(i)  Block’s general view is that neurological considerations are weighty when it 
comes to reaching psychological conclusions. Be this as it may, his conclusion 
that we should think of consciousness as present whenever a given, local part 
of the visual system is activated, quite independently of the activation of 
cognitive systems, must seem perplexing to anyone who thinks of conscious 
experience as essentially a way of finding out about our environment – as a 
cognitive achievement of some kind. The idea of sufficient neural conditions, in 
principle independent of cognitive capacities, is tempting only insofar as this 
conception of conscious experience is rejected.
153 
(ii)  Sperling’s experiments (Sperling 1960) have long formed the basis of an 
objection to Self-Intimation type-theses – in addition to Block, see Dretske 
(2006) and Tye (2006).
154 However, in their original guise at least, they are 
subject to precisely the kinds of worries that I argue masking and apparent 
motion experiments face below (see §7f.).
155 To anticipate discussion to 
come, Sperling assumes that one’s visual experience of the grid will be the 
same irrespective of which tone is played immediately after the grid is 
displayed. If we reject homoeomery, this cannot be assumed, and so the 
partial reports cannot be summed as Sperling suggests. It may be that the 
events ‘grid-followed-by-high-tone’ and ‘grid-followed-by-low-tone’ are 
different events with different visual (as well as auditory) appearances. 
(iii)  The more recent developments of Sperling’s paradigm that Block discusses 
may avoid this concern to some extent, but they also introduce other 
                                                 
 
153 For Block’s conception see in particular his 1995. 
154 Sperling’s paradigm involves showing subjects a number of letters, say twelve, arranged in a rectangular 
grid. Asked to fill-in whole blank grids after the experiment, subjects consistently report approximately 
four letters in their correct positions (a finding which holds regardless of stimulus complexity). Sperling’s 
question was whether this “limit on the number of letters that can be correctly reported” was also a limit of 
visual representation. To test this he played a brief tone very shortly after the grid had ceased to be shown 
to participants. The pitch of the tone indicated to the subject which row was to be reported on. These 
partial reports were invariably accurate (assuming the row contained only three or four letters). Sperling’s 
conclusion was that this evidenced a visual representation of (almost) all  the letters – after all had a 
different tone been played after the grid was removed, subjects would have reported equally well. 
155 Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992a) very briefly allude to this. 
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complications.
156 As Byrne et al. (2007) note, their use by Block depends on 
closing a crucial gap between visible and informational persistence. However, 
Block only succeeds in closing the gap by appeal to a tendentious claim 
regarding what subjects report (and so see), viz., that, in Sperling-type 
experiments, for each and every determinate character in the grid, subjects 
are phenomenally conscious of it as such. As is often pointed out, it may well 
be that subjects are merely conscious of a twelve letter grid and only a few 
individual determinate letters as such.
157 
 
If the anti-realist (quite correctly in my view) insists on Self-Intimation, another 
consequence immediately arises, one that the realist might seize upon. For, although 
Dennett argues that there is nothing that can decide between Orwellian and Stalinesque 
accounts, in one respect the above discussion already has decided between the two 
accounts. For only the Stalinist account concurs that the first disc is not seen. In contrast, 
the Orwellian claims that the first disc is experienced but rapidly forgotten. In a sense 
this is right. I do not think that we need any “crucial experimental result” (Dennett 
1991a: 142) to settle the dispute. The court of introspection is quite sufficient to settle 
matters. However, this need not mean advocating Stalinism. So far we are only 
committed to one aspect of the Stalinist account, viz., that the first disc is not 
experienced in the masking scenario. In fact, I think that both accounts are mistaken; 
they represent a false dichotomy. 
 
Nonetheless, if the disc is not seen, this leaves us with a puzzle as to why Dennett holds 
that the realist is committed to the existence of competing accounts as opposed to simply 
endorsing Stalinism. The anti-realist can hardly appeal to Block-style considerations 
(persuasive or not), for they amount to a rejection of the picture developed in Chapter 
Three and in particular, of Self-Intimation. Since the anti-realist argument above relies on 
that picture,
158 Block-style considerations are quite out of place in pressing anti-realism. 
The best way to understand the dialectical situation, I suggest, is rather in terms of an 
Orwellian counter-argument, which attempts to show that the first disc must, after all, be 
perceived. We can then understand Stalinism as an attempt to preserve the invisibility of 
                                                 
 
156 I have in mind Landman et al. 2003 and Sligte et al. 2006, 2008. 
157 See, for example, Papineau 2007 on scene phenomenology. 
158 Or, rather, that picture stripped of its implicit realist bias, see below (§5). 
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the disc in the masking trial whilst acknowledging the central plank of the Orwellian challenge. A 
stand-off arises because the costs of Stalinism parallel the costs of Orwellianism. As I 
have said, my reply to all of this is that both positions are premised on a false 
assumption. 
 
4. The Orwellian Challenge 
 
The Orwellian challenge can be developed as follows. The Orwellian first notes 
something to which everyone agrees, namely, that, if no second stimulus had been 
presented to the subject in the above masking trial, then they would have seen (and been 
in a position to report) the first disc. However, given this, it seems that we face a 
dilemma. Either the first disc is seen in both cases or consciousness of the first disc is 
delayed by at least 70ms quite generally – allowing time for the second stimulus to ‘block’ 
the conscious presentation of the first.
159
 
The apparent dilemma is troubling. If the disc is seen, then the considerations relating to 
self-awareness above must be mistaken. On the other hand, a delay in consciousness of 
70ms (which is the full-blown Stalinist proposal) is implausible since, as Dennett puts it, 
“There is abundant evidence that responses under conscious control … occur with close 
to the minimum latencies (delays) that are physically possible” (122).
160 The Stalinist 
must, it seems, quarrel with this. He can do so by arguing that, what retrospectively seem 
to be conscious responses within such a temporal window, are in fact unconscious. But 
now, the attractiveness of the Stalinist’s initial move, viz., an endorsement of a picture of 
the mind which seems to be as it is, has been abandoned.  
 
In other words, the Orwellian dilemma seems to force us to reject a background picture 
of self-conscious awareness (according to which conscious properties are self-intimating 
and on which we cannot be systematically deluded about our own conscious lives). On 
                                                 
 
159 The precise time is not important for present purposes but it is clear that the delay would in fact need to 
be much longer. Optimal masking occurs with SOAs of up to 100ms. However, reduced visibility masking 
occurs with SOAs of up to 300ms and no less demands explanation. Indeed, as Todd (2006: 480) notes 
these effects are of “most theoretical interest to researchers”. Hence, the Orwellian argument can appeal to 
these longer times. What is important is that the delay posited is longer than seemingly consciously 
controlled response times (plus processing, preparation and pulse travel times) – see below.  
160 That this evidence is compelling is a large assumption, especially at this timescale. However, I propose 
to grant the implausibility to Dennett since I think we can vouchsafe realism even so granting. 
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the first horn, we must accept that the disc is seen, despite this being something that we 
cannot be aware of. On the second horn, we commit to a delay in conscious awareness, a 
commitment which turns out to involve a commitment to there being an aspect of our 
conscious lives about which we are systematically deluded. We consider rapid – but not 
reflex – responses to stimuli to be under our conscious control; we believe our actions to 
be grounded in conscious awareness of their instigating stimuli. Yet, although our inner 
lives appear like this, they are not in fact like this. We are systematically deceived that a 
certain range of our actions are responses grounded in conscious awareness of the world, 
despite this being a pure fiction. 
 
If we are wedded to the picture of self-consciousness developed in Chapter Three, we 
appear to be in an inescapable bind. For both the Stalinist and Orwellian accounts 
involve abandoning a core commitment of our understanding of our conscious lives. 
Having elaborated this predicament, Dennett (as here construed) in effect suggests that 
the culprit is Cognitive Command. It cannot, as premise (i) insists, be that subjects 
exhibit cognitive shortcoming in their inability to decide between the Orwellian and 
Stalinesque accounts; nor can the difference be put down to vagueness. Consequently, it 
seems that discourse about the phenomenal does not exhibit Cognitive Command and 
realism must be rejected. 
 
Put another way, our difficulties arise from a realist commitment to there being a matter 
of fact as to which account, Stalinesque or Orwellian, correctly describes our stream of 
consciousness, and further to the principle of Self-Intimation which declares that such a 
difference is always available to subjects. We can avoid contradiction if we deny that 
there is really any matter of fact as to which account is correct. I explore how this idea 
should be developed in the next section. 
 
5. Exploring Phenomenal Anti-Realism 
 
A passage often cited by critics looking for a confession of anti-realism in Dennett is the 
following. 
 
There is no such phenomenon as really seeming – over and above the phenomenon of 
judging in one way or another that something is the case. (1991a: 364) 
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We have already seen here that Tye takes this to amount to an “identification of 
phenomenal seeming with judging or believing” (1993: 895; my emphasis). Similarly, 
Carmen tell us that “Dennett’s eliminativist theory of consciousness rests on an 
implausible reduction of sensory seeming to cognitive judgement” (Carmen 2007: 99). 
We have also seen, however, that constitutive connections between phenomenal 
experiences and their representation (or how they seem to us) can be made out which 
allow for judgement to come apart from how things seem. In particular, Self-Intimation 
offers an understanding of how things seem in terms of a subject’s epistemic position 
whilst allowing for failures to exploit that position in judgement. However, Self-
Intimation is an unabashedly realist claim. It insists that subjects are positioned to know 
that they are undergoing a perceptual experience with certain properties in virtue of so 
undergoing. This asymmetric relation makes explicit the explanatory priority afforded to 
experience itself, conceived of as independent of and prior to a subject’s epistemic 
position. 
 
Martin gives voice to this way of thinking about the relation between consciousness and 
self-consciousness. 
 
It is not clear that we can quite conceive of the cognitive aspect [of our cognitive states 
of response to phenomenal consciousness] as other than awareness of one’s mind, and 
hence a form of, or ground for, knowledge. In which case, one could not be this way 
cognitively (i.e., with this range of judgements, formed in this way) without being self-
aware and self-knowing: phenomenal consciousness would have to be present. On this 
picture, although the facts about phenomenal consciousness obtain independently and prior to any 
facts about our knowledge of it, our introspective cognition of phenomenal consciousness 
need not be independent of that consciousness: seeming awareness of one’s conscious 
mind will always be genuine self-awareness. (Martin 2006: 377-8; my emphasis)161
 
Our perceptual awareness can easily be conceived as merely apparent awareness of the 
world. The senses that provide us with perceptual knowledge can, on occasion, fail to be 
                                                 
 
161 One should not assume that this applies to all cases of sensory awareness on Martin’s picture. For in the 
case of causally matching hallucinations it is not clear that he thinks of facts about phenomenal 
consciousness as being prior to epistemological facts. Here rather we seem to have a no priority view; see 
for example his 2004: 84 and below. 
 
 
133 
a route to such. In contrast, Martin suggests, our introspective awareness cannot ever be 
considered as merely apparent awareness. Nonetheless, as Martin describes the 
constitutive relation between self-awareness and phenomenal consciousness, it is firmly 
realist: “facts about phenomenal consciousness obtain independently and prior to any 
facts about our knowledge of it”. This, I suggest, is the core claim of phenomenal 
realism, and it is quite consistent with Self-Intimation. We might think of it like this: 
being in a conscious state brings with it the potential for knowledge that one is in that 
state. Thus, our epistemic situation is explained in terms of our experiential situation; 
experience is the ground of our epistemic position. 
 
Anti-realism is sometimes characterised as the denial that truth in some domain outstrips 
what it is warranted to assert in that domain or, following Wright, what is superassertibile in 
that domain, where a statement is superassertibile just if “it is, or can be, warranted and 
some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily 
extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information” (Wright 
1992: 48). Now, riding rough shod over the finer details, the above discussion suggests 
that, even for the realist, truths about a subject’s current phenomenal state never outstrip 
warranted assertibility.
162 Self-Intimation tells us, after all, that subjects are always in a 
position to know of, and so warrantedly assert concerning their conscious experience. 
 
Consequently, contrasting assertibility or superassertibility with truth does not serve to 
distinguish realism and anti-realism in this domain.
163 In that light, and following Wright 
(1992: 79), we might think that the place to look for guidance on how to frame and 
prosecute the realism/anti-realist debate is to the famous contrast pointed out by 
Socrates in the Euthyphro. Are certain acts pious because they are loved by the Gods, or 
do the Gods love certain acts because they are pious? As Wright notes, all parties to that 
debate agree that an act is pious iff it is loved by the Gods. Debate remains because one 
                                                 
 
162 One important complication arises from the discussion of disjunctivism above. According to the 
disjunctivist, it remains true that there can be no positive characterisation of our experience which outstrips 
warranted assertibility. However, for the disjunctivist, the attribution of presentational properties to 
experience in hallucinatory cases is warranted but false. The disjunctivist must therefore find some way of 
distinguishing between cases where the range of judgements is the same and yet their truth different. That 
can only be achieved by committing to a form of realism. This is perhaps not surprising. Indeed, below, I 
suggest a way in which our thinking about perception more generally does prejudice the debate in favour 
of realism. Nonetheless, for now, I grant that in the inner realm truth and warranted assertibility (or some 
such concept) line up. I do not want to argue from disjunctivism to realism. Even if that argument is 
perfectly sound, it is unlikely to have much suasive force in the current context. 
163 See Wright 1992: 78. 
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side insists that this biconditional holds because of a sensitivity that the Gods have to 
what is independently pious, whereas the other side insists that what the Gods think 
somehow constitutes piety. 
 
The contrast in direction of explanation is a place we might hope to locate the 
realist/anti-realist contrast with respect to the phenomenal. If this is right, we need to 
find a biconditional agreed upon by both parties. We can then consider which direction 
of explanation (if any) should have priority. As already noted, the bi-conditional cannot 
be Self-Intimation given its obvious realist bias. The Euthyphro question cannot for 
example be: is a property experiential because a subject is in a position to know of its 
instantiation just in virtue of undergoing the relevant experience, or is it because the 
property is experiential that the subject is in such a position? This formulation begs the 
question in favour of realism. Read in what might seem to be the anti-realist’s favoured 
direction, the claim is that experience’s having a certain experiential property can be 
explained in terms of what a subject is in a position to know in virtue of undergoing that 
experience. But here the cognitive state which is supposed to be explanatorily prior turns 
out to be one which obtains only in virtue of undergoing a certain experience. Yet our 
only grip on which experience is in question comes via the experiential property in 
question which the experience is claimed to have. Thus, it transpires that the cognitive 
state is not explanatorily prior after all.
164
 
The obvious remedy here is to include experiences themselves in the biconditional. Thus, 
 
A subject S is undergoing a course of experience with experiential property P just 
if S is in a position to know that they are undergoing experience with P. 
 
This avoids the objection above, but a second worry remains because of the use of the 
verb ‘to know’ in the formulation. To invoke knowledge may appear to beg the question 
in favour of the realist since it implicitly brings with it the notion of justification. 
However precisely we answer the question, ‘What is it to know that p?’ it is hard to avoid 
the idea that it involves being justified in believing that p, even if that justification is not 
available to one, or is not characterizable independently of knowledge. Above I suggested 
                                                 
 
164 Note how in the Euthyphro case all parties implicitly agree on a piety-independent mode of identifying acts. 
This is an implicit agreement we might well challenge. 
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that, what justified introspective judgements, was simply having the relevant experience. 
However, the anti-realist cannot say this since the subject’s knowledge is supposed to be 
explanatorily prior to the experience. Yet without experience as the source of 
justification, it is hard to see where justification might come in. Whether or not that is a 
worry in itself (a point briefly discussed in the next section), it is certainly a worry if our 
formulation simply helps itself to the notion of knowledge. 
 
The remedy is to remove the offending verb. Thus, the anti-realist will ultimately endorse 
a biconditional of the following form. 
 
A subject S is undergoing a course of experience with experiential property P just 
if S represents it as though they are undergoing experience with P. 
 
A biconditional of this form can generate a Euthyphro debate since it admits of two 
understandings. The realist will claim it holds because subjects undergoing experience 
with the relevant phenomenal property are thereby in a position to judge that they are. 
The anti-realist will claim that the biconditional holds because the subject’s 
representation of their mental life constitutes what it is to have experience of a given 
phenomenal kind.
165
 
So construed, phenomenal anti-realism is a quite general doctrine about the experiential. 
However, the arguments I am concerned with, i.e., those of Dennett (1991a: Chs.5-6) 
and Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992a), arguably speak only to anti-realism about certain 
aspects of our experience, in particular, temporal features of experience. If successful, they 
only directly motivate an anti-realist reading of the biconditional with respect to these 
experiential properties. Thus, in the first instance, they serve to establish only an instance 
of a general view, which Dennett then proceeds to defend. This is not to say that no 
spreading argument can be provided. For example consider Anthony. 
 
                                                 
 
165 Here compare Kant’s view that “every advance of perception, no matter what the objects may be, 
whether appearances or pure intuitions, is nothing but an extension of the determination of inner sense” 
(2003: A210). As Martin (1998a: 119) notes, it is not obvious that we need to understand Kant here in 
terms of a perceptual model of inner sense (despite the connotations of that way of speaking). That is, of 
course, not to claim that we should not attribute an inner sense model to Kant; there is undoubtedly 
evidence in favour of such an attribution. 
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[A first] interpretation [of Dennett and Kinsbourne] takes them as straight-forwardly 
denying that conscious experiences are temporally located, that they begin, persist for 
some interval, and end. Clearly this interpretation leads directly to eliminativism, given 
materialistic assumptions. For every physical state, event, process, and so on, is temporally 
located in this sense. If there exist conscious states and processes, therefore, they are as 
well. (1992: 201-2) 
 
In the context of Dennett’s materialism, Anthony sees no way of stopping at a mere 
temporal anti-realism. If this is right, beginning with temporal issues is a dialectically 
excellent choice of starting point for Dennett, if his larger ambition is the defence of a 
quite general phenomenal anti-realism. 
 
Anthony’s interpretation is questionable. Dennett holds that experiences are 
informational/neural states or events. Therefore, there is no question of their lacking 
temporal properties. There is the question, however, of whether those properties are 
relevant from a psychological point of view; in other words, of whether these properties 
of such events are to be thought of as conscious. In that light, temporal anti-realism can be 
conceived of as the view that there is nothing more to a particular neural event being 
conscious at t1 as opposed to t2 than when that event is represented as being conscious. The 
timing the event is represented as having is quite independent of the time of its neural 
tokening.
166 Consequently, temporal anti-realism is (at least, prima facie) quite compatible 
with other aspects of the stream of consciousness obtaining independently and prior to 
their recording as such. 
 
A spreading argument can be found if one thinks that experiences, if they exist at all, are 
essentially  dynamic events in the stream of consciousness. If that is right, then an 
insistence that the dynamic nature of such events must be construed in anti-realist 
fashion entails that an anti-realist account has to be given of experience itself. If there is 
nothing more to experiential time-structure than the structure recorded in working 
memory, that rules out there being experiences as understood by the realist, since the 
realist’s experiences must essentially have a time-structure conceived of as distinct from a 
mere record of such. 
                                                 
 
166 Cf. “…content-fixations in the brain are precisely locatable in both space and time, but their onsets do 
not mark the onset of consciousness of their content” (Dennett 1991a: 113). 
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Dennett and Kinsbourne clearly do intend a general conclusion, noting that, though they 
concentrate first of all on temporal features, their ‘Multiple Drafts’ model applies to all 
features of subjective experience. However, it is quite possible to defend a restricted 
form of anti-realism about certain features of experience. In particular, one might defend 
temporal anti-realism, a view that we have seen anticipated in the discussion of film and 
again in the discussion of §1 of this chapter.  
 
In the next section, I suggest that even if we think that full-blown phenomenal anti-
realism is a deeply unattractive view, restricted forms of anti-realism need taking far more 
seriously. Quite what that restriction should be is unclear. Dennett presents his 
arguments as concerned with temporal features of the stream of consciousness, 
considering them to provide the best case for the anti-realist. However, the cases he 
considers also, arguably, testify in favour of anti-realism about related aspects of spatial 
and colour phenomenology (e.g. the presence of a masked stimulus or colour change). I 
focus just on temporal features for two reasons. Firstly, such a focus provides a relatively 
simple and well-motivated restriction with which to appreciate the theoretical lie of the 
land, even if the restriction is, in the end, less clear cut. Secondly, the basic phenomenon 
in all the cases that Dennett adduces does seem to be a broadly temporal one. Even 
where the fact to be given an anti-realist interpretation concerns the presence of, say, a 
spatial feature, as opposed to the temporal ordering of  certain events, what motivates 
the anti-realist interpretation ultimately comes down to a question of ‘settling contents’ 
into temporal structures. Thus, my interest in the next section is to further motivate 
temporal anti-realism and so show why the realist urgently needs to resist Dennett’s 
arguments as I do in §§7-9. That said, the resistance mounted in §§7-9 in no way depends 
on accepting this line of thought. 
 
6. Pursuing the Debate 
 
Given a neutral bi-conditional of the above form, how might the debate be moved 
forward? This section tentatively sketches a number of approaches, noting how the 
temporal anti-realist has much more to say in response to standard realist objections than 
the full-blown phenomenal anti-realist. 
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One idea floated by Wright is to consider whether “the decidability of the statements in 
question [is] assured only as a matter of contingency or – closely relatedly – whether the 
coincidence of truth with superassertibility within the discourse [is] something that could 
be known only a posteriori” (1992: 81). This is a bad idea in the current context. The 
biconditional (if it holds) is arguably something that we can know a priori insofar as that 
test is a clear one in this context. But it is hardly plausible to think that this provokes a 
crisis for the realist. As Wright is well aware, 
 
Even in cases where decidability is guaranteed a priori – for instance, statements 
describing one’s own sensations … – there ought to be space for a contrast between the 
thought that truth-conferring states of affairs are necessarily detectable by an appropriate 
subject, and the thought that they are, rather conceptually grounded in the judgements of 
such a subject. (1992: 82)167
 
Thus, as Wright puts it, for the realist the appropriate 
 
line of attack would [in fact: must] be to show that, even though extensional divergence 
[of truth from superassertibility] is excluded a priori, it is proper to think of the truth of a 
statement of the discourse in question as the explanatory ground of its superassertibility 
(1992: 143) 
 
In pursuit of this strategy, realists are likely to make three broad objections to anti-
realism. First, the realist might insist that, pre-theoretically, we find it quite obvious that 
our phenomenal judgements are grounded in, or rationalised by, the subjective character 
of our experience. ‘Why did you judge that you were having an experience as of a tiger?’ 
‘Because I was having such an experience – and I know what that’s like!’  ‘Why did you 
judge that your bone felt broken?’ ‘Well, because it did feel broken.’ In contrast to this 
natural picture, the full-blown anti-realist must claim that we simply find ourselves 
inclined to judge in certain ways without being able to offer any reasoned explanation 
why we so judged. Not so the temporal anti-realist. The reason is that the temporal anti-
                                                 
 
167 Later Wright remarks that the Euthyphronist is committed to the necessitation of the biconditional. In 
contrast, if detectivism [realism] is right, “it seems that it ought to be a possibility that the causal order be 
so constituted that opinions formed under the conditions which, as things are, ensure that they track the 
facts, might not have done so” (1992: 112). Thus, “at least a potentially sufficient condition for the 
propriety of the detectivist view” is that the biconditional is “at best contingently true”. Merely sufficient, 
however, given that this possibility is not one we will wish to countenance in the inner realm (see above). 
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realist can appeal to non-temporal features of experience in order to ground the 
phenomenal judgements in question. This was the approach introduced in §1 of this 
chapter in relation to duration judgements. Moreover, in light of that discussion, the 
temporal anti-realist can cite duration judgements as demonstrative of the coherence of 
such an approach. That is not to disagree with the realist’s thought that realism is our 
natural, default view. It is, however, to counter the impression that the temporal anti-
realist has nothing to say regarding the basis for our temporal phenomenal judgements. 
 
Second, the realist might argue that the anti-realist has no obvious way of explaining why 
only some properties and events figure in our experience. Hearing a cuckoo or feeling a 
lover’s touch are experiential events, digesting a tuna sandwich or repairing damaged skin 
cells (typically) are not. Whence the difference? According to the realist, the answer is 
that the former are events with phenomenal properties. It is hard to see what the anti-
realist can say other than once more, and rather unsatisfactorily, that we simply find 
ourselves making judgements with some contents and not others. The temporal anti-
realist is able to provide a more convincing reply. The reply appeals to the existence of 
non-temporal phenomenal properties (construed in a realist manner) in combination 
with the unobjectionable notion of autobiographical memory. According to the anti-
realist account, temporal properties are introduced into the representation of the stream 
of consciousness to make sense of the experiential contents that we find ourselves 
with.
168 For example, in apparent motion cases, we find ourselves with an experience of a 
disc in place A, in addition to one of a similar disc in place B. Our autobiographical 
memory then constructs the fiction that we experienced one and the same disc moving 
from A to B (perhaps changing as it does) to account for these multiple contents. In 
addition to properties conceived of in a realist manner, properties introduced in this 
manner are the subject matter of phenomenal judgements. However, only a very 
restricted range of properties are introduced in this manner, providing the required 
demarcation principle. 
 
A third and final objection to phenomenal anti-realism questions how the anti-realist can 
handle the misjudgements of the insane or chronically inattentive, or simply judgements 
                                                 
 
168 For the Dennettian, presumably the contents are those in working memory and the structuring is a 
matter of what gets written into short-term autobiographical memory. For a Kantian, presumably the 
structuring is a matter of synthesis over all experiences. This vastly more complex task is possible only 
because of the kind of principles established in the Analogies.  
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made for absolutely no reason at all. The realist thinks of such cases as resulting from 
failures to exploit the evidential position that experience puts one in, independently of 
particular judgements. In contrast, the full-blown anti-realist must introduce some kind 
of optimality condition to rule out ‘ungrounded’ inclinations to judge from being 
constitutive of ‘genuine’ phenomenal episodes. However, it is far from clear that 
optimality conditions are available, which succeed in ruling out bad cases and ruling in 
good cases without trivialising the anti-realist’s thesis (and without committing the 
conditional fallacy). Unless some story is provided here, full-blown phenomenal anti-
realism remains a promissory note.
169 However, though this is a serious concern for the 
full-blown anti-realist, the temporal anti-realist may freely appeal to non-temporal 
experiential features to explain misjudgements. Indeed, the Dennettian argument above 
claims to find failures of Cognitive Command, which are inexplicable on the realist 
account, but explained easily by the temporal anti-realist in terms of multiple narratives 
based on the same non-temporal contents. Thus, not only does the temporal anti-realist 
have an answer here; they also have a powerful rejoinder. Whatever our final verdict on 
the rejoinder, temporal anti-realism once again appears at least superficially coherent and 
defensible when put under pressure by the realist. 
 
Aside from raising concerns about the coherence of the anti-realist’s view, can the realist 
do anything positive to press his position? Wright’s most appetising offering for the 
realist is the following. 
 
Where it is possible, without mention of human judgement or the conditions under 
which, in the case in question, such judgement would be best, either fully to analyse, or 
at least to draw attention to the general characteristics of the truth-conferring states of 
affairs in such a way that it is a consequence that there is an a priori guarantee that best 
opinion will be on track, then it is appropriate to think in terms of infallibility. Where it 
is not, … then the notion of (partial) extension-determination has its proper place. 
(1992: 124) 
 
                                                 
 
169 Note how a form of anti-realism or response-dependency concerning properties like that of being 
stylish or fashionable seems in better shape in this respect. In those cases scope for reasons might be 
argued to enter by way of the community. Thus, we might evidence the claim that kitten heels are en vogue 
by watching people on The King’s Road, reading Cosmopolitan, or by consulting Anna Wintour. No such 
options exist with respect to our own experience. I cannot consider what other people’s experience is like, 
read a text book, or consult an expert; I am the only expert. 
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Now we need not think quite in terms of infallibility for this test to be appropriate. The 
key point is that in a case where it is a priori that a neutral biconditional holds, the above 
test may provide traction on the Euthyphro debate. So, let us ask, where the truth 
conferring states in question are phenomenal episodes, can we “draw attention” to their 
general characteristics in such a way as to avoid mentioning judgement? Let us focus on 
perceptual experiences as we have done elsewhere. 
 
Reaching out to the Nagelian idea that such episodes contribute to what, subjectively, it 
is like to be the subject may not appear helpful. That phrase seems closely connected to a 
subject’s epistemic position. As such it may appear to favour the anti-realist side of the 
debate. However, as Martin (1998b) points out, when we characterise perceptual 
experiences we typically reach for objective qualities in order to identify what the episode is 
like. Thus, we describe how we are enjoying the blueness of the ocean or the creaminess 
of the butter. Taking this datum seriously has led many to claim that the subjective 
qualities of our experience (what it is like to undergo our experience) are, in part, 
constituted by objective features in the world (or perhaps the representation of such). Put 
another way, this tradition thinks of perceptual experience as a subjective perspective on 
an objective world.
170
 
If this tradition is right, we can draw attention to general characteristics of the truth 
conferring states of affairs without invoking judgement. We achieve that by identifying 
such episodes as presentations of mind-independent features to subjects. The idea here 
is, prima facie, most congenial to the naïve realist, according to whom the character of 
such states is literally constituted by certain mind-independent features (certain scenes). 
If we accept realism about the external world and the idea that perceptual episodes are 
literally relations between subjects and that world, materials are in play to secure a grip on 
experience, independent of judgement. Perceptual experience can be given a basic, 
judgement-independent characterisation as a relation to mind-independent particulars 
and their aspects. The perspectival nature of that relation can then be held to explain why 
subjects are positioned to know that they stand in it when they do, hence the apriority of 
the biconditional. In this way, the realist can pass Wright’s test. 
 
                                                 
 
170 Cf. Soteriou 2005. 
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As already noted, there is an obvious worry here for the naïve realist. Hallucinations are 
not episodes that involve mind-independent entities as literal constituents. Rather, 
according to Martin, causally matching hallucinations at least must be characterised in 
purely epistemic terms, as states that are not knowably not veridical perceptions of a 
certain kind. Evidently, hallucinations so treated dramatically fail Wright’s test. Thus, 
realism about hallucinations looks untenable. There are two options here. Either one can 
insist on naïve realism and accept the rejection of realism as applied to hallucinations. 
This need not necessarily involve claiming the opposite direction of explanatory priority; 
instead one might deny that any direction of explanation takes priority in such cases (an 
assumption Wright is rightly criticised for ignoring).
171 Alternatively, one might deny the 
naïve realist’s literal constitution claim and insist that a representationalist construal of 
the perspectivity datum according to which the character of perceptual experience is 
determined by represented features will do duty here. Consideration of the merits and 
demerits of that choice is well beyond the scope on this discussion. 
 
Let me sum up. Our naïve picture of mind involves a stream of consciousness conceived 
of in realist terms. Moreover, a widely held view in the philosophy of perception, namely, 
that experience is a perspective on a mind-independent world, provides a way of gaining 
a judgement-independent grip on perceptual experience, thereby passing Wright’s 
proposed test for detectivism/realism in the Euthyphro debate. In this light, I suggest that 
realism is rightly regarded as our default view in the sense that no-one would be inclined 
to accept an anti-realist view unless they hadn’t seen how to answer certain kinds of 
argument. Nonetheless, in the temporal case, the realist precisely appears to lack an 
answer to Dennett’s challenge. Moreover, a restricted temporal anti-realism appears to be 
a coherent alternative view which explains what is going on in the cases Dennett directs 
us to. Should we abandon our default, naïve view? 
 
7. A Different Diagnosis 
 
I am a realist. But I also think we should insist on the idea that it makes no sense to think 
of there being conscious, experiential properties which are simply beyond the ken of 
their subject. Likewise, I think we should insist that subjects cannot be systematically in 
                                                 
 
171 For that view see Martin 2004: 84. 
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error about their own conscious lives. How then can one avoid Dennett’s argument? In 
defending his Multiple Drafts model Dennett suggests the following challenge, giving his 
preferred response. 
 
Should we insist that the disc was experienced because if the ring hadn’t intervened the disc 
would have been reported? That would be to make the mistake of supposing that we 
could “freeze-frame” the film in the Cartesian Theatre and make sure that the disc frame 
really did make it into the Theatre before the memory of it was obliterated by later 
events. (1991a: 142) 
 
I want to suggest that there is an insight here, which can be achieved outside of the 
Multiple Drafts model and without embracing any form of anti-realism. 
 
It is not uncommon to conceive of our stream of consciousness on analogy with a series 
of photographic frames.
172 The real point of that analogy in this context is to draw 
attention to the supposed fact that experience can be analysed (metaphysically speaking) 
into a series of instantaneous (or near-instantaneous) ‘frames’ or ‘slices’ – that is 
presentations or representations at an instant, each logically independent of all others. 
Call this principle (following Miller 1984) the Strong Principle of Simultaneous 
Awareness (PSA). 
 
Strong PSA Irreducibly temporal facts have no place in explanations of sameness 
and difference across experiences. Present tense psychological facts are necessary 
and sufficient to explain any sameness or difference between conscious episodes. 
 
The idea behind this principle is that we can say everything we want to say about 
experience in terms of a series of independent instantaneous representations or 
presentations that together constitute our stream of consciousness. 
 
I re-introduce and discuss this principle, its origins and motivation more fully and in its 
more usual context in the next chapter. For now, note how Strong PSA is tantamount to 
the view that experience is homoeomerous down to instants (or brief durations). To say 
that a process is homoeomerous, recall, is to deny that any stretch has temporal sub-parts 
                                                 
 
172 Dennett sometimes also uses the metaphor of railcars travelling along a track. Similar points apply. 
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whose nature depends constitutively on facts about the nature of the process before 
and/or after the particular temporal part in question. This is just to deny that irreducibly 
temporal facts have any place in explaining the nature of the stream. To work towards 
the thought in the terms favoured in Chapter Four, consider that if experience is 
homoeomerous, then, if a subject is experiencing over some duration, over any sub-
duration the subject will have experienced, i.e. had an experience, where the nature of that 
experience is constitutively independent of facts about surrounding experience. If a 
subject has so experienced (had such an experience) over some tiny duration, we can 
enquire about the nature of that achievement in isolation from subsequent experience, 
accounting for its similarity to and differences from other experiences in terms of facts 
local to the time of the experience. This precisely what Strong PSA claims can be done 
(either as applied to instants or at least to very short durations). 
 
If we accept this picture, then we will think it an appropriate question to ask of any 
instant in the flow of the stream of consciousness, ‘What is represented at that moment?’ 
where the answer to this question will not depend in any way on what is represented at 
surrounding instants – just as we might stop a reel of film and enquire what image is 
currently in the projector, a question we should be able to answer without concerning 
ourselves with recent or forthcoming images. 
 
In particular, if we accept Strong PSA, we will think it is appropriate to ask of any instant 
during a visual masking experiment: ‘What is represented at that moment?’ where the 
answer to this question does not depend in any way on what is represented at 
surrounding moments. I now argue that if we do not accept a principle like Strong PSA, 
i.e., if we deny that experience is analysable down to instantaneous representations or 
very brief intervals (homoeomery), we can escape the predicament into which Dennett 
corners the realist.
173
 
Consider two trials of the masking experiment. On the first trial the only stimulus 
presented is a single disc. The subject reports seeing the disc. On the second trial the 
                                                 
 
173 I argue in Chapter Six that we must reject Strong PSA if we are to provide an account of temporal 
experience. However, that argument is not independent of the issue of realism since it assumes a 
transparency thesis premised on the acceptance of realism. To this extent one should see the concerns as 
interlocking; a mistaken commitment to Strong PSA is the root evil behind many seemingly unrelated 
philosophical problems concerning time and perception. 
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same stimulus disc is presented but on this occasion a masking ring is presented 70ms 
after the first disc. The subject reports seeing only the masking ring. 
 
It seems extremely natural to graph the situation in the first trial as follows. The stimulus 
is presented at time t0; the subject then sees the disc at some later instant, t0 + δt. The 
naturalness of this picture prompts us to ask: ‘What does the subject see at t0 + δt in the 
second trial?’ The above discussion of Orwellianism versus Stalinism suggests two 
options. Either δt is a very short period (perhaps just enough for light to reach the eyes 
and for the requisite visual processing), in which case the subject sees the disc at t0 + δt 
but shortly forgets about it afterwards (Orwellianism). Alternatively, δt is a longer period 
(70ms or more) – enough time for the disc to be ‘processed out’ by subsequent 
processing of the ring. In this case, the subject does not see the disc (Stalinism). 
 
However, this natural way of thinking implicitly assumes that we can legitimately ask 
what is true at some instant of experience – t0 + δt – without taking into account the 
nature of the subject’s experience at any subsequent times. That would be legitimate if 
experience were analysable down to instants, i.e., if Strong PSA were true. What if 
instead Strong PSA is false and experience is not so analysable? What if experience is 
anhomoeomerous and we cannot assume that what is true at some moment holds true 
independently of what is true over surrounding intervals of experience? 
 
If we reject Strong PSA, then in thinking about visual masking we have no reason to 
assume that what is perceived at t0 + δt must be the same across trials. If there are no 
truths concerning instants of experience which hold independently of what is true during 
the surrounding interval of experience, then at a minimum there is no reason to assume 
that the experiential presence of a mask subsequent to the first stimulus is irrelevant to 
answering the question whether the first stimulus is perceived.
174 So, whilst it is true that 
if the ring hadn’t intervened, the disc would have been reported, this has no bearing on 
the case where the ring was present. ‘Has one seen the disc at t?’ (where t is a moment 
briefly after the presentation) is not a question that one can answer independently of 
                                                 
 
174 The independence here is from surrounding visual experience but this restriction might be lifted. It 
seems plausible that the whole unified stream of consciousness is anhomoeomerous as evidenced by cross-
modal phenomena.  
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one’s experience during the surrounding period of time. To assume that it must be is to 
insist that experience is analysable down to instants or at least very short periods. 
 
If we reject Strong PSA, we can escape the Orwellian/Stalinist stand-off. Note that we 
began that discussion by establishing that the disc does not register on consciousness in 
the second, masking trial. To this the Orwellian objected that such lack of awareness 
could only be explained by positing an implausible slack in consciousness. The Stalinist 
accepted this slack and its unwelcome consequences. If we reject Strong PSA, we can 
avoid Stalinism whilst maintaining that the disc does not register on consciousness in the 
second, masking trial. For note how the Orwellian objection to this proceeded. First, it 
was correctly asserted that a disc would have been seen had it not been for the mask. It 
was then asserted as a consequence that, either the disc was seen in the masking trial 
(Orwellianism) or, alternatively, that there was a slack in consciousness (Stalinism). But 
this exhaustive disjunction only follows if we assume that some present tense fact at t0 + 
δt must distinguish the masking trial from the unmasked, single stimulus case if the 
situation is not to be exactly the same.
175
 
This is precisely to assume Strong PSA. A picture of experience analysable into 
independent instants would commit us to such a view. For then we could not appeal to 
the nature of subsequent experience (an irreducibly temporal fact) to distinguish the disc 
case (first trial) from the no disc case (second trial) unless there was sufficient delay in 
consciousness for unconscious registering of the second stimulus to come into play. 
However, if we have rejected this picture of experience we have no reason to endorse the 
disjunction. And so we have no reason to follow the argument which causes problems 
for the simple view that we do not see the disc. We do not, in particular, need to embroil 
ourselves in positing delays in consciousness, and unconscious acts which appear to us to 
be conscious. 
 
 
                                                 
 
175 When I talk of ‘present tense facts’ I intend to contrast ‘irreducibly temporal facts’ – facts whose truth 
logically depends on states obtaining at times other than the present instant. Purely present tense facts 
merely causally depend (if at all) on states obtaining at times other than the present instant. Cf. Kripke 
1978: Lecture V. 
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8. Apparent Motion 
 
The committed anti-realist may remain unimpressed with this discussion of visual 
masking. Masking is not, after all, Dennett’s central example. I focused on masking 
because the case is simple and serves to exhibit the key features of the realist defence. I 
now want to turn briefly to Dennett’s chosen case. I show how the defence applies there 
in equal measure.
176 I then turn to objections to the account set-out. First, a number of 
complications need addressing. 
 
8.1 The Varieties of Apparent Motion 
 
Dennett introduces his central case, calling it ‘phi’ (φ) as follows: 
 
if two or more small spots separated by as much as 4 degrees of visual angle are briefly 
lit in rapid succession, a single spot will move back and forth (1991a: 114) 
 
In fact, when one turns ‘on’ two white discs against a dark background in succession, a 
number of distinct phenomena can be observed. When the succession is relatively slow 
(above 200ms), there is no illusion. Ceteris paribus, one sees (veridically) two stationary 
discs turning on and off in succession. At the other extreme (less than 30ms) one sees 
what appear to be two simultaneously presented stationary discs. However, in between 
three possibilities need to be distinguished (see table below). In sum we have the 
following ordering: succession – partial apparent movement – optimal apparent 
movement (β) – pure apparent motion (φ) – simultaneity.
177
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
176 The considerations of this chapter also apply to a potentially large number of other cases – some 
mentioned by Dennett, for example the cutaneous ‘rabbit’ (Geldard and Sherrick 1972), some not, for 
example, repetition blindness (Kanwisher 1987). See also the brief discussion of Sperling’s visual display 
experiments above. 
177 For an online demonstration see http://www2.psych.purdue.edu/Magniphi/. 
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Type of apparent motion  Inter-Stimulus Interval  Phenomenology 
None >  c.200msec  Succession 
Partial or dual apparent 
motion 
c.60msec – 200msec  Two white discs, each apparently 
moving a short distance from its 
actual location. 
Optimal apparent motion, 
Wertheimer’s β 
c.50 – 60msec  A single white disk moving back 
and forth between the actual 
locations of the two disc. 
Pure apparent motion, 
Wertheimer’s φ 
c.30 – 50 msec  Two  stationary  flickering  discs 
with a contourless (‘shadow’, 
‘cloud’ or ‘flag-like’) region with 
the colour of the background 
moving between and slightly 
around them in counterphase to 
the turning on/off of the discs. 
None  < c.30msec  Apparent simultaneity 
 
What Wertheimer called ‘φ’ in 1912 is a striking phenomenon. As Kai von Fieandt’s puts 
it, one observes 
 
[A] peculiar phenomenal motion … an objectless movement, or ‘pure motion’ as 
Wertheimer described it. Without seeing any moving objects of figures, there [is] a clear 
impression of motion from one place to the other. (1966: 263; quoted in Steinmann et al. 
2000: 2259, fn.3) 
 
However, this is not a description of Dennett’s chosen case. In passing, Dennett suggests 
that “there is an intermediate range of intervals where the phenomenology is somewhat 
paradoxical: you see the spots as two stationary flashers and as one thing moving!” 
(1991a: 123). This is closer to φ. However, Dennett suggests this occurs at intervals 
between succession and optimal apparent movement and, moreover, that the 
phenomenology is of a spot of the same kind as the stationary spots moving. None of 
this fits with φ.
 178
                                                 
 
178 For a fascinating discussion of these issues and the sources of this long-standing confusion in the 
literature see Steinmann et al. 2000. 
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In any case, it is quite clear that Dennett’s interest is in β and that shall be my concern 
for the rest of the discussion. However, the distinction is important. In particular, there 
may well be issues concerning how one should make sense of the notion of ‘objectless 
movement’ that require consideration in the literature. 
 
8.2 Dennett’s Chosen Case  
 
Dennett considers the following case of β-apparent motion. Two discs, the first red, the 
second green are turned on for 150ms each in succession separated by a 50ms interval 
(i.e., SOA = 200ms), as below.
179
 
t = 0 – 
150ms 
t = 200 – 
350ms 
 
 
The results of such experiments, according to Dennett, are as follows: 
 
The first spot seem[s] to begin moving and then change colour abruptly in the middle of 
its illusory passage toward the second location (1991a: 114) 
 
Assuming that subjects are not primed, and each disc is only turned on once (repeated 
cycles allow for explanations in terms of expectation), the reports of subjects raise a 
                                                 
 
179 See Kolers and von Grünau 1976. This paper simply talks of apparent motion (as opposed to β). 
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problem. Put crudely, ‘How does the brain know that the second disc will be green 
before it is too late?’ (i.e., before the subject is already simply perceiving a stationary 
green disc). The problem is especially vivid in the coloured case, but it is not important 
that the discs are coloured. If one simply flashes a white disc on a black screen, there will 
be no perception of movement. However, if one flashes two discs in rapid enough 
succession, optimal apparent movement occurs. But the same question arises here: ‘How 
does the brain know that the second disc will flash before it is too late?’ (i.e., before it is 
already simply perceiving the second disc stationary, at its actual location). 
 
8.3 Stalin and Orwell Revisited 
 
Dennett now sets out the familiar Orwellian versus Stalinist dialectic. According to the 
Stalinist we do genuinely enjoy experience as of a disc moving across the screen, 
changing colour half way across. This is what subject’s insist they see, and they should 
know. 
 
Two familiar considerations then motivate the puzzle. Had there been no second, green 
disc, the subject would not have experienced any illusory motion at all. Consider then the 
moment in this single stimulus case when a subject ceases to see the first disc any more, t 
= 150ms + δt. Assuming that there are such things as truths about instants or brief 
intervals in the stream of consciousness which hold independently of truths about 
intervals of experience we have two options as to what to say about the analogous 
moment in the β-case. On the one hand, we can say that conscious experience is delayed 
by a time sufficient for our brains to have processed information about whether or not 
there is a second disc before we experience the apparent motion (or lack of it).
180 This is 
Stalinism. On the other hand, we can deny that we see apparent motion in either case 
and claim that it is merely a fiction of our memory that we do.
181 This is Orwellianism. In 
                                                 
 
180 Dennett assumes that the relevant slack must be at least 200ms (see his 1991a: 121). However, his logic 
only holds if subjects report the disc as moving from the very beginning. Without this unwarranted 
assumption the lowest possible slack will be fixed by the inter-stimulus interval not the SOA, i.e., at 50-
60ms. That said, dual apparent motion raises similar considerations with an inter-stimulus interval of up to 
200ms so Dennett’s figure may after all be correct. Of course, precise figures are an empirical matter. 
(Note that the related cutaneous ‘rabbit’ illusion occurs with inter-stimulus intervals of up to 200ms.) 
181 “You say and believe that you saw the illusory motion and colour change, but that is really a memory 
hallucination, not an accurate recollection of your original consciousness” (1991a: 121). 
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response to this line of thought, exactly parallel points can be made as were made in the 
masking case. 
 
9. Naturalism 
 
A reader sympathetic to Dennett might well object to the above accounts as follows: 
Even granting that experiential instants and brief intervals are not independent of each 
other, your account is incompatible with a plausible naturalistic account of our mental 
lives. After all, Dennett’s argument rests only on denying backwards causation and not 
on metaphysical claims about the homoeomerous nature of experience or Strong PSA . 
 
Certainly we should agree that experience is a part of the causal order. Experiential time 
cannot simply “float free” of processing time. Given this, the following constraint on any 
satisfactory account of masking phenomena may seem plausible. 
 
Causal Constraint For any experiential property whose instantiation by 
experience is the causal upshot of the visual (or auditory etc.) processing of 
certain information, experience cannot instantiate that property until the relevant 
information has begun to be received and processed.
182
 
This constraint may seem problematic for the following reason. In the normal non-
masking case, when the disc flashes up, the account above eschews (full-blown) 
Stalinesque delay. Thus, it is committed to claiming that we see the disc before there is time 
for a possible ring to block awareness of the disc. Yet, if this is so, the Causal Constraint appears 
to force us to attribute this same property to experience at the parallel moment in the 
masking case just before the mask appears. (Clearly, something we must avoid.) After all, 
attributing experience of no ring would be to attribute a property dependent on as yet 
unprocessed information regarding a future mask. Indeed, in both cases there appears to 
be an aspect of experience – disc absence or presence – which causally depends upon 
information being received or not in the future. That seems obviously incompatible with 
Causal Constraint. 
 
                                                 
 
182 Cf. the truisms in Dennett 1995. 
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This objection reveals how hard it can be to appreciate the idea that experience might be 
anhomoeomerous. We can see why this is so with reference to a non-experiential 
example. Recall the discussion of walking above. That discussion concluded that whether 
one counts as walking depends on what occurs over some duration of time. We should 
therefore reject the following constraint on walking. 
 
Walking Constraint Walking is a part of the causal order. Thus, one cannot 
instantiate the property  “… is walking,” at t unless sufficient activity has gone on 
to ground walking at t regardless of what may come after t. 
 
This is false. One may count as walking at t even if only a single support phase has so far 
occurred, a phase which in and of itself is not sufficient to ground walking (as opposed 
to running etc.). Another way of putting the point is by saying that one can be in the 
process of walking without yet having walked. One has not yet walked at t, but one can 
nonetheless be walking. What is true is that one cannot have walked unless sufficient 
activity has gone on to ground walking. 
 
The same, I submit, is true of experience. One can be experiencing, i.e., in the midst of 
experiencing some event or process, without yet having experienced the event or process. In 
particular, one can be in the midst of experiencing a certain apparent event (viz., disc-
followed-by-blank-screen, or blank-screen-followed-by-ring)  without yet having 
experienced the event. We might put it like this: different events have different 
perceptual appearances for us. The perceptual appearances of events are constrained by 
the fact that our experiences themselves have a certain coarse-grained temporal structure. 
These constraints mean that we must think of the appearances of events as attaching first 
and foremost to durations above a certain minimum temporal threshold, in other words 
to temporally extended events rather than instantaneous or near instantaneous time-
slices. In the masking case we should consider the events, (i) disc followed by mask, and 
(ii) disc followed by no mask, as different events with different appearances. What 
masking experiments show is that the appearances of sub-events of an event whole can 
contrast strikingly with the appearance of one of the sub-events presented on its own. 
 
Thus, as with walking, one may be in the midst of experiencing in some way without yet 
having experienced in that way and so without yet having processed all the information 
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necessary to experience in that way.
183 Nonetheless, it is quite right to think that 
experiential time cannot simply “float free” of processing time for, as with walking, one 
cannot have experienced a particular masking episode unless mask presence (or absence) 
information has been received and processed. Once we abandon the idea that experience 
is homoeomerous, we can happily allow that our fundamental explanations (causal and 
otherwise) about experience will be explanations of temporal periods of a certain size. All 
we can say of instants/very brief portions of experience is that they are instants/brief 
periods during which subjects are in the midst of experiencing in some manner (e.g., a 
blank-screen-followed-by-ring) as determined by which stretch of the stream of 
consciousness they fall within. 
 
This is not to say that there are not complications here. In particular, the picture here is 
one on which it is appropriate to attribute a property to a temporal point during some 
course of experience, where that point occurs before all the processing relevant for the 
attribution of that property has taken place. That is acceptable only because the truth of 
the attribution holds only in virtue of the occurrence of a longer duration of experience 
in which the moment is embedded and the insistence that the Causal Constraint applies 
only to this longer duration of experience. If, with Frege, we think of utterance or 
propositional truth as tenseless, no difficulty emerges here, for it will be true even just 
before the mask has been presented that the subject is in the midst of experiencing a 
masking event (i.e., blank screen followed by a ring). However, if we are convinced that 
the future is open in the strongest sense, one which demands tensed propositional truth, 
we will need to deny that at the moment just before the ring is presented and processed 
that there is a fact of the matter as to what the subject is experiencing. Relative to that 
context of assessment it will be indeterminate what the subject is experiencing. 
Subsequently, relative to a given future context, there will be a fact of the matter.
 184
 
 
 
                                                 
 
183 In the apparent motion case it is even more tempting to baulk at the idea that we might be experiencing 
motion without yet having experienced any yet. But this is simply because over ordinary timescales we treat 
experiential processes as homoeomerous. At the tiny timescales here involved that assumption fails. 
184 For details of this kind of approach see MacFarlane 2003 and forthcoming. This kind of context-
relativity is not a particular issue for my approach to Dennett and it is certainly not the case that the 
approach here rests on the success of MacFarlane’s programme.  
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10. Conclusions 
 
Dennett tells us that our intuitions suggest “that our streams of consciousness consist of 
events occurring in sequence, and that at any instant every element in that sequence can 
be classified as either having occurred ‘in consciousness’ or as having not occurred ‘there’ 
yet” (1991a: 144). There are two immediate problems with this way of framing our 
intuitions. Firstly, the term ‘classified’ can be understood in two ways. It might simply 
refer to there being a fact of the matter as to whether some element is currently being 
experienced or not. On the other hand, it might refer to a subject’s ability to determine 
whether some element is currently being experienced or not. Secondly, I have urged that 
the stream of consciousness be thought of as fundamentally processive. Though we can 
divide it up into events, it should not be thought of as the mereological sum of a 
sequence of events. In this light, a better statement of our intuitions is that our stream of 
consciousness is a temporally structured process, and that at any instant (i) there is a 
matter of fact concerning the nature of the stream at that instant, and (ii) the nature of 
the stream is available to the subject of the experience at that instant. 
 
Is anything wrong with this conception? My own view is that there is, strictly speaking, 
nothing wrong with it. (I set aside the issue of the open future.) Rather what masking and 
apparent motion phenomena teach us is that we need to be extraordinarily careful about 
putting things this way. For one, what is true of any given course of experience at an 
instant is not independent of the course experience takes over longer timescales. So, 
although it is correct to hold that at any instant there is a fact of the matter concerning 
the stream of consciousness, such a claim is liable to mislead if we do not appreciate the 
anhomoeomery of the stream. Truths about instants only hold in virtue of truths 
concerning longer periods. It is even more misleading to talk about what a subject is able 
to determine at a given instant. A subject’s epistemic position with respect to their 
experience is a state that they are in which constitutively depends on their stream of 
consciousness (i.e., of the processes and/or events that the stream is comprised of). 
Thus, the state that one is in at an instant will depend on what is occurring in the stream 
at that instant. Since that depends on what goes on over some longer period, however, so 
too the state that one is in at an instant obtains only in virtue of facts about one’s mental 
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life over longer periods of time.
185 In other words, a claim parallel to experiential 
anhomoeomery applies to epistemic states too. 
 
What, if anything, prevents Dennett from agreeing? One possibility is that the block is 
his conception of seeming. As we saw above, Tye assumes that we must either insist on 
the complete independence of consciousness and self-conscious judgement (a form of 
ultra-realism) or identify the two (anti-realism). This misses the possibility of the middle-
position defended in Chapter Three, according to which the nature of conscious 
experience is not fixed independently of how it is available to self-consciousness, but 
nonetheless conceives of judgements as grounded (and on occasion ungrounded) in 
experience as opposed to constituting truths about it. It is possible that Dennett’s 
notorious remark, “There is no such phenomenon as really seeming – over and above 
the phenomenon of judging in one way or another that something is the case” (1991a: 
364), should be taken as revealing that Dennett shares Tye’s conception of the landscape. 
If so, Dennett no doubt finds anti-realism compelling. But Tye’s complaint that his 
argument begs the question against the ultra-realist will also stand. 
 
A more attractive, but much more speculative diagnosis, focuses on the key idea behind 
the multiple drafts model, which Dennett tells us, “avoids the tempting mistake of 
supposing that there must be a single narrative … that is the actual stream of 
consciousness of the subject, whether or not the experimenter (or even the subject) can 
gain access to it” (1991a: 113). As I have said, on the realist account offered above, it 
makes perfect sense to insist that there is an actual, single, unified stream of 
consciousness despite acknowledging that this is not structured as it is in independence 
of the subject’s ability to access it. Perhaps what Dennett does not quite see is the way in 
which a subject’s access at an instant can be a matter of their being in an 
anhomoeomerous epistemic state as just discussed. If Dennett, were to think that there 
were only punctate judgements, i.e., events at instants, it would indeed be hard to 
combine an anhomoeomerous stream with a version of Self-Intimation framed in those 
terms. The nature of the stream at some point would be dependent on its course over 
some period; but the judgement about that point made at that point would not seem able 
so to depend. Later judgements would thus indeed be in conflict with earlier judgements 
                                                 
 
185 Compare here Soteriou 2007. Thanks to Guy Longworth for pressing me on this point. 
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and we would find ourselves disposing of the idea of the realist’s single narrative and 
thinking in terms of multiple drafts. 
 
In any case, given the availability of a subtle form of realism, which emphasises the 
anhomoeomery of experience, I see no reason to adopt such a position. The experiments 
Dennett employs to attack our intuitive picture of conscious experience do indeed turn 
out to have serious implications for the way in which we think about temporal 
experience. If I am right, they show that the stream of consciousness is homoeomerous 
only down to timescales of perhaps several hundred milliseconds. This should not be 
such a surprising empirical discovery about how experience is for us – anhomoeomery is 
a common phenomenon amongst processes in general. Appreciating it in this context 
shows that empirical findings do not refute realism. In the next two chapters, I show 
how appreciating it dissolves two other puzzles about the experience of time. By the end 
of those chapters, a fully satisfying picture of temporal experience will have emerged. 
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Chapter Six: 
Perceiving Temporal Properties 
 
 
We normally take experience in larger chunks, and if we try to pulverize it by focusing attention 
on particles within … we usually find ourselves puzzled and uncertain.
186
 
 
1. Puzzlement 
 
his thesis began with a datum, the fact that myriad different temporal 
properties and relations can be made manifest in perceptual awareness. 
Consider, for example, the celebrated opening bars of Gershwin’s Rhapsody in 
Blue during which the first B-flat clarinet, starting from a long low trill, crescendos 
flamboyantly through a smooth two-and-a-half octave glissando to arrive on a sustained 
minim concert B-flat (see below). 
  T
 
 
 
Listening to this passage, our experience seems to present us with various aspects: (a) the 
alternation of successive notes at the beginning of the phrase, first piano and steady, then 
louder and faster as the trill accelerates; (b) the rapid, long, continuous seventeen note 
ascent that emerges from it; and (c) the final sustained minim, lingering for a moment 
before relaxing into the next passage. In listening to the clarinet, we experience 
persistence, succession, and, with the final B-flat, simultaneity – assuming that the rest of 
                                                 
 
186 Goodman 1977: 203. 
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the orchestra is brought in on time. We also experience properties logically connected to 
time such as change in volume, pitch, speed, tone etc. 
 
Evidently, it is not just our enjoyment of music that depends upon the perception of 
such temporal properties and relations. The world buzzes and blooms around us and we 
are constantly experiencing the movement, change, persistence, succession and 
simultaneity of its denizen objects and events. Moreover, as noted in Chapter One, we 
seem to be no less directly acquainted with the temporal structure of the world around us 
than with its spatial structure. As John Foster puts it, 
 
duration and change through time seem to be presented to us with the same phenomenal 
immediacy as homogeneity and variation of colour through space. (1982: 255) 
 
Barry Dainton agrees, calling the direct experience of change and persistence an 
“obvious truth” and terming it “the phenomenological constraint” (2000: 114–5). 
 
Obvious as these facts are, they have been the source of profound and long-standing 
philosophical puzzlement. Indeed, Kant – arguably the greatest influence on thinking 
about issues relating time and experience – ultimately denies the “obvious truth” that we 
directly experience change and persistence. In particular, throughout the Analytic of 
Principles, he asserts that “time cannot be perceived by itself, and what precedes and what 
follows cannot, therefore, by relation to it, be empirically determined in the object” 
(2003: B233).
187 According to Guyer, Kant’s claim here is “more intelligibly” rendered as 
the view “that particular temporal relations are not directly perceived” (1987: 167). 
 
Kant is far from alone in this regard. The key father figure in Anglophone discussion of 
time-consciousness is perhaps Thomas Reid who writes as follows. 
 
It may here be observed, that if we speak strictly and philosophically, no kind of 
succession can be an object of either the sense or of consciousness; because the 
                                                 
 
187 See further B219, B225, B257 and A183, references in Guyer 1987: 88 and also A33/B49–50. 
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operations of both are confined to the present point of time and there can be no 
succession in a point of time. (1827: 169)188
 
Another ‘denier’ is Prichard (1950a) who claims that it is, strictly speaking, impossible to 
hear sounds. What could drive someone to this extreme view? More generally, why have 
philosophers struggled to make sense of our experience of succession, persistence and 
change? 
 
In the first part of this chapter I suggest a principle that lies at the root of the 
puzzlement. I then show how the two leading, rival theories of temporal awareness – 
specious present theories and memory theories – should be seen as attempts to explain 
how temporal awareness is possible in the light of that principle. In the second and main 
part of the chapter I argue that, for the same fundamental reason, neither of these 
theories is satisfactory unless it rejects the very principle that drove its motivating 
puzzlement. Thus, the developments of both theories represent paths which take us back 
to where we started. However, what stands revealed at the end of our exploring is that 
the apparent rivalry between memory and specious present theories is illusory. Both 
theories must ultimately unite in rejecting the background assumption that forces them 
apart and makes them unworkable. Once this background assumption is rejected, the 
theories no longer appear to be rivals. What is more, we must reconsider what, if 
anything, is wrong with a very simple account of temporal awareness. 
 
Put crudely, the problematic principle is that if one experiences succession or temporal 
structure at all, then one experiences it at a moment. Applying the claims defended in 
Part One, I demonstrate that this principle is false; in order to understand the perception 
of temporal properties we must look beyond the instant. Our experience of temporal 
phenomena cannot be understood if we attempt to break experience down into 
instantaneous slices. The attempt to do so drives the philosophical puzzlement. Of 
course this problematic principle is precisely the assumption already fingered above in 
                                                 
 
188 Reid notes that “this observation seems to contradict the common sense and common language of 
mankind” (ibid.) but goes on to account for this by (a) providing a now traditional memory theory of 
temporal consciousness (see below) and (b) noting that the ‘vulgar view’ is explained by a failure to 
properly distinguish memory and perception. For discussion of Reid and his followers such as Dugald 
Stewart, Thomas Brown and William Hamilton see Anderson and Grush forthcoming. Note that a 
common objection to memory theories is that they are really denials that we actually perceive temporal 
properties. Reid simply admits this; cf. discussion of Brentano below. 
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resisting Dennettian anti-realist arguments, viz., the homoeomerous nature of experience.  
Puzzlement and denial is driven by the assumption that experience must be 
homoeomerous down to instants. Contraposing, I argue that experience can only be 
experience of temporal properties if it is anhomoeomerous. 
 
2. Experiencing Succession: a Simple Example 
 
It will help to have an example in front of us. Consider the following very simple case of 
auditory experience: hearing a C major, broken triad played staccato and allegro on a well-
damped piano. Listening as the piano is played, one experiences each of the notes of the 
broken chord in turn. But one’s experience also has an additional aspect which can be 
brought out by comparing Case A with Case B where one simply hears a staccato G played 
on the same piano. 
 
Case A 
 
Case B 
 
 
Cases A and B resemble one another in this respect: in both, a small time after the G-key 
has been struck, one hears a G. However, intuitively, there is also a difference in one’s 
experience at this time, t. In Case A, one does not merely hear a G, one experiences 
succession. That is, one hears the G following on from the two previous notes of the triad and 
not in lonely isolation as in Case B. One would be failing to characterise fully how things 
were for you at t if one only mentioned the fact that one was then hearing a G. 
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At t, in Case A, one is in a position to attend to a series of note-soundings spanning an 
interval of time. This contrasts with a case in which the notes are spread out over a very 
long period of time. No doubt in such a case one might recall the past notes as one heard 
the  G, but – assuming that the period is long enough – one would not be able to 
selectively attend to all the notes occupying that interval. This, I suggest, supports the 
thought that, in the slow case, one’s experience of the auditory world at t would not 
require mention of successiveness (even if one’s overall experience in some way did).
189
 
More generally, the datum is this: there are cases (like Case A) in which one hears or 
perceives in such a way that one is able to attend to a structure of sounds, events or 
event parts which occupy a temporal interval. If what has just been said is right, we can 
ask: how should we account for such cases of perception, in particular for the additional 
aspect of experience in Case A? A simple-minded account might run as follows. 
 
The difference between the two experiential situations (A and B) at time t when 
the G is first heard is simply that in situation A the subject has just heard a C and 
an E in that order, whereas in situation B the subject has just heard nothing, 
merely two beats of silence before the G. 
 
According to the simple-minded account, an irreducibly temporal difference is appealed 
to as a way of distinguishing the two experiences, namely, the past experience of the 
subject. 
 
This kind of appeal is rejected by almost all participants in the debate. William James 
articulates the objection thus, 
 
A succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession. (1890: 629) 
 
Husserl makes the same point. 
 
                                                 
 
189 Bill Brewer encouraged me to clarify the sense in which we have genuinely direct perceptual experience 
of temporal properties as opposed to a more general sense of the past’s relation to present experience. His 
own example was of hearing a long, difficult string quartet by Morton Feldman – String Quartet II at over 
five hours being an extreme case in point – where notes heard an hour ago might still, in some sense, affect 
one’s current experience – giving one a sense of finality, repetition or larger structure. Such cases are not 
the source of philosophical puzzlement at issue here. 
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The duration of sensation and the sensation of duration are different. And it is the same 
with [succession].190 The succession of sensations and the sensations of succession are 
not the same. (Husserl 1964: 31) 
 
Careful to distinguish between acts and objects of acts, he goes on to make the 
equivalent point about acts. 
 
We must naturally raise precisely the same objection against those who would trace the 
idea of duration and succession back to the fact of the duration and succession of the 
psychical act. (ibid.) 
 
James’ and Husserl’s thought is that merely having a series of experiences with differing 
objects, or one extended experience whose objects change over time, is compatible with 
the absence of temporal experience. This is, of course, true in many cases. When the 
triad is played very slowly, merely experiencing each note is not sufficient for 
experiencing them as successive. 
 
However, James and Husserl seem to suggest that this claim holds across the board, for 
all experience. Their accounts suggest a picture according to which all phases of 
experience are strictly independent of preceding experience-phases. What we need, 
therefore, is some way in which our current experience can embrace temporal structure. 
As James puts it, the “feeling of past time” must be “a present feeling”.
191 The thought is 
that at any time, the nature of one’s perceptual experience must be based on the single 
state available at that time. Insofar as one is immediately aware (or apparently aware)
192 of 
succession or temporal structure, this must be due to that whole structure being 
represented or presented to you at that very point in time.
193
                                                 
 
190 The translation has ‘sensation’ here but this seems to be a misprint. 
191 James 1890: 628; cf. Husserl 1964: 40 and Miller 1984: 108f. Husserl’s lectures date from 1905. 
192 Throughout what is in question is our apparent awareness of succession and so the apparent objects of 
awareness. Nothing is meant to turn on awareness or perception being a success. 
193 This claim traces back to Kant. Kant makes it most clearly in the A-deduction. Thus at A99 he writes 
that a “representation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute 
unity”. Guyer holds that this is “the fundamental premise of Kant’s transcendental theory of experience” 
(1987: 171) and comments, “[What this claim] implies is precisely that although, of course, the manifold of 
subjective states occurs or is given successively, knowledge at any particular time that any particular 
succession of such states has occurred must be based on the single representational state available at that 
time. And this means that an interpretation of that state is necessary for the mind to determine the 
sequence of one impression upon another (as Kant puts it). In other words, the several members of a 
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Another less well-known exponent of exactly this principle is T.H. Green who, in the 
words of G.F. Stout, is one of a number of writers in whom we “find … a continual 
reiteration of the statement that the apprehension of succession cannot be itself 
succession – that in order to be aware of B as succeeding A we must have both A and B 
before consciousness at once” (1900a: 1). With his usual acumen Stout continues, “The 
necessity does indeed appear self-evident. But it is worth while to consider what is really 
involved in it, and in what way the actual process of consciousness satisfies this 
requirement which is imposed upon it a priori” (ibid.). I touch on Stout’s own view 
below. But first I want to consider what makes this supposed a priori constraint so 
compelling for the thinkers mentioned above. 
 
3. The Principle of Simultaneous Awareness 
 
Following Miller (1984), let us call the idea given loose expression above – the claim that 
if one experiences succession or temporal structure at all, then one experiences it at a 
moment – the Principle of Simultaneous Awareness (PSA). Why do Husserl, James and others 
embrace this principle? I suggest two possible and related reasons.
194
 
3.1 The Conceivability of Unawareness 
 
Our question, recall, is whether there have to be further present tense facts which hold at 
t to ground the difference between Cases A and B, facts over and above the irreducibly 
temporal facts that clearly do distinguish the two cases. When I talk of ‘irreducibly 
temporal facts’ I mean facts the truth of which logically depends on states obtaining at 
times other than the present instant. Purely present tense facts merely causally depend (if 
                                                                                                                                            
 
succession of states are indeed immediately perceived in succession, but there is nothing which counts as 
immediate perception of the succession” (1987: 171–2). 
194 Kelly opens his discussion of what he calls the puzzle of experience by posing it in the following terms: 
“How is it possible for us to have experiences as of continuous, dynamic, temporally structured, unified 
events given that we start with (what at least seems to be) a sequence of independent and static snapshots 
of the world at a time?” (2005: 210) It is quite perplexing why this would seem to be our starting point rather 
than something we are driven to by philosophical arguments such as those below. 
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at all) on states obtaining at times other than the present instant.
195 One line of thought 
motivating subscription to PSA is the following. There must be such facts, for there is a 
possible Case C which resembles Case A except that we have no experience of succession 
in C. Husserl is explicitly motivated by this thought, insisting that “it is conceivable that 
our sensations could endure or succeed one another without our being aware of it in the 
least” (1964: 31-2). 
 
Case C 
 
Case C, then, is like Case A – the same notes are sounded and heard at the same tempo 
and in the same order. However, so the line of thought goes, it is conceivable (and so 
possible) that one might experience each of the notes individually in Case C and yet fail to 
experience succession as an aspect of one’s experience on hearing the final G. More 
generally, it is conceivable that one might fail to hear any relations of succession between 
the sounded notes over and above the individual sounds. Consequently, one would not 
be in a position at t to attend to the whole broken chord, spread out as it is, over a 
temporal interval. If, indeed, Case C is possible, it follows that a merely temporal 
difference between A and B cannot ground the difference in experience. 
 
Even if this strategy is persuasive, however, it is crucial to note that the possibility of Case 
C does not establish that present tense facts (with respect to the time of hearing the final 
G) are alone sufficient for experience of succession. It may be that the obtaining of 
irreducibly temporal facts remains a necessary, though insufficient, condition. Thus, two 
strengths of PSA can be distinguished. 
 
                                                 
 
195 Cf. Kripke 1978: Lecture V. Here logical dependence is not defined in terms of deducibility in any 
system of formal logic but is rather what is often termed “broad logical” possibility. On this point see 
Chalmers 1996: 35 which I follow. 
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Weak PSA Irreducibly temporal facts are insufficient to explain the difference 
between Cases A and B. There must, in addition, be present tense facts which 
hold at t to explain the difference. It is these facts which do not obtain in Case C. 
 
Strong PSA Irreducibly temporal facts have no place in our explanation of the 
A/B contrast. Present tense psychological facts are necessary and sufficient to 
explain the contrast. 
 
So far as I know, this distinction is not made in the literature. However, the authors 
mentioned above appear to assume the stronger principle. That leads one to suspect that 
they have additional motivations lurking in the background. 
 
3.2 Russell Worlds 
 
Another motivation, this time for Strong PSA, may be a thesis given vivid expression by 
Russell in The Analysis of Mind. 
 
There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five 
minutes ago, exactly as it then was, … There is no logically necessary connection 
between events at different times; … Hence the occurrences which are called knowledge 
of the past are logically independent of the past; they are wholly analysable into present 
contents, which might, theoretically, be just what they are even if no past had existed. 
(1921: Lecture IX) 
 
Taken to its limit, this view holds that all presents facts, and hence facts about our 
conscious or mental lives, are compatible with the world’s having been brought into 
sudden existence any finite time before the present moment and likewise being 
annihilated any finite time after the present moment. I focus on the past in what follows. 
If our mental lives are (logically speaking) wholly independent of our histories, then 
appeal to irreducibly temporal facts is evidently ruled out. Purely present tense facts must 
be sufficient to account for contrasts like that between Cases A and B.
196
                                                 
 
196 Note that this thesis is not obviously entailed by presentism assuming that the presentist can appeal to 
irreducibly tensed relations. Nonetheless, it has no doubt often been assumed that such a thesis is a 
 
 
166 
 
In what follows, I refer to worlds newly created with the aim of perfectly matching some 
ordinary world at some moment as ‘Russell worlds’. Whether Russell would have been 
happy taking his argument to the limit is far from clear. The data he proposes as the 
foundation for his construction in Our Knowledge of the External World are explicitly events 
with a finite duration (1914: 126; cf. 1915: 271 on the absurdity of instantaneous 
experience).
197 Nonetheless, Russell’s basic thought concerning logical independence 
taken in its strongest form is a perennial one and it is not difficult to find adherents 
throughout the ages. 
 
Hume is probably the best known proponent of the view that every moment of time is 
independent of every other. However, Hume’s most likely source for the principle is 
Descartes. Such a principle plays a key role for Descartes in the Meditations where he 
relies on the following claim. 
 
A lifetime can be divided into countless parts, each completely independent of the 
others, so that it does not follow from the fact that I existed a little while ago that I must 
exist now … (1986: 33)198
 
And in one of his replies to Caterus he argues as follows. 
 
The separate divisions of time do not depend on each other; hence the fact that the body 
in question is supposed to have existed up till now ‘from itself’, that is, without a cause, 
is not sufficient to make it continue to exist in future, unless there is some power in it 
that as it were recreates it continuously. (1986: 88) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
consequence of presentism. For example, Dainton (2001: 107-8) effectively makes this assumption in 
arguing that the presentist cannot account for our experience of succession. 
197 Interestingly, when Carnap (1967: §67) discusses the choice of basic element to be used in his logical 
construction of the world he chooses “experiences is their totality and undivided unity” (108) in 
“opposition to the ‘atomising’ school of thought in psychology and epistemology”. He cites various writers 
on this point (e.g. Schlick, Schuppe and Cornelius) and notes in particular the work of Gestalt theorists. He 
does not mention temporal duration but there is every reason to think that the anti-atomist rationale ought 
to apply here too – thus elementary experiences for Carnap ought to be extended in time. 
198 Cf. Ismael nearly four-hundred years later: “We suppose that the mind decomposes into a set of 
momentary parts … the momentary parts of an extended self retain their psychological identity, they are 
psychologically separable from parts that lie along the same connected stream” (ms: 3-4). 
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Descartes does not argue for the claim here relied upon. He simply states that it should 
be “quite clear to anyone who attentively considers the nature of time” and declares it to 
be “one of the things that are evident by the natural light” (ibid.: 33). 
 
Lennon in a wide-ranging discussion partly focused on what he calls the “staccato 
conception of time” (1995: 346) notes that discussion of these issues is “continuous and, 
at least implicitly, universal through the history of philosophy” (ibid.: 353). By way of 
supporting this contention Lennon draws our attention to the rich debate in eleventh and 
twelfth century Islamic philosophy. Of particular interest in the present context is the 
debate between Ghazali and Averroes as to whether there are any necessary connections 
between moments of time – Ghazali anticipates Descartes and Hume; Averroes 
anticipates the contrary view of Leibniz.
199  
 
More recently, we might also note Bergson’s attack on what he calls the cinematographic 
conception of time (Bergson 1914), a metaphor for the very same idea that time can be 
analysed into logically independent moments. And similarly, Kripke (1978: passim) who 
argues against what he calls the “holographic or time instantaneous description picture” 
which he finds implicit in much contemporary (neo-Humean) metaphysics. 
 
Russell’s defence of the possibility of Russell worlds, relies on a brute conceivability 
claim. However, one might try and motivate that claim by appeal to further principles 
that have seemed independently attractive. For example, one might claim that the 
physical facts at a time were path-independent, that is held independently of physical 
facts at other times. If that were right, Russell’s thought experiment would be consistent 
with respect to the physical world; there would be no logical impossibility in God 
creating the world in the state it is in at any moment, yet lacking any history. One might 
then add a supervenience claim to the effect that the mental facts at a time supervene on 
the physical facts at a time. This would then commit one to the view that all facts about 
our conscious or mental lives are compatible with the world’s having been brought into 
sudden existence any finite time before the present moment. 
 
                                                 
 
199 On Ghazali and Averroes see Lennon 1995: 355 who cites Van Den Bergh Vol. I p.185 and pp.318-9 
respectively. On Leibniz’s rejection of the Cartesian version of the principle see Lennon 1995: 351 who 
points us to Leibniz 1965: 30. In conversation, Christopher Martin detailed a history of not obviously 
successful attempts to trace the independence principle back to Aristotle. 
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I do not want to discuss these arguments here. All I want to do is to exhibit the 
pervasiveness of a certain way of thinking about time, however it is motivated. My main 
aim here is to consider why one might be concerned at being forced to accept Strong PSA 
and so why one might be inclined to resist any arguments that might be mustered in its 
defence.
200
 
Accepting Strong PSA is tantamount to insisting that experience can be broken down 
into independent slices, each constitutively independent of any others. Thus, if Strong 
PSA is true, then experience must be homoeomerous down to instants. Conversely, if 
experience is not homoeomerous down to instants as I have suggested, we cannot accept 
Strong PSA. After all, if experience is anhomoeomerous, then it has temporal parts 
whose natures depend constitutively on the nature of experience over periods beyond the 
periods of the parts. In other words, it has parts whose nature can only be explained by 
appeal to irreducibly temporal facts. This is in direct conflict with the strictures of Strong 
PSA. Furthermore, if Strong PSA is false, then irreducibly temporal facts are required to 
explain certain aspects of experience. That suffices for anhomoeomery. Consequently, 
experience is homoeomerous just if Strong PSA holds. 
 
Broadly speaking, two views of temporal experience have been suggested which attempt 
to account for temporal awareness within the constraints of Strong PSA. The first kind 
appeals to the specious present, the second to memory. I consider each account in turn. 
My conclusion is that for the same fundamental reason, neither succeeds in accounting 
for temporal awareness whilst respecting Strong PSA. As a result, we face a choice: reject 
Strong PSA or deny that we do in fact perceive temporal properties. Or, what is just the 
same point, reject homoeomery or deny that we do in fact perceive temporal properties. 
 
                                                 
 
200 One obvious tension I will not explore here is between the staccato view of time and Naïve Realism. 
Naïve Realism holds that the phenomenal character of our mental lives is (at least partly) constituted by 
worldly objects and their properties. If successiveness is one such property which is actualised in our 
experience, then no such experience could be had in the absence of such successiveness. Thus, the Naïve 
Realist will need to deny that Russell’s thought experiment conceives a genuine possibility. Indeed, given 
time-lag considerations, the incompatibility of Russell worlds and Naïve Realism goes beyond the 
presentation of temporal properties in experience. 
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4. Specious Present Theory 
4.1 SPT and PSA 
 
According to the specious present theory (SPT), at any instant we are aware of an 
extended period of time.
201 Thus, our experience at a moment literally embraces 
extended temporal structure. SPT provides a very clear account of how temporal 
experience is possible despite the constraints of Strong PSA. 
 
However, various standard objections have been raised against this kind of theory. 
Recently, for example, Sean Kelly argues that our being aware of a duration at a moment 
“simply makes no sense” being “committed to claims about experience that have no 
sensible interpretation” (2005: 211). Kelly makes a very strong claim here: SPT is an 
incoherent response to the puzzle of temporal experience. Can that be right? 
 
Two of Kelly’s three reasons for thinking that SPT is incoherent rest on confusions. 
Firstly, Kelly thinks that SPT is committed to our being aware of the future and that 
awareness of the future is impossible. However, such a commitment (coherent or not) is 
not an essential part of SPT. Indeed, in the course of advocating his version of the 
theory, Broad contends that “to sense what has not yet become, would be literally to 
sense nothing” (1923: 358); likewise Russell writes, “It should be noted that there is no 
experience of the future. … What I mean is that there is no experience of anything as 
future” (1915: 227). 
 
Secondly, Kelly suggests that SPT runs into difficulty in claiming that we are aware of the 
past. However, arguably, we are often aware of events that are no longer taking place 
because of time lag considerations. Few, for example, would deny that we see 
supernovae despite the fact that these occur long before the time of perception. Kelly 
seems to think that time lag considerations are out of place here, since, supposedly, such 
an appeal would involve abandoning the claim that we are directly aware of the present. 
                                                 
 
201 See, in particular, James 1890, Broad 1923 and more recently Tye 2003. As with so many loci classici, 
James’ account of the theory is problematic in many ways. Notoriously one is led to question how James 
could have thought the specious present quite so long as he did, arguing for example, that since “our 
maximum distinct intuition of duration hardly covers more than a dozen seconds (while our maximum 
vague intuition is probably not more than that of a minute or so), we must suppose that this amount of 
duration is pictured fairly steadily in each passing instant of consciousness” (1890: 630). 
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However, even if this were true, it is not an essential part of SPT that I am directly aware 
of the present (contra Kelly 2005: 219; again cf. Broad 1923: 358). The core claim of SPT 
is simply that at a moment we can be aware of an extended period of time. 
 
Kelly’s third objection is much more serious, however. He challenges SPT to make sense 
of the idea that a momentary experience might simultaneously present a number of 
successive states of affairs as successive. The specious present must make sense of this if 
it is to account for our awareness of succession and proponents of SPT certainly do 
make such claims. For example, Russell contends that “[s]uccession can occur within the 
specious present, of which we can distinguish some parts as earlier and others as later” 
(Russell 1921: 145; quoted in Kelly 2005: 220).
202
 
Kelly’s worry about this seems to be roughly the following: what I experience at a 
moment cannot be experienced as successive (as Russell claims). Experience of 
succession necessarily takes time. Rather, the most SPT can claim is that successive 
objects are experienced together. But this then faces the objection that our experience 
would be like a chord or cacophony rather than a genuine experience of succession. 
 
Although I think this worry is ultimately fatal, Kelly’s argument is too quick. More needs 
saying in order to explain what is wrong with the possibility of experiencing a genuine 
succession at a moment. For, if we distinguish between the temporal structure of 
experience and the temporal structure of the objects experienced, it is not obvious why 
the two should not come apart. That is, we need to ask what exactly is wrong with the 
following picture where an experience, e, at some one moment is an experience of events 
taking place at two separated times t1 and t2 as such (see below)? On the one hand, there 
seems nothing theoretically incoherent about this picture. On the other, it is hard not to 
feel the force of Kelly’s worry. 
 
                                                 
 
202 Likewise: “When I see a rapid movement, I am aware that one part of the movement is earlier than 
another, in spite of the whole being comprised within one specious present. If I were not aware of this, I 
should not know whether the movement had been from A to B or from B to A, or even that changes had 
occurred” (Russell 1948: 226). Dobbs and Broad (1951: 124-5) are especially emphatic about this aspect of 
the theory. 
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Object Time
Experiential Time 
e
t1  t2 
 
 
The argument of Part One shows what is wrong with this picture and provides the 
necessary additional considerations to drive Kelly’s worry home. Thus, we can argue 
against the idea that we can experience succession (or any temporal interval) at a moment 
not on the basis that it is a theoretical impossibility but rather on the grounds that it is 
revealed to be impossible when we reflect on the nature of our experience. In particular we can 
deploy the following argument. 
 
First it is noted that experience’s temporal structure is experiential structure. We are in a 
position to know about it just in virtue of undergoing such experience. However, we 
then note the claim I labelled Temporal Transparency, viz., the idea that for any temporal 
determination of experience, I am only ever rationally positioned to judge my experience 
to be so determined on the basis of a judgement concerning the temporal structure of 
the apparent objects of perception. In other words, I am always in a position to know 
about my experience’s temporal structure, but only by taking it to mirror the structure of 
its apparent objects. Consequently, our only rational strategy when undergoing 
experience  of succession is to take our experience itself to be successive in temporal 
structure as opposed to instantaneous. 
 
Now, specious present theorists might at this point complain that such a judgement, 
however rational, merely represents how things seem to subjects. However, this leaves 
them unable to explain how subjects are in a position to know about the temporal 
structure of their experience, something I have argued is essential to our conception of 
an experiential property. It also brings them into conflict with the principle I labelled 
Seems → Is above. According to that principle, if our experience has a phenomenal 
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property of a certain kind, then that experience cannot systematically  seem to differ 
phenomenally in that regard. In particular, we cannot make sense of the idea that 
experience systematically seems to one’s rational introspective reflection to possess a 
certain temporal structure, when it is not in fact genuinely so structured. Assuming 
Seems → Is and Temporal Transparency we must conclude that contra SPT, we cannot 
be systematically in error when we judge our experiences of succession to themselves be 
successive in temporal structure as opposed to instantaneous. 
 
The two key principles of this argument have already been discussed and defended at 
length. The above argument shows how their joint application is inconsistent with 
traditional SPT. In other words, traditional SPT involves a rejection of the naïve and 
natural picture of experience in time developed in Part One. According to that picture we 
cannot be systematically in error when we judge our experiences of succession or 
duration to themselves be successive or possess duration as opposed to being 
instantaneous. That is a conclusion which is incompatible with SPT.
203
 
We can approach the difficulty with SPT in a somewhat different way by considering 
what one might call coherence constraints on possible experiential lives. Imagine, for 
reductio, a person in a new Russell world – a world newly created with the aim of 
perfectly matching some ordinary world at some moment – who at the instant of 
creation enjoys experience as of a succession (G following on from E and C, say). Now 
imagine this person continues to live over time. If creation-instant, Russell world 
experience of succession is possible, and each instant of experience is logically 
independent of any other, we should be able to imagine that at a subsequent very close 
instant (indeed, at any instant no matter how close) the subject could undergo experience 
as of a note, say, a G again, but this time preceded by two beats of silence. Moreover, 
from a theoretical point of view, there is no reason the Specious Present Theorist has to 
offer against this being compatible with the subject veridically remembering his previous 
experience of apparent succession at this subsequent moment.
204 It is hard to see why 
this scenario should not be possible according to SPT. After all, according to Strong PSA 
                                                 
 
203 Note that even severely weakening our epistemic standing with respect to our inner lives from that 
expressed by Self-Intimation and Seems → Is will not help SPT since the theory must posit a completely 
systematic illusion about the temporal structure of our experience. 
204 Note that given the timescales and the plausible claim that states of knowledge or epistemic standing 
cannot be merely instantaneous, a commitment to Self-Intimation (or anything like it) will require some 
commitment to perceptual experiences being briefly memorable. But this is being ruled out here. 
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only present tense facts are relevant to what we experience at some moment; thus 
separate instants of experience are independent. 
 
Nonetheless, when we think about it, we don’t seem equipped to make sense of such a 
case. How could one experience no succession whilst simultaneously remembering (quite 
rationally and correctly) that one had just experienced apparent succession? In other 
words, how could things seem both one way and also another incompatible way to you? 
If we reject the possibility sketched, we effectively impose coherence constraints on the 
kinds of possible experiences and memories one can combine. Yet it is not clear how we 
could justify the imposition of such constraints on experiential lives if one accepts 
Russell worlds as genuine possibilities. In other words, accepting Strong PSA commits us 
either to the possibility of seemingly incoherent experiential lives or to ad hoc constraints 
on the kinds of worlds which are possible. 
 
Many objections have been raised against SPT. However, I want to suggest that the 
insights contained in many of the traditional objections to SPT are subsumed by the 
above argument. The above argument displays the core failing of SPT. Let me give two 
examples. 
 
Kelly’s objection concerning SPT’s capacity to account for experiences of succession is a 
traditional one. Broad attempts to handle it by arguing that, within the specious present, 
successive events are distinguished in terms of their degree of what he calls 
‘presentedness’. The problem with this move is that it is wholly unclear what this 
mysterious quality is (unless it is simply assimilated, implausibly, to vivacity). Thus, as 
Dummett puts it, in relation to motion perception, 
 
An attempt used to be made to account for [motion perception] within the specious 
present theory by saying that when, at some given instant, we had a visual impression of 
the object as at the position where it was at the time when light from it struck our eyes a 
short time before the present but within the specious present, we were aware of that 
visual impression as past, but nevertheless aware of it after the mode of the present. But what 
does that mean? It does not mean anything. It is merely a form of words concocted to 
conceal the fact that we cannot explain the phenomenon in question. (Dummett ms.: 6) 
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I wholly agree with Dummett here. Yet the objection in question (and indeed the 
objection Dummett himself raises in the paper just cited) does not get to the heart of the 
issue. Indeed, one can easily imagine modern representationalists reviving Broad’s basic 
idea. If we are to move beyond such debates, we need to recognize the basic problem 
with SPT as traditionally conceived, namely, its wrenching apart of the temporal structure 
of experience from the temporal structure of the objects experienced. 
 
A second major traditional worry for SPT exhibits the same superficiality. It is articulated 
by Dainton as follows.
205 If momentary acts of awareness present durations of time, then 
an event which occurs or a brief sound which is heard during the duration presented by 
one act will also be the potential object of other experiential acts (see diagram below). 
But we only hear such sounds or see such events once. Indeed, if we take momentary 
acts with extended durations as objects seriously it seems we will hear any sound 
infinitely many times. As Dainton says, ‘[t]his is ridiculous’ (2000: 141). 
 
Object Time
Experiential Time 
e1  e2  e3 
Brief sound 
 
 
Michael Tye has recently defended a traditional SPT against this objection. He writes as 
follows. (I have adapted his example to fit the present discussion.) 
 
This objection is ineffective. Suppose that there are indeed two different token 
experiences of [a tone], one for each specious present … so that the [tone] is 
experienced at two different times. Still, it would be a mistake to infer from this that [the 
                                                 
 
205 See also Mabbott 1951, Foster 1979 and Sprigge 1993. 
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tone] is experienced as being at two different times or that I, the subject, have an 
experience as of two [tones]. 
 
I hear [the tone] twice in that there are two times at which an act of hearing a [tone] 
occurs … But the [two] times have no time between them at which I experience that 
there is no [tone]. Indeed, there is no time between these two times at which anything is 
experientially represented by hearing. So, I do not hear a [tone] as occurring twice. It 
does not seem to me that there is a [tone] followed by a second [tone]. (2003: 94; cf. 
discussion of Tye in Chapter Two) 
 
Tye’s response is interesting because it shows how one can respond to the multiple 
soundings objection if (but only if) one is prepared to give up Temporal Transparency 
and/or Seems → Is. If one accepts those claims, his reply fails. According to Tye, despite 
our having two experiences of a tone, it nevertheless seems that there is only a single 
tone, occurring at a single time. Temporal Transparency tells us that rational judgements 
concerning the temporal structure of one’s experience will match judgements about the 
temporal structure of the objects of one’s experience. Thus, if it does seem as if there is 
only a single note, we will judge that there is only one time at which we experience a 
tone. However, Seems → Is then entails that we cannot systematically be misled 
concerning how our experience is; in other words, we cannot systematically be misguided 
when we judge that there is only one token experience of said sound. This conflicts with 
the claim that the specious present theorist is committed to, viz., that there are always 
multiple such experiences. 
 
We should reject Tye’s reply. However, if we do so, we can also leave aside the details of 
the multiple soundings objection. The objection again merely illustrates the more basic 
problem with SPT, namely, its attempt to pull apart the temporal structure of experience 
from the temporal structure of the objects experienced. 
 
Theorists like Dainton and Foster, who are sympathetic to SPT, only avoid the two 
problems just raised (that of accounting for experienced succession and avoiding 
multiple soundings) by making two moves. Firstly, they insist that experiential acts are 
never momentary but rather always extended. Secondly, they claim that such extended acts 
overlap, that is, literally share common parts (see Foster 1979: 176; Dainton 2000: Ch. 7). 
Of course, the overlap claim only makes sense in light of the first claim, that is, if our 
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experiential primitives are extended acts. Two momentary experiences can only overlap 
by being strictly simultaneous. The diagram below illustrates the new picture and how it 
avoids Dainton’s infinite soundings objection. Here, the event of the brief sound being 
heard in the experience e1 is the same event as its being heard in later overlapping 
experiences such as e2. 
 
Object Time 
Experiential Time 
Brief Sound
e1  e2
 
 
I consider these moves to be the only way to salvage SPT. For they represent the only 
way to avoid pulling apart the temporal structure of experience and the temporal 
structure of the objects experienced. The problem with these moves, however, is that the 
denial that awareness is “packaged into momentary acts” (Dainton 2000: 166; cf. Foster 
1991: 249) straightforwardly flouts the thought that each new momentary phase of 
experience might (conceivably) be completely independent of preceding experience 
phases, i.e., Strong PSA. 
 
Consider a situation where you are listening to a sound or melody. Take some moment 
during that period and consider the Russell world for that moment – a world newly 
created with the aim of perfectly matching the ordinary world at that moment. In order 
to match the ordinary world, the Russell world must allow that a sound or melody is 
being heard at the moment of creation. However, that involves the postulation of a non-
momentary act of awareness and thus involves a commitment to there being a past or 
future beyond the instant in the Russell world. This conflicts with the supposed 
conceivability of qualitative identity of the world at a time without irreducibly temporal 
 
 
177 
matching. Given this, SPT holds no refuge for a defender of Strong PSA. The principle 
must be abandoned if we are to account for our perception of temporal structure.
206
 
4.2 Foster and Dainton’s Overlap Theory 
 
Dainton, following Foster, does not simply reject Strong PSA. Rather he develops a 
sophisticated reworking of the SPT – the ‘overlap theory’ – designed to explain temporal 
awareness. We need to ask though: does this theory really have any work to do once we 
have rejected Strong PSA? 
 
Recall James’ objection to the simple theory, namely, that a succession of experiences 
does not amount to an experience of succession. Dainton offers the following response 
to this concern in the light of his overlap theory. 
 
The difference between an experience of succession and a succession of experiences 
poses no difficulty at all, for according to the overlap theory every temporally extended 
experience is an experience of succession. The experience [of successive tones, Do-Re] 
amounts to an experience of succession for two reasons: first because Do is co-
conscious with Re (and vice-versa), and second, because the content of this experience is 
a phenomeno-temporal pattern, of Do-flowing-into-Re. There is no need to posit a point 
like awareness which encompasses both tones. (2000: 180) 
 
Two notions are appealed to here: ‘diachronic co-consciousness’ and ‘phenomeno-
temporal patterns’. Let us briefly consider the role each plays in turn. Dainton tends to 
talk of co-consciousness both as a relation between acts and as a relation between 
objects. Thus, whereas in the passage quoted he is talking about the co-consciousness of 
objects, elsewhere he writes, “[t]hree total experiences X, Y and Z can be such that X is 
co-conscious with Y, and Y with Z, but X is not co-conscious with Z” (2000: 172). This, 
in turn, is perhaps explained by Dainton’s ultimate rejection of an act-object conception 
of experience.
207 As a result there is a certain obscurity in his discussion. Nevertheless, as 
                                                 
 
206 None of this is, as yet, to say that Weak PSA may not be well motivated by the conceivability argument. 
See §9, however. 
207 See Dainton 2000: 166. The basic thought seems to be that “it makes no sense to suppose that an act of 
awareness can apprehend a content of greater temporal duration than itself” (ibid.: 180) and so there is no 
motivation for the act-object view. I cannot see why this makes no sense – though that is not to say that it 
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I read it, the central problem with Dainton’s appeal to diachronic co-consciousness as 
applied to either experiences or objects of experience is that it amounts to nothing more 
than a blunt denial of the claim that each new momentary phase of experience might be 
completely independent of preceding experience phases. Indeed, ‘co-consciousness’ 
seems no more than a piece of terminology with which to frame the rejection of Strong 
PSA. As Dainton puts it, 
 
Co-consciousness is a basic experiential relationship, one about which there is nothing 
more to be said, at least while we confine ourselves to describing how things seem. 
(2000: 84) 
 
What about Dainton’s notion of phenomeno-temporal patterns? Here, Dainton openly 
struggles with how to account for genuine experience of passage even given the overlap 
model. As he acknowledges, when hearing Do-Re, 
 
we experience the notes as occurring in a definite temporal order … hear Do giving way 
to Re … hear the first note flow into the second note. (2000: 173) 
 
Likewise, 
 
an individual auditory sensation itself exhibits flow. For the short time it lasts, the tone 
seems to be extruding itself forward into the future. (ibid.) 
 
Dainton sees trouble because, 
 
Since the temporal asymmetry is phenomenal, we cannot appeal to memory, and since 
co-consciousness is symmetrical with respect to time, co-consciousness cannot be the 
answer. (ibid.) 
 
Now, Dainton is right to think that appeal to a symmetric notion of co-consciousness 
will not do here. Dainton’s solution is to deny that it is the job of co-conscious 
experiences to solve the problem he points to. Rather, it is explained by “experience itself 
                                                                                                                                            
 
is a genuine possibility. Moreover, it’s not being a genuine possibility would not entail Dainton’s 
conclusion. Perhaps, as suggested above, acts and objects necessarily match in temporal structure. 
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possessing an inherent direction,” structure and flow. Co-consciousness of overlapping 
acts only explains why a “succession of notes is experienced as fully continuous” (176). 
 
In other words, at this point, Dainton directly appeals to irreducibly temporal properties 
– the flow of experience itself. But, if it is legitimate to appeal to irreducibly temporal 
properties in the context of explaining our perception of order and flow, why not simply 
do the same with respect to our perception of temporal properties more generally? Why 
not simply reject Strong PSA and leave it at that? Once Strong PSA is abandoned, the 
whole overlap theory looks like unwholesome food served to a man already full. 
 
5. The Appeal to Memory 
 
If one remains convinced of the truth of Strong PSA, one needs to find a different way 
of making sense of our temporal awareness other than SPT. Let us therefore forget SPT 
and return to our original scenario of the C major triad. Consider the following question: 
when the final G sounds, what happens to our consciousness of the preceding notes? 
Assuming those notes are not sustained, I no longer hear the E or C which preceded it. 
If that is all there is to say about our experience, then it becomes hard to see how we can 
ever experience the relations two notes bear to each other, and so directly experience 
succession. 
 
One option would be to say that the preceding notes simply persist in consciousness in 
the manner in which they were first presented. Of course, the problem here is, as Husserl 
puts it, that “instead of a melody we should have a chord of simultaneous notes or rather 
a disharmonious jumble of sounds” (1964: 30). Brentano sees that we can avoid this 
unfortunate result if we allow the preceding note(s) to remain in consciousness but in a 
different way, specifically, in memorial consciousness.
208 As we presently experience the 
present tone, we must, according to Brentano, remain aware of the preceding tone or 
                                                 
 
208 I follow Husserl’s exposition of Brentano’s view which he uses as a stalking horse in the opening 
sections of The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (1964). A full treatment of Brentano’s view would 
need to take account of important changes in his position post-dating the theory Husserl sketches. 
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tones in memory. If we did not, “[i]n each moment we should have only the 
consciousness of the sensation just produced and nothing further” (Husserl 1964: 32).
209
 
Early memory theorists such as Brentano assume that perception and memory are 
intrinsically the same kind of mental phenomenon. Thus, Brentano holds that “phantasy-
presentations [i.e., imaginings and rememberings] … differ from sensations [i.e., 
perceptions] only in their [causal] origin, not in their [type of] content …” (1973: 316; 
quoted in Miller 1984: 105). Evidently, with this conception in play, no real progress has 
been made here in responding to the chord-cum-cacophony objection. Fortunately, 
better accounts of the relation between memory and perception are available. One 
attractive account is defended in Mike Martin’s work. Martin moots a structural 
difference between sensory (episodic) memory and perception. Both types of mental 
event are directed towards particular events and objects. However, the relation is 
different in each case. Memory is “the representational recall of … an experiential 
encounter” (2001: 270) with a particular event or object. That is, when one sensorily 
remembers an f, one does so through recalling (imagining) a particular past occasion of 
consciously experiencing an f (cf. 2001: 273f.). In contrast, perception is a direct 
(representational or presentational) encounter with said particulars. With this account in 
play, there will be no straightforward chord-cum-cacophony objection since the present 
tone will be structurally privileged within our awareness. 
 
Crude memory theories nonetheless face immediate difficulties and must be modified to 
cope with them. The crudest of theories will seek to explain our experience of succession 
in a triad case like Case A by claiming that the experience of succession we have at time t, 
when the G is heard, arises because when we hear the G sound, we simultaneously 
auditorily remember hearing the E and the C. However, as Dainton rightly points out, 
this theory is insufficient to account for the phenomenon since it is possible to hear a G 
and auditorily remember hearing a C and E heard many hours or days ago. No theory 
should predict that this would amount to an experience of succession. Thus, a constraint 
on any memory theory is that “[m]y memory must register the temporal distance between 
present and past experiences” (Dainton 2000: 124). Similarly, merely saying that we 
                                                 
 
209 Cf. Hamilton’s remark, “Without memory, each indivisible, each infinitesimal, moment in the mental 
succession would stand isolated from every other, – would constitute, in fact, a separate existence” 
(Hamilton 1861: vol.1, 205; quoted in Anderson and Grush forthcoming). See also Ismael ms: 9 which 
makes effectively the same point. 
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experience succession because we hear a G whilst remembering a C and an E won’t do 
since that will fail to distinguish between more complex successions. It will fail, for 
example, to distinguish hearing C, E, G from hearing E, C, G or C & E, G. 
 
The most promising idea that Dainton considers which meets these concerns is an 
appeal to “a distinctive sort of memory” which he terms “immediate short-term 
memory” (125). In contrast to “ordinary long-term experiential memory” such a faculty 
is supposed to provide memories which are “a lot more complete and accurate than our 
typical long-term experience-memories” (125) and will also be (wholly?) involuntary and 
automatic in contrast to ordinary long-term experiential memory which is “to a large 
degree voluntary … [and] subject to our will” (126).
210
 
Such differences in kind, at least prima facie, avoid the initial objection since short-term 
memories are by their very nature, short-term. They are also said to be involuntary, which 
may meet worries to do with the passivity of temporal experience (cf. Husserl 1964: §20). 
This principally leaves us with the problem of complex successions. This is avoided if we 
allow that we can have memories of experiences of succession. Thus, the improved account 
runs as follows. 
 
First I hear C; I then hear [E], the experience of which is automatically accompanied by a 
short-term memory image corresponding to my hearing C; I then hear [G] and as I do so 
I have a short-term memory of an experience of succession: ‘C-being-followed-by-[E]’. 
(2000: 126) 
 
This sophisticated memory theory has a certain prima facie plausibility. However, Dainton 
contends that the general claim that “memory is largely or wholly responsible for our 
experience of time” (2000: 123) is untenable.
211 In what follows, I argue that Dainton’s 
first two objections can be avoided by adopting a non-standard version of the memory 
theory. However, if this non-standard theory is to avoid Dainton’s third objection, it 
must reject Strong PSA. Thus, in the final analysis, memory theories cannot account for 
temporal experience within the confines of Strong PSA. 
                                                 
 
210 The psychological literature standardly recognizes at least three kinds of memory systems, in relation to 
vision, specifically: iconic memory, visual short-term memory (VSTM) and long-term memory. Thus, 
memory theorists are hardly being speculative in positing distinct kinds of memory. On the other hand, 
there are evidently empirical factors to be considered if the theorist appeals to a particular system. 
211 Tye (2003: 88) also objects to memory theories along similar lines. 
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5.1 The Illusion Objection 
 
Dainton’s first objection goes back at least to Husserl’s discussion of Brentano’s version 
of the memory theory. There, Husserl suggests – and indeed tells us that Brentano 
concedes – that Brentano’s theory is an error-theory. For, according to Husserl, 
Brentano himself does not see his theory as grounding the direct perception of 
succession and alteration at all. Rather, it explains why it seems as if we do so perceive. 
 
We believe that we hear a melody, that we still hear something that is certainly past. 
However, this is only an illusion which proceeds from the vivacity of primordial 
association. (Husserl 1964: 33) 
 
A number of thoughts are conflated here. In particular, there seems no reason to think 
that we do not often see and hear things that occur in the past – a supernova or a 
thunder-clap, for example. Nevertheless, Husserl also seems to be pointing out that, on a 
memory theory such as Brentano’s, all we ever hear is the current sound independent of 
other sounds. Nothing else is the object of a perceptual act. Given this, it seems that we 
have not accounted for direct experience of succession at all. 
 
In reply to the objection, it might be argued that hearing a melody just is hearing the 
current note whilst remembering the past note. But this move does not seem to avoid a 
point which Dainton raises against Broad’s similarly structured theory, viz., that his 
theory “has the consequence that awareness of change cannot be as immediate as 
awareness of simultaneity” (2000: 154). The central thought here is that the memory 
theorist cannot avoid the consequence that ‘perception’ of temporal relations, if it should 
be counted as perceptual at all, is a second rate or derivative kind of perceptual 
experience. That flouts the phenomenological datum we began with. 
 
5.2 The Complexity Objection 
 
Dainton continues his attack on memory theories by arguing that the more sophisticated, 
nested memory account is unacceptable on phenomenological grounds. As he puts it, 
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the complexity of this proposal counts against it. Simply hearing the sequence C-D-E 
does not seem to involve intricate compound memories of the required sort. (2000: 127) 
 
Even allowing for the specialness of short-term visual memory and its automaticity, there 
does surely seem something phenomenologically off-key about the appeal being made to 
such a form of memory in this context. Consider shutting your eyes during a gory scene 
in a horror film and being unable to avoid visually recalling what you have just seen. 
Assuming this is a case of short-term memory (if it is not, we need to press further on 
that notion), it seems clear that the phenomenology is very different from that of a 
perceptual act or of any act that takes place during ordinary experience. Worse still, the 
nested-memory theory is positing a plethora of such experiences. It is hard not to 
sympathize with a request to know where they are and what phenomenological reality 
they have when it comes to ordinary temporal experience. 
 
One might object that there is a great difference between mere remembering and 
remembering in combination with perception. However, again, the thought is not very 
persuasive. If the two kinds of act are discrete and independent, something needs saying 
to explain our failure to introspect any acts of short-term memory during perception. 
And the memory theorist seemingly has nothing to say here. 
 
5.3 A Common Theme 
 
The two objections just raised are closely related. In particular, they arise because we 
make a certain assumption as to what is essential to an act’s being an act of memory. 
Although Dainton allows that the memory theorist may appeal to a certain distinctive 
kind of short-term memory which is richly detailed and automatic, he nevertheless 
assumes that the appeal will be to distinct, discrete acts of recall with their own objects which 
occur alongside perceptual experiences. On that picture two things seem plausible. 
 
(a)  That it is only the original perceptual acts (which acts of recall are joined to or 
simply simultaneous with) that are genuine acts of direct perception. This 
grounding the illusion objection. 
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(b) That temporal experience should be effectively resolvable into a number of 
distinct and phenomenologically discernible acts which differ only qualitatively 
from ordinary acts of short-term recall. This grounding the complexity objection. 
 
In the next section I sketch a way in which we might broaden our conception of how 
memory might be involved in temporal awareness which avoids these objections. Merely 
invoking automatic, short-term memory does not go nearly far enough. 
 
6. Retentiveness without Reminiscence: a Non-Standard Memory Account 
 
G.F. Stout considers a nice example of experience of succession, hearing a postman’s 
daily ‘rat-tat’ on one’s door. He remarks, 
 
There is successive experience: the first knock is heard before the second. There is also 
retentiveness: the individual’s experience, when the second knock occurs, has a character 
which it would not have if he had not heard the first. Further there is no reminiscence. In 
actually experiencing the second sound the subject does not definitely discriminate it as a 
present occurrence from the first as a past occurrence. The second treads too closely on 
the heels of the first to admit of such discrimination between past and present as such. 
So there is no remembrance of the past as such. This just emerges subsequently when 
the whole experience of having heard the double knock is remembered. (1930: 170) 
 
Stout makes two claims of importance in this passage. Both apply mutatis mutandis to any 
experience of succession. 
 
(1) There is retentiveness: the individual’s experience, when the second knock or 
note occurs, has a character which it would not have if the individual had not 
heard the first knock or note. 
(2) There is no reminiscence (discrimination, remembrance). 
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How should we think of this combination of retentiveness without reminiscence?
212 The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘reminiscence’ as: 
 
The act, process, or fact, of remembering or recollecting; sometimes spec. the act of 
recovering knowledge by mental effort (cf. recollection). (Simpson and Weiner 1989) 
 
Thus, reminiscing is something one does. It is a distinct mental act with its own character. 
How should we distinguish retentiveness in contrast to this? 
 
Not by appeal to any standard classification of memory into, say, the procedural, 
semantic and episodic. These distinctions are distinctions amongst the grammatical objects 
picked out by the complement clauses in sentences of the form ‘S remembers …’. 
Reminiscence and retention are not distinguished in terms of their objects. Nor is the 
distinction helpfully thought of in terms of the long-term versus short-term memory or 
indeed, in the visual case, between short-term visual memory and iconic memory. 
Crucially, retentiveness is not intended by Stout to be conceived as a distinct mental act 
or process of re-acquaintance with some particular object, event or event-phase (the ‘rat’ 
of the ‘rat-tat’, for example). If it is not a distinct act, what can we say positively about 
retention? 
 
The key remark here is Stout’s claim that “the individual’s experience, when the second 
knock occurs, has a character which it would not have if he had not heard the first”. 
Brian O’Shaughnessy echoes this claim in his recent discussion of the temporal 
properties of experience in general (which he takes to include intentional action). He 
then goes on to raise a question of obvious concern for us. “But why describe this as an 
exercise of memory?” 
 
The reason is, that had he not been acting [more generally: experiencing] thus in the past 
he would not be acting [experiencing] thus in the present, so that present experience 
                                                 
 
212 The retention versus reminiscence/recollection distinction plays an important role in Hodgson’s 
neglected work on time consciousness and is intimately related to Husserl’s distinction between primary 
and secondary remembrance. See Hodgson 1898 and Husserl 1964. (Husserl also comes to use the term 
‘retention’ as his thought develops.) Though arguably Stout is rather uncharitable in his reading of 
Hodgson, their debate in Mind (Stout 1900a, 1990b, Hodgson 1900) is instructive in pressing the question 
to what extent Hodgson rejects the traditional memory model. Precisely the same question needs pressing 
with respect to Husserl. See Anderson and Grush forthcoming for evidence that Husserl was aware of the 
Mind debate and Hodgson’s work more generally. 
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must both unite with and depend upon past experience. This means that the past must in 
some sense be co-present with the present, and such a co-presence is a mode of 
remembering. Doubtless it is a developmentally early form of memory, to be 
supplemented later by additional less primitive ways of relating to one’s past, notably 
cognitive modes. What in effect we are concerned with here is the tendency on the part 
of experience and its given objects to unite across time to form determinate wholes. 
(2000: 56) 
 
The important point in these passages is that both Stout and O’Shaughnessy insist 
 
(a)  That a subject’s current experience can depend constitutively on how they have 
been experiencing in the recent past; and 
(b) That the fact that an act has such a character is sufficient for it to count as a form 
of memory. 
 
Thus, what it is like to undergo the experience one has of the postman’s ‘tat,’ is 
constitutively dependent on the fact that it is a ‘tat’ which has been immediately preceded 
by experience of a ‘rat’. One would not be experiencing thus in the present were it not 
for one’s experience in the past. 
 
O’Shaughnessy suggests that the constitutive link to the past involved in such experience 
is sufficient for us to think of such experience as an act of memory. Someone 
sympathetic to the constitutive claim may resist this further move. At this point, we need 
to consider a question raised by Mike Martin in his discussion of episodic memory, 
namely: what, if anything, “the varieties of memory that we mark out in natural language 
have in common that should make them all memories?” (2001: 261). Martin’s limited 
positive answer to this question is that all forms of memory are ways of preserving 
cognitive contact. That is, we should think of memory in general as the retention of past 
psychological achievement. 
 
For example, semantic memory is the preservation of past knowledge, episodic memory 
the preservation of past apprehension. As Martin puts it, 
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Just as we can differentiate the kinds of cognitive contact and the objects they have, so 
too can we differentiate the kinds of memories that result. We can then conceive of 
memory in general as the preservation of cognitive contact in general … (2001: 266)213
 
On Stout and O’Shaughnessy’s picture, in hearing succession, one’s perception of a past 
tone does not merely leave a causal trace on current perception. Rather, current 
experience is constitutively dependent on past experience. This amounts to a retention of 
a past psychological achievement and thereby to an act of memory. 
 
Martin distinguishes different forms of memory in terms of the different psychological 
successes retained. We cannot distinguish retention without reminiscence in this way as 
the object retained is the same as that retained in episodic memory: past perception. 
However, one possible way of fleshing out the concept of retention without 
reminiscence in contrast to episodic memory would be as follows. One first notes that 
listing the objects presented (or represented) in perception does not suffice uniquely to 
characterise our experience. To do that one needs to specify the ways in which things are 
presented in experience. These can make a difference to phenomenal content too. Thus, 
perceptual phenomenology cannot be exhaustively characterised in terms of the 
presentation of objects. 
 
Consequently, experiences with qualitatively identical objects can still differ in 
phenomenal character so long as those objects are presented in different ways. For 
example, a ‘tat’ preceded by a ‘rat’ can be heard as a successor to a past ‘rat’, as the 
second part of a larger auditory event. On the other hand, a ‘tat’ not succeeding a ‘rat’ 
can be presented as emerging from past silence. 
 
In this light, Stout’s distinction can be understood as a distinction between two ways in 
which a single kind of cognitive contact can be preserved. In reminiscence, the retained 
or preserved contact is manifested in distinct acts of episodic memory. In retention, in 
contrast, past cognitive contact is preserved or retained as part of the character of a fresh 
act of acquaintance with a present object. The very encounter with the present itself is a 
                                                 
 
213 Matt Soteriou suggested to me that it would be better to think of what is retained in episodic memory as 
an ability to reacquaint ourselves with the particular past episode of apprehension in question. In the 
context of the account below of retentiveness one might think of the perceptual act itself as, in part, a 
manifestation of this just-acquired and possibly very short-lived ability. 
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way in which cognitive contact with the past is preserved because the way in which the 
current object of perception is encountered is constitutively dependent upon past 
experience. When I experience the postman’s ‘tat’, cognitive contact with the preceding 
‘rat’ is preserved as part of the character of the presentation of the ‘tat’. 
 
7. Back to Dainton’s Objections 
 
Armed with our new understanding of memory as retention without reminiscence, we 
can now address the illusion and complexity objections raised by Dainton above. On the 
new model, acts of perception are not joined with distinct acts of recollection so as to 
‘constitute’ temporal experience. Relations of preserved cognitive contact constitutive of 
memory are not provided from outside the perceptual experience itself, by a concurrent 
remembering or reminiscence. There is only one act that counts both as a perceptual act 
and as a manifestation of memory. 
 
As a result, there is no complexity objection. We should precisely not expect to find 
phenomenology redolent of independent acts of episodic recall (short or long term) 
during perception. The kind of memory involved is quite different – retention without 
reminiscence. There is only one act and only one object. Of course, this object can be 
seen or heard in complex ways. A ‘tat’ can be heard as successor to a ‘rat’, a note as a 
culmination of a glissando, a word as quieter or louder than the preceding phrase.
214 This 
complexity is no problem; our experience seems to be complex in these ways. That is the 
datum. 
 
The illusion objection arose because the standard memory account began with 
momentary ‘direct’ perceptions to which memories were joined. It was then hard to see 
how the joining of memories to perceptions could really account for our direct perception of 
temporal relations. By taking as a starting point genuinely perceptual acts plus memories, 
the memory theorist seems to be conceding that experiences of temporal structure are 
                                                 
 
214 Indeed, the various ways one can hear notes is potentially limitless. For example, consider the following 
remark by Tenney and Polansky: “… for the musician, a piece of music does not consist merely of an 
inarticulate stream of elementary sounds, but a hierarchically ordered network of sounds, motives, phases, 
passages, sections, movements, etc. – i.e., time-spans whose perceptual boundaries are largely determined 
by the nature of the sounds and sound configurations occurring within them” (1980: 205). 
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not perceptual acts. At the very least the theorist must concede that perception of 
temporal relations is less basic than other forms of perception, that as Dainton put it, 
“awareness of change cannot be as immediate as awareness of simultaneity” (2000: 154). 
 
The new single-act theory avoids the illusion object. On this account the perception of 
the current object of awareness is itself a manifestation of one’s retained cognitive link to 
an object of one’s past perception. The perceptual act is intrinsically an act of memory. 
However, there is also no sense in which it is not a perception proper. It is a retention 
and a perception, and, in virtue of being both, a perception of temporal structure. Thus, 
successiveness is as much a part of perceptual experience as the other ways in which 
objects are presented. 
 
8. Sounds and Durations 
 
Stout and O’Shaughnessy implicitly reject Strong PSA, holding that past perceptual 
experience is constitutive of current experience: one could not be experiencing the way one 
is now if one had not been experiencing so in the past.
215 However, it is not obvious why 
an adherent to Strong PSA might not agree that temporal experience must be understood 
in terms of the way the object currently being experienced is being experienced but deny 
that the individuation of such ways is constitutively dependent on past experience. I now 
argue that if the non-standard memory theory is to be applied to temporal experience in 
general, Strong PSA must be abandoned. In particular, I want to suggest that, even if the 
above account can explain our experience of succession (something I see no reason to 
grant at this stage), it cannot explain our experience of individual sounds themselves. To 
apply the above account to our experience of an individual tone one would need to claim 
that, at any moment, one’s experience was of a ‘tone-phase’ heard as a continuing on of 
earlier tone phases – one’s current experience being dependent (constitutively or 
otherwise) on one’s prior experience of earlier phases. Whether or not we appeal to a 
constitutive dependence, this account can seem plausible if we think of how we hear 
notes sustained over some reasonable period – each current phase is heard as a part of a 
longer note. However, as I now argue, unless the relation is constitutive, the account 
                                                 
 
215 However, both philosophers also seem to subscribe to the idea that there must be some present tense 
consequence of these irreducibly temporal relations. If this were not so, a simple-minded account would 
have sufficed. Thus, their theory fits best with Weak PSA. 
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cannot be a general one since it presupposes a form of temporal experience, namely, our 
perception of tone phases. 
 
Dainton hints at the problem as follows. 
 
If phenomenal temporality is wholly the product of memory, … our experience of even 
a single brief tone must be explained in terms of involuntary short-term memories. But 
memories of what? The answer must be: a succession of strictly durationless experiences. 
(2000: 127) 
 
According to Dainton this view “suffers from a very severe plausibility problem … it is 
hard to believe that we are not immediately aware of some duration in experience. Is a 
strictly durationless auditory experience even possible?” (ibid.). The central charge is that 
the memory theory must appeal to strictly durationless auditory experiences combined 
with a doubt as to whether such experiences are possible.
216
 
What everyone (and I am no exception) agrees with is the claim that any auditory 
experience will present or represent an object as having a duration of some length. As 
John Foster writes, “it is inconceivable that there should be a sensation of sound which 
was not the sensation of a sound-filled period” (1982: 256). Likewise, Husserl insists, 
“[e]very tone itself has a temporal extension …” (1964: 43).
217, 218
 
Now, assuming that we are happy with a distinction between the temporal structure of 
experience and the temporal structure of the objects experienced, it is not conceptually 
                                                 
 
216 In a wonderful, brief note, entitled ‘The Apprehension of Time,’ Prichard makes just this objection to 
the Kantian view that “what we call hearing a sound really consists in the act of perceiving or hearing what 
is now given – together with… acts of remembering and thinking of certain things as related to what is now 
given” (1950a: 47). Prichard at first concludes, quite rightly, that “perceiving anything which has a duration 
– is absolutely ultimate and cannot be resolved into anything else” (48). Unfortunately, within a few lines 
he considers that this leads us into contradiction (due to his explicit commitment to Strong PSA: “the 
hearing of the whole note must take place at a definite moment”) and declares that “it seems impossible that 
we hear a sound” (49). 
217 See also O’Callaghan 2007. Contrast the view implicit in this passage from Brough, “If a painting really 
could be seen in a single instant, its internal structure or content would be the visual equivalent of a 
musical composition consisting entirely of one sound, say, a crash of cymbals” (2000: 227). 
218 Although Husserl recognizes the problem here, I am not clear what his solution to it is. Indeed, he 
retains an ambivalence when, for example, he talks about “a sound (or a tonal phase) in the now point” 
(1964: 57). Indeed, in certain places he offers what sounds like a traditional, Reidian form of the memory 
theory. Thus, “Therefore at any given time I hear only the actually present phase of the tone, and the 
objectivity of the whole enduring tone is constituted in an act-continuum that is in part memory, in 
smallest punctual part perception, and in further part expectation” (1964: 24). 
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incoherent to think that we could at some isolated instant have an auditory experience, an 
instantaneous experience of a sound-filled period. However, we are now back to issues 
encountered in relation to SPT above. There I argued that there are good reasons to 
reject any theory which attempts to account for temporal experience in terms of our 
experiencing durations at an instant. When we reflect upon the nature of our experience, 
we come to appreciate that the apparent temporal structure of experience maps the 
apparent temporal structure of the world experienced. So any experience of a sound, 
something which must have a duration, will seem to rational reflection to itself possess a 
duration. However, in the domain of experience, it is, I claimed, not possible for 
experience systematically to seem some way to rational reflection, and yet not be such a 
way. Thus, we cannot systematically be in error when we judge that our experiences of 
sounds are not instantaneous. 
 
As a result, a theorist who appeals to memory cannot apply that account to all temporal 
experience unless they abandon Strong PSA for just the same reasons we encountered in 
the case of SPT. Whichever way we turn, a general account of temporal experience 
cannot subscribe to Strong PSA. 
 
9. Conclusions,  Weak PSA and a Terminological Note 
 
The traditional and contemporary debates on temporal experience assume that SPT and 
memory theories are clear rivals.
219 However, in the light of the argument of this chapter, 
they begin to look rather similar. The revised memory theory posits constitutive relations 
between past and present experience. In order to understand the nature of present 
perceptual experience, one must look beyond the instant. Similarly, Dainton’s revised 
SPT posits a primitive relation of what he calls ‘co-consciousness’ between past and 
present experiences. Again, the thought is that, in order to understand the nature of 
present perceptual experience, one must look beyond the instant. If one thinks that such 
constitutive links are sufficient to think of temporal perception as a case of memory, then 
we can think in terms of a memory theory. On the other hand, it would not be inept to 
give the name ‘the specious present’ to that interval of experience standing in constitutive 
                                                 
 
219 See especially, Dainton 2000 and Kelly 2005 for recent work that thinks in these terms. 
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relation to present experience. Thus, the theory in question can also be thought of as a 
SPT. 
 
Both revised accounts reject Strong PSA. According to both, for example, if one has not 
been having an auditory experience in some temporal window around the current 
moment, one will simply not be in a position currently to have an auditory experience at 
all. However, this is not quite to say that there is no distinction between the two 
accounts. It may be that although they do not differ at short-time scales, the memory 
account can explain perceptual phenomena at longer time scales more adequately than a 
specious present theory can. 
 
It is worth flagging at this point how my terminology relates to Dainton’s recent talk of 
Extensionalist and Retentionalist views. According to the Retentionalist, “our experience 
of change is a product of simultaneously existing features of momentary episodes of 
consciousness” (2008: 626). The Extensionalist denies this, rejecting the idea that “our 
consciousness is confined to an instant” (ibid.). Clearly my argument so far rejects 
Retentionalism in this sense and so sides with Extensionalism. However, there are 
reasons for preferring the traditional terminology that I have used, at least for present 
purposes. One problem with the Extensionalist/Retentionalist dichotomy as glossed is 
that it fails to separate out acts and objects, no doubt because Dainton himself rejects the 
act/object distinction. However, the distinction is necessary to make sense of the range 
of views on the table. Thus, we need at the very least to consider a matrix of the kind 
below. 
 
Now we might choose to call the left-hand column views, ‘Retentionalist’ since they 
reject extended acts of consciousness. However, the term ‘Retentionalist’ immediately 
suggests the involvement of memory. Thus, it is far from ideal as a label for a group of 
views which include views that think memory is not involved in temporal experience. 
Moreover, these views reject the involvement of memory for two very different reasons. 
On the one hand they might think that strictly speaking there is no such thing as 
temporal experience (as Reid does). On the other hand, they might believe in 
instantaneous acts with extended contents as part of these acts’ specious presents. 
Perhaps it is better to think of the left-hand column views as all Pointilliste views and of 
some of them as Retentionalist. 
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    Is temporal experience the product of momentary acts 
of consciousness? 
 
   Yes.  No. 
Is temporal 
experience the 
product of 
momentary 
objects of 
consciousness? 
Yes.  Pure snapshot views – 
experience is made up of 
instantaneous awarenesses of 
instantaneous contents. 
Memory theory as conceived 
by Reid (and as conceded by 
Brentano). 
No takers. 
  No.  Traditional Specious Present 
Theory. 
Overlap Specious Present 
Theory (e.g., Foster and 
Dainton, though with 
act/object distinction). 
Memory Theory as it is often 
characterised and arguably as 
Husserl and Hodgson 
ultimately conceive it. 
Revised Memory Theory (e.g., 
O’Shaughnessy). 
 
There is another difficulty with the term ‘Retentionalist’, however. This is that some 
memory theorists who insist on the traditional distinction discussed above between 
retention and reminiscence wish to claim that temporal experience involves retention 
without reminiscence and that this allows them to place their view in the bottom right of 
the matrix. Thus, the term ‘Retentionalist’ is doubly problematic as used here and I have 
avoided it. It is far less objectionable to call the views in the bottom right of the matrix, 
‘Extensionalist’, though, as noted, it is not entirely straightforward that the two views 
there mentioned are of a piece. However, my preference is to think in terms of the 
stream of consciousness first and foremost and not first off in terms of building the 
stream up from extended acts as the term ‘Extensionalist’ can suggest. One question this 
chapter began with was whether we really need anything beyond a very simple theory of 
temporal consciousness once Strong PSA is abandoned. To endorse an ‘Extensionalist’ 
view, even if only in name, is to prejudice the answer to that question. Thus, again, I have 
avoided the term. 
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By way of initiating further debate once it has been conceded that Strong PSA is false, I 
want to end this chapter by reconsidering how Weak PSA looks in the light of our 
rejection of Strong PSA. Recall that Weak PSA was the following claim. 
 
Weak PSA Irreducibly temporal facts are necessary but insufficient to explain the 
difference between Cases A and B. They need, in addition, to have present tense 
psychological consequences. It is these consequences which are absent in Case C. 
 
The argument for Weak PSA was an appeal to a supposedly possible Case C where one 
experienced each note of a triad but yet failed to experience the final note as succeeding 
the tonic and major third heard before it. However, Case C does not motivate Weak PSA 
construed as a universal principle. Read as such, Weak PSA tells us that merely having any 
durational/successive auditory experience is insufficient for experiencing a 
duration/succession. What would support this general claim? Presumably the thought is 
that C-style cases can be conceived in every case of temporal experience.  
 
In particular, presumably the Weak PSA theorist thinks we must be able to conceive of a 
distinction between the following two cases. 
 
Case B 
 
Case D 
 
 
In Case B, I have what one might think of as an ordinary experience of a G natural. In 
Case D, in contrast, though I experience each individual phase of the note, my experience 
of the final phase is independent of my experience of preceding phases. If such a case 
were conceivable it would, as appeal to Case C was held to, show that at least Weak PSA 
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must be true. However, as should be obvious now, at some point this style of argument 
must break down. If it does not, we will be committed to a case where the final instant of 
our experience is independent of all our previous experience. This either directly flouts 
the claim that any auditory experience will be experience of a sound-filled period or runs 
into all the problems of the traditional SPT. 
 
If this is right, then Weak PSA cannot be motivated all the way down on the basis of the 
conceivability of cases such as D. Once this is seen, it must be acknowledged that a 
simple-minded account must be correct in at least some cases – at least when the times in 
question are very short. In other words, even Weak PSA cannot be a universal principle. 
Moreover, this problem concerning the general validity of Weak PSA greatly complicates 
assessment of any argument such as the one we began with contrasting Cases A and C. 
As it was set out above, such an argument did not merely claim that pairs of cases such 
as A and C involved similar histories. Their histories were claimed to be similar in all 
relevant respects right up to the moment in question, t. But the simple-minded theorist now 
notes that our experience at t is not independent of (at least very nearby) surrounding 
experience. It is thus not obvious that one could – at the very moment the G sounds – 
enjoy experience which was not in part experience of succession unless there was some 
difference in history between the two cases. Thus, even if a simple-minded account is 
ultimately indefensible, more work needs doing to show that it is. On the other hand, 
what is certain is that Strong PSA is untenable if we do not wish to follow Kant, Reid 
and others in their denial that we perceive temporal properties. And that is to say that 
experience cannot be homoeomerous if we are to explain our perception of temporal 
properties. 
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Chapter Seven: 
Indiscriminability and Experience of Change 
 
 
Force 3: Gentle Breeze – Leaves and small twigs in constant motion …
220
 
 
1. Overview 
 
It is overwhelmingly plausible to hold that we often experience objects as being in 
constant motion. It is also very natural to appeal to the claim that there are changes too 
slight to be perceived in accounting for our experience of slow moving objects like hour-
hands, and in explaining supposed failures of the transitivity of indiscriminability. 
However, Fara (2001) argues that this natural explanation precludes our experiencing 
constant motion. We therefore seem skewered on the horns of a dilemma. Here I argue 
that Fara’s puzzle about constant motion can be resolved by thinking carefully about the 
anhomoeomery of experience in this context. As such this chapter forms the final part of 
my case against homoeomery. It also provides the opportunity to draw together hitherto 
disparate elements in the thesis, closing with a unified account of our experience of 
change. 
 
The following course is charted. First, I introduce our natural explanation of non-
transitivity in slow motion, ‘hour-hand’ cases and Fara’s puzzle concerning that 
explanation. I raise two concerns about Fara’s own proposed explanation of our 
experience in such ‘hour-hand’ cases. I then explain how a proper appreciation of the 
special conditions on experiencing change (as opposed to mere variation) allow one to 
respond to Fara’s challenge by appealing to the anhomoeomery of experience in time. I 
thereby safeguard both our experience of constant motion as well as the natural 
explanation of our experience of slow changes. In contrast, as Fara in effect 
demonstrates, failure to appreciate the exceptional conditions in play with experience of 
                                                 
 
220 The Beaufort Scale: Land based specification, UK Met. Office. 
 
 
197 
change renders it impossible to make sense of our experience of constant motion. In 
other words, unless we accept that experience is significantly anhomoeomerous, we 
cannot account for our experience of constant motion. 
 
2. Experience of Slow Motion and Non-transitivity 
 
The non-transitivity of indiscriminability in relation to phenomenal continua supposedly 
arises because it is thought possible to have three scenes, S1-3, such that S1 looks the same 
as S2, S2 the same as S3, but nonetheless S1 does not look the same as S3.
221 A paradigm 
case is taken to be “phenomenal motion too slow to be momentarily perceived” 
(Goodman 1977: 203). As Dummett explicates: 
 
I look at something which is moving, but moving too slowly for me to be able to see 
that it is moving. After one second, it still looks to me as though it is in the same 
position; similarly after three seconds. After four seconds, however, I can recognize that 
it has moved from where it was at the start, i.e. four seconds ago. At this time, however, 
it does not look to me as though it is in a different position from that it was in one, or 
even three, seconds before. Do I not contradict myself in the very attempt to express 
how it looks to me? (1975: 316)222
 
The kind of case Goodman and Dummett have in mind is our experience of an hour-
hand as it progresses slowly around a clock-face. After looking at the hour-hand for 
some time, one perceives the hand as being in a distinct position and so infers that it has 
moved. This kind of experience contrasts with a case in which we attend to a constantly 
moving second-hand and can straightforwardly see the second-hand moving around the 
clock-face. Here the change in position of the second-hand over time is an object of our 
experience; change itself is not experienced in the hour-hand case. 
 
                                                 
 
221 In each case what is relevant is how things look to the same subject. Hellie (2005: §1.3) advises against 
discussing non-transitivity in terms of the vernacular of ‘looking the same’. Certainly, we should be careful 
in unpacking that notion. However, we do talk this way and that needs accounting for. Moreover, Hellie 
himself offers a plausible understanding of ‘looking the same’ in terms of indiscriminability – his reading 
(4). For much more on indiscriminability, see below. 
222 See further discussion in Chapter Three above. 
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We should also contrast experiencing mere variation with experiencing genuine change. 
Looking at a full colour spectrum one perceives the variation in colour around the wheel 
but one does not perceive change. Change, as it is understood here, is variation of the 
properties of some object over time.
223 The properties of an ordinary colour spectrum do 
not change in this sense. An example of genuine change is variation in body temperature 
over the course of a day. Of course, most properties change and also merely vary. Body 
temperature is not the same in all parts of the body. Thus the body’s temperature both 
changes over time and also merely varies between its parts. 
 
3. Fara’s Puzzle 
 
In discussions of non-transitivity the fast, second-hand case is typically ignored. When it 
is explicitly considered, it is typically held to present no special problems. Wright does 
discuss the case of “seemingly continuous processes in time” (1975: 345), acknowledging, 
quite rightly, that they do not come “ready made out of finitely many stages” (ibid.). 
However, he treats the case as merely a less “artificial”, more “dignified” version of the 
colour patch case. He achieves this by analysing it in terms of the discriminability or 
otherwise of stages of the process, where a stage is “an instantaneous exposure, as it were, 
of the process at [a] point [in time]” (ibid.). Likewise, Burgess distinguishes between fast, 
dynamic, and static cases but claims that “we can know a priori that [a continuous change] 
must be … divisible” (1990: 212) into “observed [temporal] stages of the process of 
change” (208). On this basis, he concludes that there is no essential difference between 
the cases.
224
 
Yet, as Fara highlights, the second-hand case presents a serious difficulty for standard 
explanations of non-transitivity. The standard explanation of slow-motion, hour-hand 
cases, is that there are changes of position which are too slight to be perceived, the 
change in position of an hour-hand over the course of a few seconds being just such a 
change.
225 However, as Fara notes, this explanation is “very suspect … since it should 
                                                 
 
223 Goodman (1977: 271-2) emphasises this ordinary distinction in a different context but does not apply it 
to his discussion of non-transitivity. 
224 Cf. De Clercq and Horsten, “… consider a process of change in respect of some observable property (a 
determinable such as colour, position or pitch). The process is composed of stages…” (2004: 440). 
225 This claim that there are changes too slight to be perceived is analysed in detail below. 
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leave us wondering why not every experience of motion is an experience of slow 
motion.” As she puts it: 
 
If the reason that the hour-hand strikes us as still-looking for any twenty-second interval 
is that we cannot visually represent a change in position as small as, say, 1/6° (on a 
normal-size clock), then the second-hand should look still for any 1/36 second interval, 
for it changes its position only that amount during such an interval. But, when we watch 
the second-hand moving, it never looks still – it appears to be constantly moving. … 
Although the [proposed explanation] would explain why we experience slow motion, the 
explanation seems too strong, since it seems to preclude the possibility of experiences of 
constant motion. (2001: 926-7) 
 
Think of Fara’s challenge like this: the explanation of why there are changes of position 
which are too slight to be perceived carried across to the case of fast, second-hand 
motion conflicts with the existence of experience of constant motion.
226 Yet experience of 
constant motion is actual, so the explanation must be false. 
 
Fara detects no relevant difference between experience of fast and slow motion.
227 
Consequently, she must offer an alternative explanation as to why we don’t perceive 
changes even in slow cases. On Fara’s view, if the explanation did apply in the slow case, 
it would carry over to the fast. In the next section I raise two doubts about Fara’s 
proposed explanation. However, at the heart of the chapter is the claim that perception 
of change is a fundamentally special case. The reason is that there are conditions on 
experience representing change that are not in play in hour-hand or colour spectrum 
cases, i.e., that do not apply to its representing distinctness or mere variation.
228 
Appreciation of these conditions allows one to respond to Fara’s challenge, safeguarding 
both our experience of constant motion and the plausible explanation of our experience 
in slow-change cases; failure to distinguish the two cases renders it impossible to make 
sense of our experience of constant motion. 
                                                 
 
226 If I experience an object as constantly moving through some interval over some period, then there is no 
time during that period at which I see the object and yet it does not look to be in motion. Constant motion 
does not require constant velocity. It must also be distinguished from strictly continuous motion which 
involves experiencing motion through all proper parts of the interval. 
227 Thus: “It is intended that remarks in this discussion be taken to hold mutatis mutandis for perceived 
differences between two things at a single time, as well as for perceived changes in a single thing over 
time.” (916, fn.14; cf. fns.20 and 21) 
228 As elsewhere I talk about what experience represents. Naïve realists can substitute ‘presents’ throughout 
without affecting the argument. 
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4. Fara’s Explanation 
 
Fara’s own reply to the puzzle she raises is to suggest that the tiniest of slow changes may 
indeed be perceived but just not noticed (927-8). There are two immediate problems with 
this claim, one minor and one more serious. 
 
Firstly, according to Fara, “Noticing the change in apparent position requires not only that 
there be an apparent change, but also that we believe there to be one” (928). It is not 
clear whether Fara thinks adding belief is sufficient or merely necessary for noticing. In 
any case, adding belief is neither necessary nor sufficient for noticing. It is not sufficient 
since I might believe that there was an apparent change for a congeries of better or worse 
reasons (or none at all). Perhaps my guru tells me that there has been an apparent 
change. Clearly, this does not mean that I notice it. Similarly, it is not necessary since we 
can make sense of someone genuinely noticing a change and yet judging that there was 
no apparent change and consequently forming no belief. Perhaps again the subject is 
convinced by his guru that there could not have been an apparent change, any 
appearance to the contrary being explained by a failure to properly attend to his 
experience. Certainly Fara (e.g., 927) is happy to allow that our judgements about the 
character of our experience can be mistaken; thus more needs saying about noticing. 
 
There is a more pressing second concern. The explanation that Fara proposes is meant to 
explain why we cannot see hour-hand motion over a period of just a few seconds. To 
explain this whilst acquiescing that such motion is really apparent, one must argue that 
we cannot notice such apparent motion. However, whilst a distinction between what we 
experience and what we notice of the scene experienced seems in order, the idea that 
there are things we experience which we simply cannot notice seems extremely hard to 
make sense of. 
 
At one point Fara notes that what she has “difficulty understanding is, if it is really the 
look of [two patches] which is different, why cannot this come across, so to speak, by 
looking just at them?” (915) What I have difficulty understanding is, if a change is really an 
apparent one, why this cannot come within our cognitive ken? To paraphrase her: there is a 
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heavy burden on the proponent of this explanation to persuade us that an unnoticeable 
apparent change is really an apparent change at all. 
 
In glossing Fara’s position on this point Martin suggests that her view involves the 
following commitment. 
 
Even if a subject may on occasion fail to notice the difference in look between adjacent 
samples, and indeed may be bound to fail to notice such a difference, nonetheless there 
is a difference to be noticed and which could be noticed. (2004: 77) 
 
I find this commitment equally perplexing. If someone is bound to fail to notice a 
difference of some kind, how is it a difference which nonetheless could be noticed? Even 
embracing the distinction between impersonal and individual discriminability (see 
Chapter Three, §4) does not appear to help in this particular case, since no appeal is 
made to a specific deficit relative to which a subject or subjects in general fail to notice 
the difference despite it being impersonally noticeable. Any such deficit simply seems to 
be an aspect of vision or experience and as such will prevent any impersonal/individual 
distinction from gaining a useful grip here. 
 
In what follows, I show that we can avoid these difficulties and retain the explanation of 
the slow motion case which Fara rejects. 
 
5. Homogeneity 
 
Focus on a case of reasonably rapid motion like that of a second-hand moving constantly 
around a clock-face from one to two o’clock, sweeping out an angle of 30°. You perceive 
the hand constantly moving from one o’clock to two o’clock. Now consider the 
following claim (cf. Fara’s P2, 921). 
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Homogeneity Variation in small enough spatial intervals appears homogeneous. 
That is, there is a small enough sector (with central angle ∆θ) which is such that 
all pointer positions lying within the sector appear the same.
229
 
In the scenario as described, Homogeneity entails that variation in small enough temporal 
intervals appears homogeneous. That is, there is a small enough time (the time during 
which the minimal angle ∆θ is swept out, i.e., ∆t = ∆θ/ω, where ω is angular velocity) 
which is such that all pointer positions during ∆t appear the same. 
 
Homogeneity has struck most philosophers as obvious.
230 In hour-hand and colour 
spectrum cases, Fara combines Homogeneity with the claim that phenomenal continua 
(i.e., cases of continuous looking variation) are possible to derive the conclusion that 
‘looks the same as’ is not transitive. In the current context, we need not rely on the 
doubtful premise that we experience strictly continuous motion to generate a problematic 
conclusion. The claim that we experience constant motion suffices since, as already noted, 
this appears precluded by Homogeneity as formulated above. 
 
In the hour-hand and colour spectrum cases, Fara accepts the ‘Homogeneity plus 
phenomenal continua’ argument as valid and instead questions its soundness. In 
particular, she argues that there are insufficient grounds for accepting either premise and 
moreover, that “the two premises are in so much tension with one another that their 
conjunction cannot be admitted as plausible” (922). Thus, in the end she affirms the 
“disjunctive claim: either there are no phenomenal continua after all, or it is not the case 
that sufficiently small parts of phenomenal continua are all homogeneous-looking” 
(ibid.). In the constant motion case, the disjunctive conclusion is rather that either there 
is no perception of constant motion or that Homogeneity is false. Given that we surely 
                                                 
 
229 I have followed Fara in formulating Homogeneity. An important issue with this formulation is whether 
we should distinguish between: (i) pointer positions within ∆θ look the same, and (ii) pointer positions 
within ∆θ merely do not look distinct. (See Hellie 2005: 489, fn.9.) However, even if the weaker, second 
reading suffices to explain hour-hand cases, it does not avoid Fara’s problem about constant motion. It 
would remain true that within a small enough sector no pointer positions would look distinct. Yet a 
constantly moving pointer looks to be constantly changing its position. And how could it look to be 
changing its position if over small enough sectors it did not look to occupy distinct positions (i.e., have 
changed position)? Note also that we need to give a precise sense to the notion of a position appearing the 
same. There is, for example, arguably a difference between saying that the pointer looks to be in the same 
position relative to some fixed mark on the clock-face and saying that it looks to be in the same position relative to 
some previous position. This nicety does not affect anything substantive in what follows. 
230 It is implicit in the ‘dot’ argument in Dummett 1975: 314-15. See also Wright 1975: 343 and, in relation 
to both Wright and Fara, De Clercq and Horsten 2004. However, contrast Hellie op. cit.. 
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do experience constant motion, this conclusion forces us to look more carefully at the 
motivation for Homogeneity. 
 
6. Finite Powers of Discrimination 
 
Homogeneity is typically motivated by the idea that our powers of discrimination are 
finite. As Wright avers, to reject Homogeneity would be “to suppose that we have 
infinite powers of discrimination” (1975: 346). However, intuitive support for the idea 
that our powers of discrimination are finite rests, I suggest, with the appeal of the claim 
that there are changes too small to be seen or, more generally, changes too small to be 
perceptually detected. 
  
What exactly does this claim amount to? Fara distinguishes two readings: 
 
(a)  For some sufficiently slight amount of change (in colour, sound, position, etc.), when we 
perceive an object for the entirety of an interval during which it changes by less than that 
amount, we perceive it as not having changed at all during that interval. 
(b)  For some sufficiently slight amount of change (in colour, sound, position, etc.), we 
cannot perceive an object as having changed by less than that amount unless we perceive 
it as not having changed at all (as having changed by a zero amount). (917) 
 
As Fara puts it, (a) tells us “that sufficiently small changes in our perceptual environment 
appear to us as no change,” whereas (b) tells us “that there is a limit to how slight an 
apparent change can be” (917). 
 
Fara goes on to argue that any acceptably modified version of (a) will collapse into a 
version of claim (b). In particular, as it stands (a) is unsatisfactory if it is meant to capture 
the thought that “there are changes too slight for us to detect by observation” because it 
entails that “whenever we perceived stasis we would perceive it as stasis” (919), 
something quite implausible in the light of several well-known illusions.
231 However, 
modifying (a) to avoid this consequence we arrive at a claim such as: 
 
                                                 
 
231 See Kitaoka’s striking examples at http://www.psy.ritsumei.ac.jp/~akitaoka/saishin17e.html. 
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For some small amount of change ε, we cannot visually represent [or, more generally, 
have an experience as of] a change of any positive amount δ less than ε. (920) 
 
And clearly “this is just to retreat to saying that our powers of discrimination are finite in 
the (b) sense” (920). I agree entirely and henceforth focus on (b). 
 
7. A Crucial Distinction 
 
In addition to the above statement of (b), Fara also writes the following. 
 
Looked at another way, what (b) denies is this: for every experience I could have as of a 
change, there is an experience I could have as of a lesser change (but for the exception 
just mentioned [that is, except for an experience of ‘zero change’]). (918) 
 
However, it is not clear that this is what (b) as first stated denies. What the passage just 
cited denies is the following: for every experience as of a change that I might have, there 
is some experience I could undergo as of a lesser change. In other words, the passage denies 
the existence of a stand-alone experience which only represents a change below the 
threshold. Experiences merely as of very small changes are ruled out. 
 
What is not ruled out by this passage, but may seem ruled out by (b) is the representation 
of change below a certain limit. Consider that an experience of a large change will typically 
involve the representation of sub-changes. My experience of a shooting star tracing an 
arc across the sky involves experiencing various parts of the motion – parts 
corresponding to the meteor’s movement through proper segments of the whole arc 
traced. Read strictly, the passage above does not insist on any limit to how small these 
sub-changes might be represented as being. What it rules out is that very small changes 
might be the sole objects of a change-experience, i.e., that they might be experienced on 
their own and not as part of a larger change.
232 More generally, just because we deny that slight 
                                                 
 
232 If we think of experience as a process or event then, plausibly, we might think of the process or event 
of experiencing the meteor’s motion as involving sub-processes or sub-events corresponding to 
experiencing different parts of the motion. However, as I argue below, we should resist this idea in its full 
generality. 
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changes are imperceptible on their own, this should not be taken to commit us to claims about what is 
true in cases where changes over longer periods are perceived. 
 
Thus, there are two different claims which we might want to make if we are trying to 
capture the thought that there are changes too small to be detected – two claims which 
Fara hesitates between in discussing (b).
233
 
(b1)   For some sufficiently slight amount of change, we cannot have a perceptual 
experience as of an object merely changing by less than that amount unless we 
experience it as not changing at all. 
(b2)   For some sufficiently slight amount of change, we simply cannot perceive an 
object as changing by less than that amount fullstop – even as part of a larger 
change – unless we perceive it as not changing at all.234
 
Even if Fara intends the (b2) reading, the weaker reading (b1) is sufficient to yield the 
denial she expresses in the quotation just given, viz., the denial that “for every experience 
I could have as of a change, there is an experience I could have as of a lesser change”. In 
other words, (b1) captures one clear sense in which there are changes too slight to be 
perceived; (b1) tells us that only changes above a certain size, can in themselves be 
apparent changes. But the minimal size for a change experience need not be the same as 
the size of the minimal change detectable. Indeed, for all that (b1) says, I may perceive 
the very finest degrees of some slight change and yet be incapable of having an 
experience which only represents a change smaller than that slight change. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
233 Compare and contrast: “(b) requires only that when we perceive an object to be changing , we perceive 
it to be changing by at least some given amount” (919) – reading (b1) – and “the truth of (b) requires only 
that when we discern a change … there can be no interval during which the things appears to change … by 
some smaller amount than the threshold of discrimination” (919) – reading (b2). 
234 John Morrison pointed out to me that talk of an absolute limit across all perceptual circumstances here 
is implausible, noting cases of viewing through microscopes and suggesting the notion of change in one’s 
visual field to accommodate such cases. Even with this modification it may remain the case that some 
circumstances simply afford better discriminations than others. In the case in point, adding time-markings 
to the clock-face may change the perceptual circumstance in this way. Consequently, we will have to 
relativize (b1) and (b2) to perceptual contexts. I ignore this complication in what follows.   
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8. The New Account 
 
If we accept (b2), then, Fara argues, the non-transitivity of ‘looking the same as’ follows 
on the assumption that there are phenomenal continua. Likewise, Fara also argues that 
(b2) precludes our experiencing constant motion. The reason is, she claims, that (b2) 
commits us, quite generally, to there being finite intervals in which things look the same, i.e. 
to Homogeneity. Shortly I show that (b2) does not, in fact, commit us to Homogeneity. 
However, first I want to show how by endorsing (b1) but, for now, resisting (b2) we can 
explain our basic intuitions concerning Homogeneity without precluding the existence of 
experience of constant motion. I first explain how this move is best understood and how 
it achieves the result just noted. I then show how the conclusions of previous chapters 
independently motivate the resulting picture of experience in the case of perceived 
change at hand. 
 
If we only endorse (b1), all that is ruled out is our merely perceiving an object moving 
some small finite amount, say seeing the second-hand sweeping out an angle of merely 
∆θ over a time ∆t. On this proposal the visual system cannot merely represent a change of 
any positive amount less than or equal to ∆θ. However, experience of constant motion is 
not precluded. The reason is that there is no experience of motion of any kind in these 
situations since no change at all is being represented. On their own, changes so small are 
not apparent according to (b1). The only possibility for phenomenal change and so 
experience of constant motion is over some larger interval strictly greater than ∆θ. 
 
Plausible cases in which we experience motion (and so potentially constant motion) 
clearly involve intervals larger than ∆θ. In the example above, the clock is sweeping out a 
30° angle and obviously ∆θ << 30°. However, (b1) has no implications for cases where 
we perceive changes larger than ∆θ. In fact, (b1) leaves open two main options 
concerning what we do perceive when we perceive changes larger than ∆θ.  
 
One option is to insist that in virtue of perceiving the larger change one is able to 
perceive the tiniest of sub-changes within the relevant interval. If that were true, then 
Homogeneity would evidently fail to hold in such cases – indeed such cases would be 
cases of genuine, strict phenomenal continua. However, once we recognize the general 
point that just because we deny that slight changes are imperceptible on their own, this 
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need not commit us to claims about what is true in cases where changes over longer 
periods are perceived, we can account for constant motion without committing to 
perceiving the tiniest of sub-changes as with the above account. Indeed, whilst Fara 
leaves it open whether we might perceive the tiniest of changes (though not notice 
them), such a claim taken to its limit seems incredible. Is it really plausible to think of the 
visual system as affording discriminations down to 10
-25m say?
235
 
The alternative approach denies that we perceive all  the sub-changes of a perceived 
change. In some cases, certainly, we may perceive certain sub-changes in virtue of 
perceiving larger changes. But we do not see all sub-changes of perceived changes; there 
are some changes which we simply see as such. The content of experience is determinable 
in this respect. We can perceive a change over some reasonable temporal interval despite 
not perceiving all the sub-changes within that interval. This is not to say that we perceive 
the second-hand as stationary or unchanging through some sub-intervals, however. 
Rather it is to deny that we need say any more than that over these very small intervals 
we can be (in the process of) experiencing change over some larger interval. 
 
In particular, we should insist that there are cases where throughout the course of some 
short period ∆t, one is experiencing the second-hand sweeping out an angle of ∆θ and 
yet: (i) it is not true that over any proper sub-period of ∆t one experiences the hand 
sweeping out an angle of ∆θ; nor (ii) is it true that over any proper sub-period of ∆t one 
experiences, or is experiencing, the hand sweeping out some sub-interval of ∆θ, say δθ. 
Over sub-periods of ∆t – indeed, throughout ∆t – one is simply experiencing the second-
hand sweeping out an angle of ∆θ. 
 
On this account we can reject Homogeneity and respond to Fara’s challenge regarding 
constant motion experience as follows. First, note how Fara’s original argument had the 
following form. “If the reason that the hour-hand strikes us as still-looking for any 
twenty-second interval is that we cannot visually represent a change in position as small 
as, say, 1/6° (on a normal-size clock), then the second-hand should look still for any 
1/36 second interval.” However, even if a change of 1/6° and so a 1/36 second 
experience of the second-hand on its own would be an experience of no change, this does 
                                                 
 
235 Comments from Tomas Bogardus helped me to clarify my position on this issue. 
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not mean that we cannot see constant change throughout, say, a one second period in 
which the hand turns 6°. Moreover, in contrast to the first account considered, saying 
this does not commit us to seeing changes of 1/6° during 1/36 second sub-periods of 
this second. Rather, as we probe the structure of the experience over the course of the 
second we must eventually stop and simply deny that experience has any finer structure. 
Again: over such timescales we simply see change. This means that we can allow for 
experience of constant  motion throughout periods without insisting on experience of 
continuous motion over those periods in the strict sense that for every experience of 
change in position over an interval, there must be experience of some lesser change over 
some proper part of that interval. 
 
Interestingly, on this new account it turns out that, although the (b1)/(b2) contrast 
importantly highlights the possibility of there being certain changes which are only 
perceivable as part of larger changes, (b2) need not be completely rejected after all. For, 
pace Fara, on the picture just sketched (b2) does not straightforwardly entail 
Homogeneity. The above account denies that not being able to perceive an object as 
changing by less than some amount (unless it is perceived as not changing at all) commits 
us to pointer positions appearing the same throughout the brief periods where only such 
change is occurring. Instead it insists that we can be experiencing some larger change 
throughout a brief period in virtue of its being a sub-period of a larger change 
experience, and moreover, that that is all there is to be said about our experience in such 
cases. 
 
In sum: Homogeneity fails precisely in those cases where there is experience of constant 
motion. Consequently, constant motion experience is safeguarded as well as the obvious 
truth cited in explanations of hour-hand cases, namely, that our powers of discrimination 
are finite. My account is attractive because of its ability to respond to Fara’s challenge. 
What I now show is how the considerations we have encountered at length already in the 
thesis provide independent support for the picture of experience over time here 
exploited. 
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9. Anhomoeomery Again 
 
Two key ideas were exploited in this chapter so far. First, that we may experience certain 
changes only as parts of larger changes; second, that change experience may be 
fundamentally determinable, in that we may experience change throughout some period 
without experiencing all the sub-changes of that change. Both ideas involve the thought 
that experience cannot remorselessly be broken down into independent parts. In the 
former case, the thought is that whether or not one sees certain slight changes depends 
upon what one experiences over some longer period. In the latter case, the thought is 
that whether one is experiencing change over some brief period depends upon whether one 
experiences change over some longer period. 
 
As discussed at length in Chapter Four, it has traditionally been assumed that activities 
are homoeomerous where a process is homoeomerous just if none of its temporal parts 
has a nature (be that a matter of what activity the period is filled with or of what has been 
accomplished over the period) which depends constitutively on facts about the process 
beyond the period of the temporal part in question.
236 Following Taylor (1977), Soteriou 
(2007), and others, I argued that such an assumption was false of most ordinary 
processes. For example, I argued that walking and running are not homoeomerous down 
to instants or brief temporal parts. Recall that “walking can be characterized as an 
alternating sequence of single and double support” in contrast to, say, running which 
“involves alternating sequences of [single] support and nonsupport” (Enoka 2002: 179). 
Thus, a single support phase (which is all that will be going on during certain sub-periods 
of periods of walking) will not be sufficient an occurrence on its own to make it true that 
someone walked. Similarly, with talking one arguably has at least to utter a 
phoneme/distinctive feature (i.e., a genuine phonological unit) to have talked as opposed 
to have merely made noise. 
 
Recall also that for all that it is natural to allow that if Paula Radcliffe was running 
throughout a two hours and fifteen minute marathon win, that she was running during all 
sub-periods of the two hours and fifteen minutes. However, in the light of the above, we 
                                                 
 
236 As discussed in Chapter Four, I am inclined towards the view that experience is anhomoeomerous even 
when the condition of homoeomery is the following: an activity of Ф-ing by x is homoeomerous just if for 
any duration D which falls wholly within a duration during which Ф-ing by x goes on, D is a duration over 
which it is true that x Ф-ed. This detail need not detain us here, however. 
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are led to conclude that she must only count as running over certain sub-periods of time 
in virtue of what was going on in surrounding intervals. In isolation a single support phase isn’t 
running; nonetheless, Radcliffe may be running during a time in which she only 
accomplishes a single support phase in virtue of what she accomplishes in surrounding 
times.
237
 
The response offered to Fara above then turns out to be intimately connected to the 
denial of homoeomery where the relevant activity is experiencing change. Accounting for 
our experience of constant motion in the face of Fara’s challenge has, in effect, led us to 
deny that change experience is homoeomerous down to very small temporal parts. Given 
the anhomoeomery of other processes this should perhaps not be an unexpected 
discovery about experience. However, as I argued above, there are other, quite specific 
reasons for thinking that experience of change could not be homoeomerous, reasons I 
now briefly recapitulate. 
 
10. Temporal Minima 
 
Firstly, change experience cannot be homoeomerous down to instants. That was the 
conclusion of Chapter Six where I argued that since change takes time, our experience of 
change must itself unfold over time. It follows from this that we should reject the idea 
that change-experience can be broken down into instants. We cannot experience change 
at an instant – though we may be in the midst of change experience at some instant and 
so be experiencing change then.
238
 
This armchair argument establishes that there are experiential temporal minima in the 
relevant cases. Change experience is comprised of events or processes with some duration, 
and properties of change experience attach to those events or processes and not to 
instants. However, so far that argument only establishes that change experience is not 
                                                 
 
237 On the closely related notion of dissectivity see Goodman 1977: 28, Armstrong 1961, and especially 
Hilbert 1987. 
238 The same applies to our experience of sounds. We experience sounds; any experience of a sound is an 
experience of a sound-filled period; the temporal structure of our experience matches the temporal 
structure apparently presented; thus, any sound experience itself will take place over time and so sound-
experience cannot be broken down into instants. For all that, we can be hearing a sound at an instant if that 
instant falls during a period over which we hear a sound. 
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homoeomerous down to instants. For all that has been said it might be homoeomerous 
down to arbitrarily small temporal intervals. Armchair considerations will not help us 
here for the length of experiential temporal minima is plausibly an empirical matter. 
However, as we saw in the discussion of Dennett in Chapter Five, there are empirical 
reasons to think that experience cannot be broken down below quite significant 
durations. Thinking about these empirical findings also returns us to the idea that 
whether we experience some aspect of the environment depends crucially on the nature 
of stretches of experience. 
 
Recall earlier discussion of visual masking experiments. There I argued that if we hold 
that experience is significantly anhomoeomerous, we can offer an attractive, realist 
account of masking phenomena which does not appeal to problematic delays in 
consciousness. The account notes that if experience does not break down into very short 
independent experiences, then there is no reason to assume that the experiential presence 
of a mask subsequent to the first, stimulus disc is irrelevant to answering the question 
whether the disc is perceived or not. So whilst it is true that if the masking ring hadn’t 
intervened, the disc would have been reported, this has no bearing on the case where the 
ring was present. ‘Has one seen the disc at t?’ (where t is a moment briefly after the first 
stimulus presentation) is not a question that one can answer independently of one’s 
experience during the surrounding period of time. To assume that it must be is to insist 
that experience is analysable down to very short periods. Certainly, the disc would have 
been seen had it not been for the mask. But it does not follow that either the disc was 
seen in the masking trial (cf. Dennett’s Orwellianism) or, alternatively, that there is a 
slack in consciousness (cf. Dennett’s Stalinism). This disjunction is only exhaustive if we 
assume a picture of experience analysable into independent instants or experiences of 
very short duration. On that picture, we cannot appeal to the nature of subsequent 
experience to distinguish the non-masked case from the masked case unless there is 
sufficient delay in consciousness for unconscious registering of the second stimulus to 
come into play. 
 
Rejecting that picture, however, we can simply allow that in one case the first stimulus is 
seen and in the other not. As I put it above: different events have different perceptual 
appearances for us. The perceptual appearances of events are constrained by the fact that 
our experience itself has a certain coarse-grained temporal structure. These constraints 
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mean that we must think of the appearances of events as attaching first and foremost to 
durations above a certain minimum temporal threshold, in other words to temporally 
extended events rather than instantaneous or near instantaneous time-slices. In the 
masking case we should consider the events, (i) target followed by mask, and (ii) target 
followed by no mask, as different events with different appearances. What masking 
experiments show is that the appearances of sub-events of an event whole can contrast 
strikingly with the appearance of one of the sub-events presented on its own. Moreover, 
what masking suggests is that the temporal minima can be of the order of hundreds of 
milliseconds. 
 
To return to the case of experienced change. Consider a change which takes place over a 
very short interval of time (e.g., Fara’s case of the second-hand moving for a 1/36s ≈ 
28ms period). What the discussion of masking suggests is that what happens in the 
subsequent period matters to our experience of this change. That fits well with the 
response given to Fara above since the idea here is that if the 28ms change is part of a 
larger change (i.e., the subsequent period involves more change) we may well see 
something different (indeed: change throughout the period) to what would be seen if the 
change were not a part of any larger change (quite possibly no change!). Moreover, the 
rejection of homoeomery makes room for the denial that we see the 28ms sub-changes 
of the changes which we perceive going on over longer periods. Rather we may simply 
be experiencing larger changes as such throughout these very short periods. 
 
11. Temporal Limits 
 
We have seen how to retain the intuitive explanation of slow motion, hour-hand cases 
whilst allowing for the perception of constant motion, hence solving Fara’s puzzle. We 
do so by showing why Homogeneity fails in precisely those cases where we have genuine 
perception of motion. In addition we explain why failures of Homogeneity do not 
commit us to perceiving the tiniest of sub-changes of perceived changes even though we 
are experiencing constant change throughout the relevant periods. 
 
The resulting picture is attractive given its ability to respond to Fara’s worry. But it is also 
motivated independently since it rests on the denial that experience is homoeomerous 
down to instants or small durations. That denial has independent motivation arising from 
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the relation between experience itself as a temporal phenomenon and the temporal 
phenomena experienced, and further from the ability it provides to account for a variety 
of otherwise puzzling psychological phenomena. 
 
In this and the following section I want to address two final concerns. Responding to 
them provides the opportunity to bring together various lines of thought developed in 
the thesis. The first worry can be put like this. The standard explanation of slow-motion, 
hour-hand cases, recall, is that there are changes of position that are too slight to be 
perceived, the change in position of an hour-hand over the course of a few seconds 
being just such a change. This explanation invites the question: But what if you’re 
looking at the hour-hand for longer than a few seconds – say for an hour? Here the 
change in position of the hour-hand isn’t too small to be perceived, yet despite this we 
don’t see the hour-hand moving over that longer period of time. How is this to be 
explained?
239
 
The explanation of why we don’t see motion when we watch an hour-hand for an hour 
begins with the thought that the basic units of time perceived are of a certain duration. 
This duration is the key thing philosophers are alive to when they talk about the specious 
present or retentional aspects of experience.
240 One way of thinking about these 
durations is as periods over which we explain the properties of sub-parts in terms of the 
properties of the whole duration and not vice-versa. That is, periods where the 
explanatory direction runs from temporal whole to temporal parts. We have seen just this 
idea at work in the discussion above. We can be experiencing motion over some period 
in virtue of experiencing motion throughout some encompassing interval; we may fail to 
see some stimulus in virtue of the temporally surrounding experiential context. 
 
The specious present does not last forever, however; nor do we retain all past experience 
in our current awareness (whatever Bergson may occasionally suggest). In other words, it 
is not just that the basic units of time perceived must be of a certain duration – there is 
                                                 
 
239 Daniel Morgan and Matthew Soteriou both raised this concern with me independently. 
240 Cf. Russell 1948: 226: “‘Pace perceiv’d’ is only possible when the motion is so rapid that, though the 
beginning and end are noticeably different, the lapse of time is so short that both are parts of one sensation 
[i.e., fall within one specious present]”. Conversely, “suppose that we are watching a chameleon gradually 
changing. We may be quite unable to ‘see’ a process of change, and yet able to know that, after a time, a 
change has taken place. This will occur if, supposing A and B to be the shades at the beginning and end of 
a specious present, A and B are indistinguishable, while A recollected is distinguishable from C when C 
occurs” (1927: 281). 
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also a limit to how long they can be. Beyond such a limit the explanatory direction is 
reversed; over longer time periods we explain our extended experience in terms of the 
various processes and events it is made up of. As a toy-model we can think of these basic 
durations of experience as windows and of there being limits to how wide or narrow 
windows can be. On the model we can fix the window width as 300ms, say. With the 
idea of a window in play we can say that one is only able to perceive change/movement 
if the clock-hand moves a sufficient distance within a 300ms window. In the hour-hand 
cases, the hand does not do this. We are well outside of such a window before sufficient 
movement takes place. 
 
Beyond those windows the traditional thought that a succession of experience is not 
itself an experience of succession is correct.
241 Thus, in the hour-hand case simply having 
a course of experience which changes over some long period does not put one in a 
position to experience the succession itself. Put another way, in these long timescale 
cases we explain the course of experience in terms of its parts. None of those parts are of 
changes large enough to be perceived, so no change is perceived over the whole course 
of experience. In these cases the idea that sub-changes may be perceived in virtue of 
perceiving larger changes is not in play. 
 
The idea that we could perceive sub-changes as parts of larger changes is principally a 
negative claim, viz., that just because we cannot see a change on its own, we should not 
assume that we cannot see it as a sub-change of a larger perceived change. That negative 
claim does not entail that we see any old change so long as it is part of a larger perceived 
change. As discussed, the very finest degrees of perceived changes are not plausibly 
picked up on. Thinking about hour-hand cases brings out a second important feature of 
the picture. This is that it is only sub-changes of changes falling within the basic, window 
duration which are such that they might be perceived in virtue of perceiving some larger 
change. For only in these cases does the explanatory direction run from temporal whole 
to parts. Thus, the appearance, and indeed presence, of events and processes which take 
place within windows depends upon what is being experienced over the duration of the 
whole window. Outside of windows, no such move is available. 
 
                                                 
 
241 See, for example, James 1890: 629 and Husserl 1964: 31 discussed in Chapter Six. 
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To illustrate we can consider what would happen to us if our temporal window were 
suddenly to be altered. Imagine that instead of a 300ms window, one suddenly started 
experiencing with a 30ms window (if you like, a specious present of 30ms). Assuming 
that one’s powers of discrimination remained fixed, a consequence would be that one 
could only perceive change/movement if a clock-hand moved a sufficient distance within 
that 30ms window. On many clocks, it is plausible that a second-hand does not move far 
enough within 30ms for any change to be detected. Thus, the effect of the reduction in 
window-width will be that second-hand experience becomes like hour-hand experience. 
We will see that the second-hand has moved, but cease to see its movement. Conversely, 
if our window suddenly expanded to 30s, we would begin to see the minute-hand’s 
movement in just the way that we see the second-hand’s movement. 
 
12. Determinability and Resolution 
 
A second concern with the account above is with its appeal to the idea that over very 
brief durations we simply experience motion as such. In itself this is not problematic. We 
should be wary of assuming that just because we experience motion over some short 
period that we must have experienced motion in the way that we normally experience it 
at longer timescales, i.e., by experiencing various sub-parts of the motion. This cannot 
plausibly be true all the way down. Insofar then as experience presents us with temporal 
structure and with properties and events logically related to time, it presents us with 
determinable not determinate structure and properties. 
 
This general idea is rather common in representationalist accounts of experience alive to 
the limited discriminative power of ordinary vision. For example, the claim that we see 
determinables without seeing determinates is something representationalists will often 
claim in responding to alleged counter-examples such as blurry vision. Thus, Michael Tye 
argues that if you stare at a serrated stamp with 20/20 vision your experience will 
represent the stamp’s relatively precise shape. However, if you take off your glasses, you 
will merely represent the squarish-ness of the stamp without representing the relatively 
determinate serrated shape that is the stamp’s particular way of being squarish.
242 Given 
                                                 
 
242 This example is from Pace 2007: 334 which I follow in my interpretation of Tye 2002: 149. 
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that determinable shape properties seem plausible content attributions, I see no particular 
reason for thinking that determinable temporal properties can’t be invoked. 
 
Note that the idea of determinable content in the absence of determinate content is not 
only available to the representationalist. As Pace comments, 
 
It is worth noting that a naïve realist could adapt Tye’s solution to the problem of 
blurred vision by appealing to determinable spatial properties. For example, a naïve 
realist might claim that when one’s vision is out of focus one is directly aware of the 
stamp and its squarishness (though not aware of its more determinate shape). (2007: 
351)243
 
It must be acknowledged that such a move conflicts with the most extreme of ‘naïve’ 
intuitions about experience. On one picture, the naïve realist thinks of experience as 
actualizing the properties of objects and events in the world. If one thinks that all 
temporal properties in the world are determinately instantiated, then we must give up the 
claim that these determinate properties are literally actualized. Be this as it may, Pace is 
surely right that the core naïve realist idea can allow for our being related to determinable 
properties. Determinable properties are nonetheless properties of objects in the world 
and as such seem appropriate perceptual relata.
244
 
In the context of the naïve picture outlined in Part One, however, there is a more striking 
consequence of determinable content that needs considering, one which links to the 
Dennettian idea of indeterminate perceptual content. On the naïve picture, recall, the 
temporal structure of experience itself mirrors the temporal structure of the apparent 
objects of experience. In particular, given Self-Intimation and Temporal Transparency, 
there can be no more to the experiential temporal structure of experience itself than is 
found in the structure of its objects. Thus, if the objects of experience have a 
determinable temporal structure so too does experience itself. As a result, what this 
discussion reveals is that although experience is structured in ordinary, physical time, its 
                                                 
 
243 Note that Pace does not endorse either naïve or representationalist theory on this point. 
244 Some deny this claim. Thus Gillett and Rives hold that “the most reasonable position is that the world 
contains absolute determinate properties, but no determinable properties” (2005: 501). See also Armstrong 
1978: Ch.22. Johnson is primarily focused on predicates rather than metaphysical issues about properties, 
but he also makes remarks which are suggestive in this regard, see his 1940: 175-6. Such a view does seem 
to me in tension with naïve realism/relational views of perceptual experience in this context. 
 
 
217 
experiential temporal structure is not as fine grained as ordinary, physical time. In other 
words, reflection on the nature of our experience reveals that although experience has 
gross temporal structure, there are no determinate facts about its fine-grained structure. 
Experience has determinable temporal structure but lacks determinate temporal structure. 
The structure of experience itself is essentially determinable. This immediately raises a 
worry for it has long been taken to be absolutely obvious that determinable properties 
can only be instantiated where some determinate property of that determinable is also 
instantiated. 
 
Such a claim goes back at least to W.E. Johnson (1921) who provided the first systematic 
discussion of the determinable/determinate distinction in those terms. Thus, Johnson 
writes at the end of Ch.11, Part I of his Logic, 
 
The practical impossibility of literally determinate characterisation must be contrasted 
with the universally adopted postulate that the characters of things which we can only 
characterise more or less indeterminately, are, in actual fact, absolutely determinate. 
 
As Sanford (2007) comments, “In saying it is a postulate, Johnson does not mean we 
merely assume it in order to deduce its consequences. He means rather that it is both 
obviously true and cannot be inferred from truths that are even more obvious.” 
 
Likewise, in his influential discussion of determinables and determinates, Armstrong lists 
“five features of the relation between determinable and determinate” (1997: 48). The first 
is Johnson’s postulate. 
 
If an ordinary particular has a determinable property, then it is entailed that it has some 
determinate property, some more particular length or mass or colour, right down to the 
absolutely determinate lengths, masses or absolutely precise shades of colour. (ibid.)245
 
Finally, consider Funkhouser’s recent paper on the determinable/determinate relation 
which commences with a section entitled ‘Criteria for a Successful Analysis’ (2006: §1). 
                                                 
 
245 See also Gillett and Rives who endorse this principle of Johnson’s and Armstrong’s – “An individual 
satisfies a determinable predicate only if it satisfies some or other determinate predicate” (2005: 485) – 
before going on to argue for the much stronger, “pessimistic view, which rejects the existence of 
determinable properties” as default. 
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There he lists a series of “truisms about determinables and their determinates” which any 
“successful analysis of this relation should accord with” (ibid.: 548). Amongst these 
‘truisms’ is the following claim. 
 
An object instantiating a determinable must also instantiate some determinate under that 
determinable. Coloured objects must be red or yellow or blue, etc. No object is merely 
coloured simpliciter. (ibid.: 549) 
 
Call this principle The Determinate Instantiation Principle (DIP). If the principle applies 
universally, then the picture of experience defended in this thesis looks imperilled. 
 
One reply to the DIP objection seeks refuge in an identity theory. The identity theorist 
can claim that the physical events or processes with which experience is identical do have 
determinate temporal properties. What is determinable is the temporal structure that is 
experiential structure, i.e., the temporal structure that contributes to what it is like, 
subjectively, to be the subject of the experience. It seems to me that this response is 
perfectly reasonable. However, it relies on the truth of some form of identity theory. In 
that sense, the picture I have defended appears to be hostage to a substantial 
philosophical theory, the truth of which one might reasonably be sceptical about.
246
 
The only other option is to reject DIP. However, it must be acknowledged that DIP is 
highly intuitive. Consider: Could a person be tall (in some context) but lack a determinate 
height? Could a ball be flying through the air at some velocity but not at any determinate 
velocity? As Funkhouser suggests, could an object simply be coloured and yet not have 
any particular colour? Could an object be heavy but not have any determinate mass? 
These questions appear merely rhetorical. The answers all seem to be: Obviously not. One 
source of resistance to the picture of experience sketched above may well be precisely 
this commitment, viz., its commitment to experience unfolding over time but in no 
determinate fashion at very short-time scales.
247
                                                 
 
246 For scepticism see, for example, Hornsby 1980-1, 1986. 
247 Note that it is not clear that it is right to say experience has a determinable temporal structure if that 
suggests that there are a number of determinate structures that experience might have and where the 
modality is nomological or metaphysical possibility. To this thought the naïve theorist can retort that 
human experience (as it is) is not the sort of process that could have a more determinate structure. Any 
experience has just the structure it does have, it just turns out that this structure lacks the fineness of grain 
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If DIP is strictly false, it will not do simply to dismiss it. We must explain its appeal either 
by restricting the principle or explaining why experience is a special case. Thus, though it 
is (perhaps) a central lesson of quantum physics that DIP fails at the Planck scale, 
pointing to that fact alone does not suffice to diagnose the force of DIP in relation to 
experience. Hence, whilst Funkhouser (2006: 566, fn.2) concedes, “quantum 
indeterminacy might allow for determinables with indeterminate determinates,” he 
considers that “even granting quantum indeterminacy, in normal cases [the] criterion … 
still holds”. Moreover, he points out that since “quantum indeterminacy is 
probabilistically qualified” we could rescue the criterion by amending it to: “every object 
instantiating a determinable also instantiates certain determinates to certain 
probabilities”. Thirty milliseconds is hardly at the Plank scale; nor is any probabilistic 
treatment appropriate in this context. Thus, noting the alleged failure of DIP at the 
quantum level is not enough. 
 
Sometimes DIP is explicitly restricted in its scope to physical objects. Thus, in earlier 
work, Armstrong makes the following claim. 
 
A physical object is determinate in all respects, it has a perfectly precise colour, 
temperature, size, etc. It makes no sense to say that a physical object is light-blue in 
colour, but is no definite shade of light blue. (1961: 59) 
 
And he attempts to use this claim to refute phenomenalism on the grounds that 
“[p]hysical objects, which are determinate, cannot be constructions out of indeterminate 
sense-impressions” (1961: 58). Clearly the implication here is that sense-impressions are 
indeterminate. Let us agree with Armstrong that DIP does apply to physical objects (and 
events). Certainly that concession goes some way to account for the appeal of the general 
principle. Physicalism is plausible at least to the extent that it is plausible that fixing all 
the physical facts suffices to fix all the facts. Thus, the determinateness of the physical 
facts is the determinateness of the facts on which all other facts about the world 
supervene.
248
                                                                                                                                            
 
we might have assumed it did and that physical time does have. Whilst this may be true, it seems at least 
that there are, conceptually speaking, determinate ways experience might have been.  
248 Dennett’s ‘Real patterns’ (1991b) provides a model for thinking of emergent determinable facts 
(patterns) in a determinate world (the life world). Here all life world facts supervene on determinate facts. 
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Can we say anything that would motivate the failure of DIP in the case of experience 
itself? It seems to me that we already have. With ordinary physical processes there is no 
reason to think that, just because a process is temporally structured in some particular 
way, that we are in a position to know precisely what temporal structure it has. For 
example, if Paula runs for two hours, it may simply be impossible for us to know precisely 
how the relative speed of her first hour of running compared to that of her second. This, 
I take it, is the force of Johnson’s remark above concerning “the practical impossibility 
of literally determinate characterisation”. Nonetheless, this in itself is no reason to think 
that there is no answer to the question as to those relative speeds. Indeed, there may be 
powerful considerations for thinking that there must be such an answer, albeit beyond 
our ken.  
 
On the other hand, if we accept Self-Intimation, this kind of picture cannot apply to 
experiential processes in their experiential aspect. Experiential properties are just those which 
we are in a position to know about. Thus, the nature of experience itself (unless 
physically realised or otherwise possessed of a non-experiential aspect) cannot outstrip 
our powers of self-knowledge. These, as revealed by the combination of Temporal 
Transparency with the finitude of our perceptual powers, are not limitless. Consequently 
experience itself must be determinable and DIP must fail in the experiential realm. The 
contrast Johnson tries to draw between the practical impossibility of determinate 
characterisation and actual determinacy fails in the experiential case. In the subjective 
world, the limits of determination are the limits of being.
249
 
Bennett (2004: 171-2) insists not just that “our inner lives are temporally ordered” but 
that they are ordered “down to the finest detail”.
 The failure of DIP should lead us to 
question this. In particular, the failure of DIP is closely related to the fact (if I am right) 
that experiential order is not total where experience exhibits a total order just if for all 
experiences/parts of experience in a given stream of consciousness, ei ≤ e j or ej ≤ e i 
where ≤ is the relation of precedence. Two cases: (i) you hear a flash and a bang, they do 
not appear simultaneous but you are in no position to tell which came first; (ii) you see 
                                                 
 
249 One is reminded of the original version of the passage Armstrong quotes from Aristotle as ‘A Warning’ 
at the start of his 1997: “It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just 
so far as the nature of the subject admits.” Armstrong has ‘certainty’ substituted for Aristotle’s ‘precision’. 
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motion between two points but cannot tell which direction the motion was in.
250 Only if 
we presuppose DIP will we assume that there must be a matter of fact concerning which 
was heard first, flash or bang or which direction the apparent motion was in. Without 
that assumption we can simply deny that either one was heard first or that the apparent 
motion was in one direction or other. One simply perceived an asynchronous flash and 
bang as such; one simply saw motion as such.
251
 
Appeal to determinable structure arising from Self-Intimation allows us to respond to a 
recent puzzle raised by Lee (2007) which draws on claims from relativistic physics to 
argue against our inclination “to believe in a closer connection between the temporal 
layout of experience and its phenomenology than really exists” (367). This conclusion is, 
of course, diametrically opposed to a core claim of this thesis, namely, that the structure 
of experience in time is experiential structure which matches the temporal structure of 
what is apparently experienced. This is not the place to engage in detail with Lee’s 
provocative and interesting argument. However, even leaving aside concerns about Lee’s 
background “classical” conception of the stream of consciousness (e.g., 349) and its 
determination by a parallel sequence of momentary physical states, it is worth noting that 
Lee’s conclusion rests on the crucial premise that “extremely fine-grained differences in 
the sequencing” of one’s stream of consciousness – differences of no more than one 
nanosecond – “are still differences” (363).  Insofar as such differences in sequencing 
pose a problem to our intuitive picture, they must be thought of as phenomenological 
differences. Differences in the realisation of the stream which have no impact on what it 
is like to undergo the stream are by-the-by. Yet it is utterly implausible that our 
introspective powers reveal so fine a grain. Thus, given Self-Intimation, there is every 
reason to deny the key premise. If we do so, we can happily exploit the determinability of 
experience just discussed to insist that experiential sequence is frame-independent since 
at phenomenologically relevant timescales (tens of milliseconds as opposed to 
nanoseconds) distinct experiences/parts of experience will all be time-like separated (cf. 
ibid.: 364).
252
                                                 
 
250 See, for example, Pöppel 1978 and Hirsh and Sherrick 1961, both discussed by Hoerl 1998: 162. 
251 Bennett adds: “We cannot think our way down to a level where time does not apply, because no parts 
of our experience, however small or odd, lie outside time” (ibid.: 172). Quite right: no parts of our 
experience lie outside time. However the fact that our experience is temporally structured through and 
through is compatible with that structure not being fully determinate. 
252 This does not address the important idea of frame-relative dilation of experience. Here I am inclined to 
agree with Lee that Relativity reveals that durations in the stream of consciousness are not absolute as we 
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13. Conclusions 
 
At the beginning of Chapter Six, I quoted Goodman’s acute remark, “We normally take 
experience in larger chunks, and if we try to pulverize it by focusing attention on particles 
within … we usually find ourselves puzzled and uncertain” (1977: 203). Focusing 
attention on very brief particles within the stream of consciousness, considered in 
independence from the stream from which they are abstracted, can now be seen to be 
the core mistake behind a whole series of puzzles about time and experience. Struggling 
with these puzzles under the yoke of that mistake leads philosophers to make highly 
counter-intuitive claims. It leads Fara to claim either that we experience unnoticeable 
changes, perhaps even strictly continuous ones, or that we do not experience constant 
change at all. It leads Dennett, at least on one reading, to a form of anti-realism about the 
temporal structure of our experience. And it leads Kant, Reid, Prichard and others to 
deny that, strictly, speaking we perceive succession and change fullstop. 
 
We have seen now how insisting on the anhomoeomery of experience allows us to 
account for otherwise quite puzzling phenomena without abandoning any aspect of the 
natural picture of experience in time developed in Part One. Moreover, it also provides a 
positive framework within which to account for the nature of our temporal experience 
without recourse to the often baroque architectures of specious present or retention 
based theories. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
might have thought, just as the durations of events perceived are not. Temporal Transparency is not 
endangered because metrical durations are not aspects of the content of experience and so amongst its 
experiential properties (Ch.1, §1.1). 
 
 
223 
Chapter Eight: 
Seeing Movements 
 
 
Billowing clouds 
On the move 
Before my umbrella-hat
253
 
 
Though many aspects of our experience are logically connected to time, an 
overwhelmingly important aspect that humans have evolved to discriminate perceptually 
is the movement of objects in our environs. As Blake and Sekuler remark, “The 
experience of motion, in all its various forms, is so integral to daily activity that it is hard 
to imagine life without it” (2006: 317). Yet whilst motion-perception is evidently a 
fundamental aspect of our experience and in particular of our visual experience, 
philosophers and psychologists have long worried as to how it is possible. Movement 
takes place over time, hence philosophical concern over how motion perception is 
possible can certainly be an instance of the general worries about our perception of 
temporal properties discussed above. However, there seem to be relatively orthogonal 
concerns specific to understanding how visual motion perception is possible which have 
independently long exercised philosophers and psychologists.
254 It is these that this 
chapter takes up. 
 
1. Prichard’s ‘Seeing Movements’ 
 
An extremely forceful expression of philosophical concern local to movement perception 
can be found in a provocative but neglected paper of Harold Prichard’s called ‘Seeing 
Movements’.
255 There Prichard argues that we can never, strictly speaking, see bodies 
move. This conclusion may at first sight seem too preposterous to be taken seriously. 
                                                 
 
253 Kobayashi Issa (1805) D.G. Lanoue (trans.). 
254 Classic early discussions include Helmholtz 1910 and James 1890: vol. 2, 171f.. 
255 Prichard 1950b. All references to Prichard in this chapter are to this paper. 
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Nevertheless, his argument deserves our attention because responding to it forces us to 
expose a deeply rooted but misguided way of thinking about vision. I come to the 
argument shortly. However, Prichard goes on to argue for an even more radical 
conclusion on the basis of his sceptical view of motion perception. As he puts it rather 
cryptically, 
 
[F]or the same reason it cannot be true that in the process so called we really see bodies – 
for we cannot separate the ‘bodily-ness’ of what is seen from the moving of what is seen. 
(43)256
 
It is interesting briefly to explore this spreading step. In particular, how should we 
understand the inseparability claim here? The remark might be read as the claim that we 
cannot see a moving body unless we see it as moving. There seems little to recommend 
this principle. There are many illusions which involve moving bodies appearing 
stationary (and vice-versa).
257 More plausibly, Prichard is insisting that we cannot see 
bodies unless we can (or, in general, do) correctly see them as moving. Though perhaps 
more plausible, the phenomenon of akinetopsia (motion blindness) forces us to abandon 
this view.  
 
Localised brain damage can selectively disrupt and (at least in theory) outright destroy 
movement vision, a condition know as cerebral akinetopsia. Akinetopsic patients are 
extremely rare. Only a handful of definitive cases are documented.
258 In all, some very 
limited movement vision is spared. Thus, Zihl et al. (1991) describe the first patient with 
akinetopsia to be rigorously studied as follows, 
 
The patient [L.M.] had completely lost movement vision in depth, and could only 
discriminate between a stationary and a moving target in the periphery of her otherwise 
intact visual fields. In the central visual field some movement vision was spared for 
horizontally and vertically travelling targets, provided that target velocity did not exceed 
10 deg/s. She possessed neither visual movement after-effects nor apparent (phi) visual 
movement. Visually guided eye and finger movements were also impaired. In contrast, 
                                                 
 
256 Prichard is no doubt terse and cryptic here because he is already convinced of this view on the basis of 
more traditional arguments. 
257 See, for example, the optokinetic drum illusion discussed below. 
258 For a review of the relevant literature see Zeki 1991. 
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her movement perception elicited by acoustic and tactile stimuli was not impaired. 
(2235)259
 
It is now widely accepted that “movement vision represents a separate and genuine visual 
function” (ibid.). Motion processing is not localised to just one area, hence the residual 
motion vision in patients such as L.M. Nevertheless, if the basic modular hypothesis is 
right, it is reasonable to postulate pure cases of akinetopsia in which patients lose 
movement vision completely. 
 
As Pelak and Hoyt note, there are no standard psychometric tools with which to assess 
visual motion. However, in the current context, what is most interesting are the 
descriptions of the phenomenologies which accompany the condition in question. For 
example consider the following reports. 
 
[A patient reported by Pötzl and Redlich in 1911] described her perceptual experience of 
a moving target as if the visual stimulus remained stationary but appeared at different 
successive positions. (Zihl et al. 1983: 314)  
 
The visual disorder complained of by the patient [L.M.] was a loss of movement vision 
in all three dimensions. She had difficulty, for example, in pouring tea or coffee into a 
cup because the fluid appeared to be frozen, like a glacier. In addition, she could not 
stop pouring at the right time since she was unable to perceive the movement in the cup 
(or a pot) when the fluid rose. (ibid.: 315)  
 
[A former hunter] gave several examples of the difficulty he had with motion vision. For 
instance, while hunting, he was unable to see his dog move toward him or notice game 
approaching in the forest. Instead, his dog or game would appear in one location and 
then another, without any movement being seen between the two locations. … If he was 
driving a car, other cars in motion appeared to be stationary, and he occasionally 
perceived cars or objects to be moving when they were motionless. (Pelak and Hoyt 
2005: 138) 
 
The phenomenologies on record here refute the second reading of Prichard’s claim. For 
these patients, moving stimuli in general (cars, targets and liquids alike) appear stationary. 
                                                 
 
259 See also their pioneering 1983 study. 
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The objects are seen and yet their motion is not.
260 Since there is no reason not to take 
the phenomenologies at face value, we have a direct counter-example to the idea that we 
cannot in general see moving objects unless we can see them as moving. 
 
However, Prichard’s comment is strongly reminiscent of the following notorious 
contention of Locke’s.  
 
Primary qualities of bodies [viz., solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number] 
… are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be … and such as sense 
constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived; and 
the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself 
singly be perceived by our senses (1975: Bk II, Ch VIII, §9) 
 
Locke’s claim is weaker than Prichard’s, for Locke only holds that one cannot see a body 
unless one also sees it in motion or at rest. This is enough for Prichard to generalize his 
argument since he is implicitly committed to the claim that we cannot perceive 
stationarity given the grounds on which he denies that we can perceive movement.
261 
Moreover, there is greater plausibility to the Lockean claim; it is hard to imagine cases 
where one sees a body and yet fails to see it either as moving or as rest. Akinetopsia does 
not obviously provide such examples. However, there are cases. For instance, imagine 
catching a glimpse of something through the gaps in the floorboards. The light is poor 
and the gaps small such that one cannot discern what it is you see or what it is doing (if 
anything). All you can see is that there is something down there. I do not see why we 
should not say here that you see an object and yet do not see it as either in motion or at 
rest.
262 Thus, even if we felt compelled to accept Prichard’s argument concerning motion, 
                                                 
 
260 Some cases of akinetopsia do fit with what Prichard would have to say. Thus, a patient suffering from 
Alzheimer’s disease is described as follows: “when an object began to move, it would ‘disappear.’ … He 
reported difficulty watching television when people or objects were moving, and this was especially true 
while viewing sporting events. For example, football players on the television screen would seem to 
‘disappear’ as soon as they started to run. While watching television movies or other action-filled television 
shows, he frequently commented to his wife that he could not ‘see’ anything going on. But he could watch 
the news being broadcast (during which no movement or significant action occurred) without difficulty” 
(Pelak and Hoyt 2005: 139-40). 
261 In effect, there is no reason not to extend the neutrality claim (see below) to include neutrality between 
cases where both observer and object are stationary and cases where both observer and object are moving 
yet not moving relative to each other. 
262 Indeed, one might well use the same example to deny Locke’s other inseparability claims. Another case: 
imagine seeing an object on the distant horizon, too far away to determine its colour, its shape or whether 
it is moving but close enough to see that something is there. 
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we would not obviously be forced to accept any more general conclusion. I now turn to 
the argument against motion perception.  
 
2. The Argument Against Seeing Motion 
 
Prichard’s argument can be condensed as follows. 
 
(1) Seeing a body move is quite distinct from seeing that a body is moving. 
(2) Movement is absolute. 
(3) However, “two bodies moving differently or one body moving and the other at 
rest may inevitably through a given time present precisely the same appearance” 
(42). 
(4) Thus, “what we call seeing a body move cannot really be seeing a body move” 
(ibid.). 
 
Premise (1) is firmly grounded in our visual phenomenology: witness the standard 
example of the difference between seeing a second hand move round the clock, in 
contrast to seeing that the hour hand has moved.
263 More generally, it is plausible to think 
that ‘seeing that’ locutions track our epistemic standing, i.e., what we are in a position to 
know about the world in virtue of our perceptual experience. Thus, given a suitable 
epistemic context, one can, for example, see that a train is moving without seeing the 
train at all, just its smoke, or the rustling leaves, or the station monitor. 
 
Premise (2) may strike one as obviously false, however. Whatever may have been true in 
1925, few scientifically informed people these days do  think, let alone assume, that 
movement is absolute. Nevertheless, the premise can easily be amended. For, even if we 
abandon the idea of an absolute frame of reference, we can fix a frame of reference with 
respect to which we can treat motion as ‘absolute’ and distinguish one object moving 
away from another ‘stationary’ object and vice-versa. This is, in practice, how 
                                                 
 
263 See James (ibid.). Note that an inferential account of movement perception which reduces motion 
perception to judging, or being positioned to judge, that motion is occurring was historically the only game 
in town despite its obvious inadequacy. Indeed, Kellman comments that “To describe this as the prevailing 
view would be an understatement since until recent years an alternative view had scarcely been articulated” 
(1995: 351). 
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astronomers proceed in considering planetary motion. Roughly speaking, an 
approximately inertial frame is fixed with reference to the ‘fixed stars,’ whose centre is 
the centre of mass of the solar system. In our own case, an obvious choice of reference 
frame is fixed by the earth’s surface and its gravitational field. With respect to such a 
frame we can distinguish ‘absolute’ from ‘merely relative’ motion. Moreover, it is very 
plausible that we do  visually discriminate ‘absolute’ (as opposed to merely ‘relative’ 
motion) – this is exactly how things seem to us and how psychophysicists talk (e.g., 
Wertheim 1999). Indeed, this is hardly surprising: humans have evolved to discriminate 
motion in an earth-bound context, for such detection is what matters to our sublunary 
survival and prosperity. Consequently, (2) can be amended to, 
 
(2*) Movement is ‘absolute’.
264
 
So amended, the argument still goes through since premise (3) remains unaffected. 
 
The only remaining response is to deny that the same appearance is inevitably presented 
by the situations which differ only in that in (a) an object moves and I am stationary and 
in (b) the object is stationary and I move relative to it. Call the claim to be denied the 
neutrality claim. Two tasks need accomplishing: we must diagnose the attraction that the 
claim has had for Prichard and others. We must then develop a positive account which 
rejects it.
265
 
3. The Video Model of Vision 
 
It is common to think of vision as simply a way in which we are sensitive to light and of 
the visual system as a sophisticated light-sensitive mechanism. These claims can sound 
like utterly basic scientific facts. Nevertheless, they are false and appreciating this frees us 
from the trap of the neutrality claim. Vision is not a way in which we are sensitive 
                                                 
 
264 I occasionally leave off scare-quotes in what follows. 
265 Note how the same kind of argument can be given with respect to the gravitational vertical and yet it is 
clear that we see things as oriented with respect to the gravitational vertical. Clément and Eckardt produce 
some fascinating results which show, in their words, that “gravitational reference plays a significant role in 
… ‘visual’ illusions” (2005: 911). The only thing to disagree with here is the use of scare quotes which 
implicitly allows for an analogous neutrality claim concerning the ‘strictly visual’. See also Rock’s classic 
1956. 
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merely, or even typically, to light, it is a way in which we are sensitive to our surroundings. 
Visual awareness is possible because our retinas are sensitive to light. But we must not 
conflate that basic scientific fact with a false claim about the nature of vision itself. 
 
Encouraged by thinking of vision as simply as a sensitivity to light, we think of ourselves 
as equipped with something like a video camera.
266 One need not fall prey to a 
homunculus fallacy or endorse a traditional representationalism to think that an analogy 
between vision and video photography is appropriate. In particular, one can think of 
visual content as analogous to photographic content in the sense that just as the 
character of a video or photograph is purely determined by light registration on some 
sensitive film or receptor array,
267 the character of visual experience supervenes on light 
stimulation: no qualitative difference in visual experience without some difference in light 
stimulation. 
 
I now argue that underlying the intuitive pull of the neutrality claim is the video model, 
itself grounded on the idea that vision is simply a way in which we are sensitive to light. 
Consider first this passage from a recent paper of Richard Price’s where he argues that 
we should deny that objects look to the left or right of you. 
 
Call S1 the situation in which object O, against a plain white background, moves from 
your left to your right, and you keep your head still. Call S2 the situation in which O stays 
still, and you move your head from right to left. From a purely visual point of view, S1 
and S2 seem qualitatively identical. The change in look of O in S1 is identical with the 
change in look of O in S2. Of course, you may be able know whether you are in S1 or S2 
by proprioception, since proprioception may tell you whether you have moved your 
head. But if we focus on the purely visual aspects of S1 and S2 (to do this, we can imagine 
that your proprioceptive awareness has been numbed), it seems hard to deny that O’s 
change in look in S1 is identical with its change in look in S2. (2005: 369-70) 
 
The idea that we can consider the two situations from “a purely visual point of view” 
plays a crucial role in this argument. As Price readily acknowledges, it is only from this 
                                                 
 
266 Before the video-camera was part of everyday life, a simple camera obscura could equally have served as 
a model for vision. 
267 The photographer Philip Greenspun defines photography as “the recording of light rays” (see 
http://www.photo.net/learn/making-photographs/light). One might take issue with this claim. However, 
for present purposes I see no reason to demur. 
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point of view that the two situations can even be claimed to seem identical. Yet we ought 
to ask what is meant here by “a purely visual point of view” and why the two situations 
are supposedly indistinguishable from it. If one tries the experiment, the object in S1 is 
seen to move. In S2, it is seen to remain stationary. Moreover, the two situations are 
distinguished in their final state by the fact that one’s head is shunted to the side in S2 
unlike S1.
268  You  are in a different place. And one might think this underpinned a 
difference in how things seem to you visually. So we need to ask why it seems so obvious 
to Price that the situations are identical “from a purely visual point of view”. 
 
Similarly consider Prichard: 
 
‘When in the lift’, it may be said, ‘I may, according to circumstances, see the shaft going 
up or see the shaft stationary.’ Here the physical conditions so far as seeing the shaft is 
concerned are the same; what they give rise to is certain appearances, which therefore 
must be the same, and therefore the difference between ‘seeing the shaft going up’ and 
‘seeing the shaft stationary’ must solely lie in a difference of interpretation of identical 
appearances. (44)269
 
This passage reveals a picture of the physical conditions of vision appropriate to the way 
a camera records the world. There will be no difference in the recorded videos whether it 
is the lift that goes up or the camera that goes down. Watching the video, only contextual 
clues can be used to determine whether the camera was stationary or moving.
270 
Appearances, like bits of film footage, are “determined by the position [and trajectory] of 
the point [of view/camera position] relatively to the body [seen/shot]” (42). If we think 
of vision this way, it will indeed be obscure how we could genuinely see ‘absolute’ motion. 
Yet we do, and so this must be the wrong way to think about vision. How should we 
think about it? 
 
                                                 
 
268 As we shall see shortly, neck muscle feedback plays an important role in our visual awareness of motion 
and relative position. 
269 Prichard is not endorsing the conclusion (which he takes to be akin to a reductio of a certain natural, 
‘apprehension’ view of perception). He is endorsing the principle that moves us there. 
270 This fact is made use of in special effects using a camera mounted on a dolly track, hydraulic arm or 
gyroscopically balanced SteadiCam. Of course, movement relative to obvious background features must be 
avoided; as Walton notes, “With carefully arranged camera movement, a stationary horse image on a 
changing background might depict the horse in motion, or a changing background might depict it as 
stationary” (2008: 163). 
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4. The Neuropsychology of Motion Perception 
 
It has long been held “evident that perception of motion is normally visual-kinaesthetic” 
(Alexander 1914: 283).
271 However, there are various ways of understanding this claim. 
According to Alexander, on the basis of vision and our kinaesthetic sense, we can tell that 
objects are in motion. Visual experience positions us to know a disjunctive truth: either 
that the body we are seeing is moving or that we are, and then “it is the kinaesthetic 
element which tells us” which (ibid.). However, this is not an account of motion 
perception. As Prichard rightly insists, there is a great gulf between judging and perceiving.
272 
Again: we need to explain how we see things move – not just how we see that they are 
moving. 
 
Modern neuropsychology suggests another way of understanding the relation between 
proprioception and visual awareness. In particular, Wertheim (1999) proposes the 
following theory. Information from three sources combines into a “reference signal” 
which serves an evaluative function in relation to data drawn exclusively from the retinal 
image. This combined signal subserves motion perception. The three sources are as 
follows. 
 
(a)  An “efference copy signal” which carries information about oculomotor 
commands, used to determine eye velocity in relation to the head. 
(b) A “vestibular afferent signal” (the vestibular system is a combination of the 
equilibrium system and the somato-sensory kinaesthetic system) which provides 
information related to the location and movement of the head in space. 
(c)  A “visual afferent signal” which carries information directly extracted from the 
retinal image flows.  
 
Together, these inputs are used to determine ‘absolute’ eye-movement. If we assume that 
neural processing subserves perceptual consciousness by making accessible to us (i.e., 
manifest in perceptual consciousness) various features of the mind-independent 
                                                 
 
271 Though contrast H.H. Price 1932: 255. 
272 This is the central point he makes against the sense-datum theorist, insisting that “to see something is 
just not to interpret or judge something else seen as that thing” (44). 
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empirical world,
273 we can understand the processing which combines the “reference 
signal” with a purely retinal data-stream as making accessible to us the motion properties 
of objects around us. Intuitively, the information in the reference stream allows the brain 
to ‘factor-out’ self-motion and so make manifest only ‘absolute’ motion. 
 
Wertheim’s theory provides subpersonal  explanations of a range of phenomena. 
Wertheim’s central example is the optokinetic drum illusion where a subject sits inside a 
large drum painted with vertical black and white stripes. The drum is rotated at sixty 
degrees per second around the seated observer. If the lights are switched off and then 
suddenly turned on, the subject first feels stationary and sees the drum moving as it is. 
Over a period of about six seconds the drum appears to slow down and eventually 
appears stationary; concurrently the subject experiences increasing vection – a visually 
induced sense of self-motion.
274 Here the relative motion both actual and apparent is the 
same throughout the six second period. Thus, the illusion provides a clear case (if we 
needed one) of phenomenological difference despite sameness of relative motion – contra 
Prichard’s neutrality claim. Wertheim’s theory predicts this result by appeal to the nature 
of the visual afferent component in the reference stream.
275 Other components are 
required to explain (and hence are partly evidenced by) the Filehne Illusion (where during 
short periods of smooth pursuit eye movement made in the dark across a small stationary 
stimulus, the stimulus is perceived as moving in the opposite direction to the eyes), 
centre-surround induced motion and movement after-effects.
276
 
There is, importantly, also at least one case reported by Haarmeier et al. (1997) where a 
subject, RW, is reported as having suffered bilateral extrastriate cortex lesions apparently 
impairing the efference copy signal and leaving his visual world “grossly unstable unless 
the eyes are stationary” (Bruce et al. 2003: 264). Bruce et al. comment that “RW must 
also be living proof of the incorrectness of Gibson’s assertion that optic array 
                                                 
 
273 See, for example, Campbell 2002: 118-20 and Brewer 2004: 69-70. 
274 For details see Wertheim 1994. 
275 Only when a visual (i.e., retinal) pattern is large, has relatively low spatial frequency characteristics, and 
moves relatively slowly across the retinas for some extended period will stimuli generate ‘optokinetic’ 
signals. Thus, though drum rotation immediately generates a retinal signal, “vection develops only gradually, 
due to the low temporal bandpass characteristics of the gating mechanism in the optokinetic pathway. 
Therefore, a (visually induced) reference signal is not immediately present. Hence, initially the drum is 
correctly perceived as moving” (Wertheim 1994). 
276 On this last illusion, see Wertheim 1987. Of course, we are familiar with many such illusions in everyday 
life involving trains, lifts and fairground rides. 
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information alone is sufficient for active vision in the world. People [or rather their visual 
systems] really do take account of their own eye movements” (ibid.).
277
 
5. The Simple View of Motion Perception 
 
The cognitive neuroscience just sketched strongly supports the idea that kinaesthetic 
information is used in perceptual processing itself. This still leaves open the link postulated 
between proprioception and vision, for there are two ways of understanding the 
involvement of the reference signal in subserving conscious awareness of movement. 
One possibility is to insist that motion perception is an essentially cross-modal 
phenomenon. That is to say, we never visually perceive motion although we do perceive 
it. Our experience of motion is sui generis.
278
 
This approach is unattractive for three related reasons: it is obscure, unmotivated and 
phenomenologically off-key. It is obscure because nothing has been said about the nature 
of this type of sensory awareness other than that it is not analysable into visual awareness 
and kinaesthetic awareness. It is unmotivated given the availability of the simple and 
unmysterious view I sketch in the next paragraph. Finally, it is phenomenologically off-
key for, when one reflects upon one’s experience of motion, it does  seem that we 
genuinely see movement as well as feel it. One is not at all inclined to retract such claims 
and concede that strictly speaking one did not see motion but rather had some sui generis 
experience of it. Moreover, when one has done with reporting one’s visual and 
sensational experience, one has done all that needs doing in reporting what it is like to 
perceive motion. 
 
A much more attractive approach is just to say that we see movement. On this account, 
the reference stream is understood as subserving visual perception of movement. Call this 
the simple view. The view may look as if it has not discharged its explanatory burdens. 
But what needs explaining? Our experience as of a stationary object that we are moving 
relative to seems very different to our experience as of an object moving relative to us 
when we are stationary. Furthermore, we have a compelling neuropsychological account 
                                                 
 
277 For Gibson’s initially promising view see his 1966: 256. 
278 Cf. O’Callaghan 2007: Ch.11 on the audio-visual case. 
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of the mechanisms underpinning the difference. Surely the burden is on anyone who 
wishes to reject the simple account. Thus, we are brought back to the neutrality claim 
which stands in stark opposition to this simple view. 
 
Firstly, note that, in order to elucidate the idea of “a purely visual point of view,” Price 
asks us to consider how things would be if our proprioceptive awareness were numbed. 
Now, of course, on the simple account of motion perception, proprioceptive information 
is crucial to visual motion detection. Tampering with our proprioceptive system would 
interfere with our visual system. Thus, causally speaking, there is no straightforward way 
of separating out the two forms of awareness. If we ‘numb’ proprioceptive awareness, we 
remove information from Wertheim’s reference stream and this will doubtless affect how 
things seem visually. 
 
However, we could conceivably numb proprioception whilst maintaining the reference 
signal ‘down-stream’ in some way. But what reason is there now for thinking that so 
numbing proprioception would render Price’s two situations, S1 and S2, indistinguishable? 
‘Absolute’ motion is, prima facie, part of our purely visual phenomenology. The thought 
that proprioception must really be doing the work only arises because we are already 
convinced of something like the video model. 
 
Similarly, consider Prichard’s idea that the “physical conditions so far as seeing the shaft 
is concerned are the same” when you are stationary and the shaft moves, and vice-versa. 
This is simply false on Wertheim’s model, for the physical conditions so far as seeing the 
shaft are concerned include information relating to the location and movement of one’s 
body in space. Unlike a camera which does not register such information but merely 
light, subpersonal perceptual processes do make use of this information. Thus, there is 
good reason to think that such information can be employed to make manifest ‘absolute’ 
motion in such a way that my experience is not neutral in the way the video is. 
 
What can be hard to see is how this information can add anything to an already 
seemingly complete piece of, as it were, camera footage. Certainly, no further visual object 
need be present – we do not need to see the earth’s surface which partly defines our 
reference frame, for example, and nor would it help if we did. Whilst we do often see the 
relevant frame, this could only play a role in our interpretation according to the camera-
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model. Such a worry betrays a failure properly to give up the video model. We must take 
seriously the idea of vision as a way in which absolute motion can be made manifest and 
so of the idea of an absolute motion appearance. We see things as moving. There is no 
better answer to the question, ‘What is added to a motion neutral experience?’ than, 
‘Motion!’ (‘What are akinetopsics blind to?’ ‘Motion!’) 
 
We experience motion, then. We do not merely infer it. But such phenomenology – as 
Prichard rightly points out – is incompatible with thinking of vision simply as a light 
sensitive mechanism and hence with the video model of perceptual experience. Note that 
the point is not quite that information internal to the visual array is always insufficient to 
determine whether an object is moving or not. Information from the vestibular system 
and efferent ocular copy is typically relevant to what we see. However, purely visual 
information can sometimes be sufficient to determine whether an object is moving or 
not. What Prichard is misled by is the correct thought that if the information is contained 
in the visual array and is extracted through normal vision, this at most can put us in a position 
to judge that we are moving or are stationary. And judging is not seeing. That was premise 
(1). Thus, if my experience is akin to a piece of video footage, I will only be able to judge 
that it is the object moving and not me (i.e., the ‘camera’) on the basis of contextual 
information supplied by my visual experience. I have been urging that we perform a 
modus tollens and conclude that our experience is not like this. 
 
In short then, in order to resist Prichard’s radical conclusion that we do not see 
movement we need to deny the claim that visually speaking our experience is neutral 
across cases where relative motion between us and an object seems the same. This 
neutrality claim garners its support from the video model of visual appearances which 
arises when we think of the visual system as simply a light-sensitive mechanism. 
Tempting as it may be, it is a fundamental mistake to think of vision in such a way. 
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